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Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to identify and propose a few valuation strategies to provide insights to 
conservation agents and policymakers to achieve ecosystem conservation goals. The first two 
essays of the dissertation focus on how buyers and sellers value Ecosystem Services (ES) through 
the creation of an experimental market. Specifically, owners of grassland bird habitat participated 
in an auction to adopt “bird-friendly” haying practices in exchange for compensation. 
Consequently, private citizens (donors) were asked to engage in a novel pledging process, inspired 
by Lindahl pricing, to raise funds to compensate the participating landowners. The first essay 
employs a triple hurdle model to estimate the participation and contribution behavior of the donors 
simultaneously. Results indicate that while the novel solicitation approach reduces participation, 
it improves contribution from those who participate. The second essay introduces a uniform price 
auction with screening criteria, motivated by the challenges of acquiring private land to provide 
ES. We design the screening criteria to classify ES suppliers into two groups and the criteria is 
determined so that a bidder cannot influence her group assignment. Results from laboratory 
experiment show that the screening auction has the potential to be the most cost-effective (in terms  
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of the number of units acquired) way compared to a uniform price auction and a discriminatory 
auction under certain conditions. The third essay builds on the idea that natural habitat that has 
been disrupted by human activity (e.g.: drilling and placing of well pads) provides ES at a lower 
level and therefore affects human wellbeing adversely. This chapter quantifies the impact of 
drilling activities on six different land use and land cover types in North Dakota using a dynamic 
matching approach. Results show that there has been a decline in grassland area in the range of 
2.58% to 2.99% due to energy development in North Dakota. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Ecosystem Services (ES) are the direct and indirect benefits that people obtain from 
ecosystems. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) indicates that there have been 
unprecedented and mostly irreversible changes in ecosystems due to anthropogenic forces in the 
last 50 years, and their projections show that these rates will continue or accelerate in future. 
Human beings derive benefits from Ecosystem Services (ES) in multiple ways: aesthetically and 
culturally; by harvesting food, fuel, and fiber for example; via the provision of regulating services 
like climate regulation and supporting services like nutrient recycling (MEA2005). These benefits 
provide incentives for conserving ES. However, evaluation of the benefits that we receive from 
ES is difficult as these benefits are not captured in a conventional, market-based transactions.  This 
dissertation aims to identify and propose a few valuation strategies to provide insights to 
conservation agents and policymakers to achieve ecosystem conservation goals.  
The first two essays of the dissertation will focus on how buyers and sellers value ES through 
the creation of an experimental market. The first essay focuses on the demand side of the market 
and reports a large-scale field experiment. In the field experiment selected residents of Vermont 
are asked to make real monetary contributions to support local hay farmers for managing their 
fields to provide safe nesting habitats for a migratory songbird, the Bobolink. The study uses a 
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novel solicitation approach1 inspired by Lindahl Pricing (Lindahl 1919, Smith 2012), first 
proposed by Smith and Swallow (2013) and Swallow (2013). Use of a Lindahl inspired pricing 
approach, referred to an Individualized Price Auction (IPA) henceforth, allows a donor to pay an 
individual price that is no higher than the donor’s marginal benefit. This IPA framework can 
generate incentives for an individual to donate as the price reflects their personal benefit when the 
good is provided (Smith and Swallow, 2013). The first essay aims to explore the roles that different 
elements in the solicitation for contribution might or might not play in the successful generation 
of revenues to provide habitat for Bobolinks.  
The second essay focuses on the supply side of the experimental market and involves a 
laboratory experiment with student subjects to test the cost-effectiveness of three different auction 
rules: a discriminatory auction, a uniform price reverse auction and a screening auction. The same 
auction rules are then also implemented in a laboratory experiment with real landowners in Spring 
2018. In this essay, we will focus on improving the cost-effectiveness of a conservation program 
by implementing a screening criteria. Using screening criteria that are entirely, or mainly, out of 
the control of landowner-bidders in an auction, we select landowners under a modified reverse 
procurement auction to identify the minimum price a landowner would accept and still participate 
in a conservation program. The essay explores the rationale of a screening auction and aims to 
compare the outcomes of a screening auction with a discriminatory auction and a uniform price 
auction to enroll hay-fields for a bird conservation program.  
                                                          
1 This approach is a form of a business process patented by Swallow, S.K., L.C. Smith, and C.M. Anderson. 
"Revenue Raising Auction Processes for Public Goods," Patent No.: US 8,429,023 B2. Date of Patent Apr. 23, 2013. 
Patent Application 12/653,125 filed December 8, 2009 Associated with NSF grant No DEB0621014 (LTER-VCR) 
(USPTO Allowance issued 1/16/2013). 
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The third essay builds on the idea that natural habitat that has been disrupted by human activity 
(e.g.: drilling and placing of well pads) provides ES at a lower level and therefore affects human 
wellbeing adversely. This essay will assess the impact of horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing on land-use and landcover (LULC) changes in the U.S side of the Bakken region 
between 1997 and 2016. Past studies have emphasized some of the challenges in evaluating the 
impact of a treatment that is non-random. In this essay, we will use matching methods to develop 
counterfactuals for each treated parcel (parcels with wells in them) based on time-invariant 
observables that impact both the decision to place a well in a parcel and LULC change patterns. 
Followed by matching we will implement a fixed effects panel data (FEPD) estimator to estimate 
the average treatment effect on the treated parcels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
Reference: 
Lindahl, E. R. (1919). Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung. Lund: Gleerup (Translated in English 
as Just Taxation: A Positive Solution in Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, edited by Richard 
A. Musgrave and Alan T. Peacock (London: Macmillan, 1958)). 
MEA: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. 
Island Press, Washington, D.C. 
Smith E.C. 2012. Incentive Mechanisms and the Provision of Public Goods: Testing Alternative 
Frameworks to Supply Ecosystem Services. Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of the Ph.D., Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 
University of Rhode Island. 
Swallow, S. K. (2013). Demand-side value for ecosystem services and implications for innovative 
markets: Experimental perspectives on the possibility of private markets for public goods. 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 42(01), 33-56. 
Smith E.C., and Swallow S.K. 2013. Lindahl Pricing for Public Goods and Experimental Auctions 
for the Environment. In Shogren, J.F., (ed.) Encyclopedia of Energy, Natural Resource, and 
Environmental Economics, volume 3, pp. 45-51 Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Chapter 2 
Essay 1: Participation and Contribution in Bobolink 
Ecosystem Service Market: Implications of an 
Individualized Price Auction Mechanism 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter we implement a field experiment to test a novel solicitation approach, called the 
Individualized Price Auction (IPA), inspired by Lindahl pricing, to raise funds to provide 
Ecosystem Services from the working hayfields in Vermont. Using elements of experimental 
economics and charitable donation literature we create an experimental market where we match 
crowd-sourced donor contributions with landowner bids offering to provide improved nesting 
habitat of grassland birds. We model the participation and contribution behavior of the donors 
simultaneously using a triple hurdle model. We find that the use of the IPA-inspired solicitation 
reduces participation by 15.5 percentage points, however, the IPA leads to increased donation. Our 
result also shows that respondents are motivated by higher outcome success and they contribute 
0.8 – 11.6 percentage points less to achieve a lower outcome target.  
 
Keywords: IPA, field experiment, bobolinks, ecosystem services 
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2.1 Introduction 
Ecosystem services (ES) are the contributions that nature provides to human well-being, 
including both goods (e.g., food) and services (e.g., carbon sequestration). One type of service 
recognized by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) is cultural services that include 
aesthetic enjoyment that nature delivers. Agricultural land traditionally supplies food and fuel 
which are purchased through the market. However, agricultural land can also provide ES like 
wildlife habitat which may affect the aesthetic quality of rural communities. In this essay, we test 
the potential to establish an experimental market involving real monetary exchange for ES and 
analyze purchasing decisions in the ES market, wherein the farmers provide ES generated from 
their agricultural land and the public purchases those services in the market. 
One fundamental problem regarding the provision of any aesthetic ecosystem services is its 
“public good” character or non-excludability, whereby any individual can receive benefits from 
the provision of the good without paying for the cost of provision. This leads to under-provision 
of the public good as many potential beneficiaries wait for others to cover provision costs. 
Institutions and public policies could correct for weak incentives surrounding ecosystem services 
as public goods, but to date they appear to lack the ability to mainstream ecosystem services into 
market-based policies that affect the use of natural resources (Swallow, Smith, Uchida & 
Anderson, 2008; Cowling et al. 2008; Daily et al. 2009). The Bobolink Project (BP) discussed here 
attempts to capture ecosystem service values by integrating those values into decisions made in a 
market economy (Swallow, 2013; Swallow, Anderson & Uchida, 2018; Chakrabarti et al. 2018). 
We combine experimental and applied economics literature to better understand the potential for 
private provision of a public good by integrating individual values for public goods into business 
decisions. Researchers developed the Bobolink Project to bring private citizens and landowners 
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together in an experimental market approach where citizens pledge to donate money to “buy” ES 
and landowners “sell” ES produced from their lands as a new, annual farm product. On the supply 
side of the market, the primary economic issue to consider is the opportunity cost of forgoing 
agricultural uses in favor of breeding habitat for grassland birds (Phalan, Onial, Balmford, & 
Green., 2011). Consequently, we explored the possibility of linking a payment for ecosystem 
services (PES) model as a means to enable landowners to produce safe nesting habitat, the details 
of which will be discussed in chapter 3. On the demand side of the market, the primary challenge 
is to create mechanisms that can generate revenue to fund public goods by capturing at least a high 
proportion of the full (marginal) willingness to pay of a potential donor. In this essay, we focus on 
exploring different ways to solicit donations from private individuals to fund an aesthetic ES, the 
nesting habitat of grassland birds, focusing on the bobolinks as a flagship species.  
Here we report on a large-scale field experiment which used an innovative auction approach 
that was first tested in the field by Smith (2012) and Smith and Swallow (2013), the Individualized 
Price Auction (IPA) mechanism, to elicit actual monetary contributions from private citizens 
toward the provision of a public good. Between 2013 and 2015 we conducted campaigns among 
the residents of Vermont that elicited payments to support grassland nesting bird habitat, using 
both direct mail and web solicitation methods. This benefits the local residents by maintaining the 
agrarian landscape in harmony with nature, which can be considered as a cultural ecosystem 
service under the MEA (2005) definitions. In this essay, we focus on and compare the roles that 
alternative elements in the solicitation for contributions might or might not play in the successful 
generation of revenues. 
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2.2. The “Public Good” 
The ES of interest in this essay is the habitat of grassland-nesting birds, with a focus on 
Bobolinks (Dolichonyx oryivorus). Bobolinks are facing substantial population declines (Perlut et 
al. 2006; Sauer et al. 2008). They have been labeled as a species of concern by Partners in Flight, 
a collaborative of governmental and non-governmental organizations. Bobolinks are one of only a 
few species that sing while in flight, making males easy to spot above grasslands. They are also 
easily identified due to the male’s prominent yellow and black color, making Bobolinks a flagship 
species for grassland bird conservation efforts. Bobolinks establish ground nests in hay fields from 
mid-May to early June with fledging occurring in mid to late July, which coincides with the peak 
nutritional value of the hay. This nutritional value leads farmers to schedule harvests during the 
nesting season, which unfortunately exposes nests and eggs to immediate predation. Hay 
harvesting causes almost complete (99%) loss of Bobolink nests and fledglings (Bollinger et al. 
1990). Many citizens value Bobolinks due to their childhood memories of their singing, to sustain 
a well-functioning ecosystem, or as a subject for bird-watching and nature photography, with 
motives similar to those considered by Krutilla (1967). Yet this conflict with farm production sets 
up a classic example of a public good being outside market decisions and therefore, underprovided.   
Our novel market for ES compensates farmers to alter their hay management plans and delay 
harvesting to allow nesting success of grassland birds. Wildlife ecologists suggest that nesting 
bobolinks require at least 10 acres of hayfield for breeding (Vickery et al. 1994, USDA/NRCS 
2010). Thus, we established contracts for fields of at least ten acres with farmers in Vermont. To 
test various factors that affect solicitations to support this cultural ES, we asked residents of 
Addison and Chittenden counties in Vermont to support those farmers who were willing to manage 
hayfields for grassland nesting birds.    
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2.3 Application of IPA mechanism to create a market for ES 
Experimental economists have studied mechanisms to improve the provision of public goods 
(Andreoni, 1993; Groves and Ledyard, 1997), which includes analysis of factors that affect 
charitable giving (Karlan and List, 2007; Huck et al., 2015) as well as factors that focus on 
developing markets for ecosystem services (Aslam et al., 2017; Banerjee et al. 2013; Ribaudo et 
al., 2010; Swallow et al., 2018). Based on this literature earlier iterations of the Bobolink Project 
(Swallow et al., 2018) used several key components in the market mechanism to reduce free riding 
by donors which includes: the use of a provision point, the use of a money-back guarantee and the 
use a proportional rebate (Marks and Croson, 1998; Rondeau, Schulze and Poe, 1999; Spencer et 
al., 2009). In our experimental market, we connect individual donations with specific outcomes by 
encouraging donors to (a) think about how much they value different outcome levels (number of 
fields supporting bird habitat) and (b) translate that value into actual contributions for different 
outcome levels. This approach replaces earlier reliance on rebating funds collected in excess of the 
provision point. Rather our approach balances the donor contribution with the cost of delivering 
fields at the margin so that no excess funds are collected.  
This solicitation process guarantees two things to donors: (a) that the conservation agents will 
retain only that portion of their contributions that are required to contract the exact number of 
fields for which the donors have pledged and (b) that their donations are earmarked only to contract 
hayfields to provide grassland bird habitat. The earmarking assures that any excess funds will not 
be used for other worthy causes, even if those causes are consistent with other conservation goals. 
Several experimental studies show that earmarking can improve the likelihood that someone will 
contribute and the size of contributions (Eckel et al., 2017; Li et al., 2013). 
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A Lindahl inspired IPA mechanism solicits bids based on units provided. The mechanism 
requires (asks) each contributor to make decisions over the entire possible range of units available, 
to trace out their demand schedule. However, this is not particularly practical if the relevant range 
for the quantity to be provided is large. Therefore, one of our purposes is to explore some of the 
factors affecting how one can solicit a range of offers from individuals, covering a range of 
potentially relevant outcomes of market equilibrium, to establish a practical approach to implement 
the IPA framework for generating revenues for public goods.   
We follow the multi-step auction process in Swallow (2013) to set up our market for grassland 
bird habitat protection. We first identify the beneficiaries and the likely relevant range of fields 
suitable for providing good bobolink habitat by using focus groups and previous years’ experience 
of setting up a market for grassland bird habitat protection (Swallow et al. 2018). In 2013, the pilot 
year of the project in Vermont, we asked potential donors to consider a range between 1-20 fields 
of 10 acres (maximum 200 acres). This range reflected a subjective judgment of the feasibility of 
recruiting landowner-providers prior to any competitive, supply-side effort. Based on our 
experience in raising contributions in 2013 in Vermont, we chose to increase the maximum 
quantity to 100 fields in 2014 and 2015.  
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Figure 2-1: Example of IPA inspired pledge card used for 2014 field season in Vermont 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Example of standard pledge card used for 2014 field season in Vermont 
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The range of twenty fields in 2013 and one hundred fields in later years was used to 
generate three IPA scenarios, each asking potential donors to explicitly consider a different 
maximum quantity, which was set to five, ten or twenty in 2013, twenty, forty, or one hundred in 
2014 and forty, sixty or one hundred in 2015.  Each IPA scenario was divided into different field 
intervals spanning the range of fields covered. Each year individuals were asked to offer a 
contribution in each of those intervals covering their maximum, with a follow-up question 
considering a contribution for fields delivered in excess of the maximum listed (see figures 2-1 
and 2-2 for example). For example, the IPA scenario which considered providing a maximum of 
forty fields was divided into four intervals of 1 to 10 fields, 11 to 20 fields, 21 to 40 fields, and 
more than 40 fields (Figure 2-1).  
After all the contributors completed their offer schedule over the relevant intervals of fields 
presented in their solicitation, we evaluated the aggregation of offers and generated the average 
revenue (AR) curve. We then used the bids from participating landowners to develop a marginal 
cost curve. Next, we identified at what quantity the marginal cost (MC) curve crossed the average 
revenue curve to determine the uniform price paid to the farmers and price shares paid by the 
contributors.  
2.4. Treatments 
Our experimental market examined different ways to frame donation solicitations by 
introducing a novel IPA pledge solicitation approach, inspired by Lindahl’s (1919) framework, 
and modified by Swallow (2013)2. To implement the IPA-type of solicitation imposes a cognitive 
                                                          
2This pledge process is a form of a business process patented by Swallow, S.K., L.C. Smith, and C.M. Anderson. 
"Revenue Raising Auction Processes for Public Goods," Patent No.: US 8,429,023 B2. Date of Patent Apr. 23, 2013. 
Patent Application 12/653,125 filed December 8, 2009 Associated with NSF grant No DEB0621014 (LTER-VCR) 
(USPTO Allowance issued 1/16/2013). 
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burden on potential donors who, after all, generally expect a conservation solicitation to ask for a 
flat-rate donation without having to think about the explicit outcome. We, therefore, wanted to test 
how tying donor contributions with potential conservation outcome influences actual contribution 
and various ways to present the outcome information to potential donors. We achieved this 
objective by setting a target of the maximum number of available fields and the number of field-
intervals over which we solicited pledges. Our design of the IPA inspired pledge solicitation aimed 
to attain two simultaneous goals; i) to develop a mechanism that can generate the maximum 
revenue and ii) to keep the process simple and user-friendly so as not to lose participation. 
Therefore, the design of the solicitation evolved over the years. 
During the pilot year, 2013, of the Bobolink Project we implemented three IPA scenarios 
that explicitly considered delivery of a maximum of 5 fields, 10 fields and 20 fields, which we 
label as IPA_5, IPA_10, and IPA_20. Each IPA scenario consisted of either four (4-part) or five 
(5-part) intervals. In addition to the target fields and field intervals, we included the following 
elements in the solicitation process: i) a suggested contribution amount which had two levels, a 
high suggested donation (Sug_high) and a low suggested donation (Sug_Low), ii) a contribution 
style which had two levels, an option to make a per-field donation (Per_field) or a total donation 
for all the available fields (Total), and finally iii) information on farmer availability from the supply 
which also had two levels, “ten farmers” (Farmer_10) and “some farmers” (Farmer_some). 
Overall, this combination of factors created 48 treatments in the pilot year. Based on the 
participants’ responses from the pilot year (which will be discussed in section 2.7.2), we modified 
some of the treatment elements in 2014 and 2015. The treatment variables are summarized in table 
2-1 by year. 
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Table 2-1: Treatment variables by year 
 2013 pilot treatments  2014 treatments 2015 treatments 
Field3 targets 5, 10, 20 20, 40, 100 40, 60, 100 
Format  IPA IPA and Flat IPA and Flat 
IPA format 4-part, 5-part 4-part 4-part, 2-part 
Provision Point - - Yes, No 
Suggested contribution  High, low - - 
Contribution style Per-field, Total - - 
Farmer availability  10-farmers, some farmers - - 
Online calculator - - Yes, No 
Recognition  - - Yes, No 
total number of 
treatments 48 6 23 
 
 In 2014 we used three IPA scenarios consisting of 20 fields, 40 fields, and 100 fields 
respectively which we label as IPA_20, IPA_40 and IPA_100. Each IPA scenario consisted of four 
intervals. To get a comparable estimate of how IPA treatments perform against treatments with a 
standard solicitation for a flat-rate donation, we used the same maximum quantities in different 
treatments involving flat-rate donations in 2014. For example, a flat-rate donation solicitation 
comparable with an IPA scenario which explicitly asks for consideration of up to 40 fields 
provided the following information: “Last year the Bobolink Project succeeded in providing 20 
fields. We hope to provide 20 fields again this year, or do better by providing 40 fields or more”. 
Corresponding to the three IPA scenarios in 2014, we had three flat-solicitation scenarios: flat_20, 
flat_40, flat_100. Overall, we had 6 different treatments in 2014.  
In 2015, we again used three IPA scenarios that tested delivery of a maximum of 40 fields, 
60 fields and 100 fields which we label as IPA_40, IPA_60, and IPA_100. However, in 2015 we 
did not put an outcome target on the flat scenario. We wanted to test whether varying the number 
                                                          
3 One field equals 10 acres of hayfield 
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of intervals within the IPA scenario makes a difference in donor contribution. Consequently, in 
2015, each IPA scenario included either 2 intervals (2-part) or 4 intervals (4-part). In addition, we 
included several other treatments in 2015. Based on our acreage outcome in 2013 and 2014, which 
were 20 fields (200 aces) and 34 fields (340 acres) respectively, a subset of the treatments included 
a provision point of 20 fields (Ppoint) in 2015 where the donors were told that we would not enroll 
less than 20 fields. For the online donors, we included a feature in the pledging system that would 
compute the per-acre donation automatically when a donor types in her total donation amount 
(calculator). And finally, we tested the use of a recognition title (reco), which would be published 
on our website next to the name of a donor (and not the donation amount), for the donors who 
received the IPA treatment: if a donor only fills out one interval of the IPA treatment she would 
receive a title of “Bobolink Baseline Supporter” while a donor who fills out all four (or two in case 
of 2-part treatments) intervals would receive a title of “Bobolink Community Builder”. Overall, 
we ended up with 23 treatments in 2015.  
 
2.5. Implementation process 
The solicitation process involved repeated mailings to keep the study fresh in participants’ 
minds, with timing to avoid becoming an irritation.  We sent a mail package containing a cover 
letter, a pledge card which constitutes the solicitation, a marketing brochure, and a business reply 
envelope4. The pledge cards noted instructions on evaluating individual pledges based on the 
outcome, as well as the implementation of the IPA process in non-technical language. We 
maintained an online portal where anyone could pledge using our website5.  Anyone entering the 
                                                          
4 Approved under UCONN IRB protocol H12-096 
5 www.bobolink project.com. Approved under UCONN IRB protocol H12-097 
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website was randomly assigned a treatment identical to a treatment implemented through the 
direct-mail campaign.  Recipients of our direct mail were given an identification number to enter 
so that the website would present the same treatment as provided by paper mail. However, if 
someone chose to skip entering the identification number, that individual would have received a 
randomly assigned treatment; we chose to compromise the experimental controls in this manner 
to reduce inconvenience experienced by an otherwise engaged respondent. Before the mailings, 
we conducted advertising campaigns in the Burlington Free Press (both print media and digital), a 
local newspaper in Vermont and we purchased paid sponsorship on VPR (Vermont Public Radio).  
2.6. Hypotheses 
The treatments implemented in our field experiment allow evaluation of several primary 
hypotheses stated here.  In each case, variables capturing aspects of the framing of each solicitation 
could influence the evaluation of the hypothesis.   
Null hypothesis 1: Contributions are equal across IPA and flat-rate donation solicitation formats. 
Alternative hypothesis 1: Contributions are higher for the IPA solicitation.  
Our conjecture is that through the IPA solicitation a potential donor is required to think about the 
“outcome” of the conservation effort and, at the same time, the donor is guaranteed that we will 
only keep her money if we can deliver the outcome. Therefore, we expect the IPA solicitation 
would generate a higher contribution compared to a standard flat-rate format.  
Null hypothesis 2: Contributions are equal across different maximum available fields within the 
IPA scenarios.  
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Alternative hypothesis 2: Respondents’ contributions are unequal across maximum available 
fields in different IPA scenarios; more specifically contributions are higher in IPA scenarios 
presenting a higher number of maximum available fields.  (eg: contribution at IPA_100 > 
contribution at IPA_40 > contribution at IPA_20).   
As the donors are promised that we will only keep their money if we can deliver the outcome, we 
expect the donors to contribute higher if they are provided a higher target level. A higher target 
level could be linked directly to more fledglings that could potentially be protected from the fields 
which motivates the donors.   
Null hypothesis 3: Contributions are equal for web and non-web methods of donation. 
Alternative hypothesis 3: Web-donations are higher than non-web donations.  
Web-donations involve less transaction cost by reducing the time to mail the pledge cards back to 
the conservation agents. 
Null hypothesis 4: Use of auto-compute feature for web-donations has no impact on actual 
donations for the IPA scenarios. 
Alternative hypothesis 4: Use of auto-compute feature generates higher donations for IPA 
scenarios. 
The auto-compute feature also involves lower transaction cost by reducing the burden of 
calculation by a donor.  
Null hypothesis 5: Providing recognition to donors has no impact on actual donations. 
Alternative hypothesis 5: Providing recognition to donors generates higher donations. 
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2.7. Econometric model 
2.7.1. Conceptual framework 
We are interested in the average contribution of donors by each treatment, given the 
characteristics of the donors and the treatment variables. The model must account not only for 
factors leading to higher amounts of donations but also for effects on the individual’s participation 
decision and the decision of individuals in the IPA treatment to make donations (pledges) relative 
to higher quantity outcome. These solicitation structures led us to analyze the donor behavior using 
a “three-tiered” model or a triple hurdle model. Only those individuals who cross an initial hurdle 
are willing to move to the next hurdle and donate a positive amount under any treatment.  
The key to the participation-contribution model is the recognition that there are several 
simultaneous stages embedded in an individual’s decision-making process and that varied factors 
affect each stage (Figure 3).  The first hurdle is the decision made by a potential donor regarding 
whether to donate or not. This first hurdle distinguishes the participants from the non-participants 
using a probit model. In the second hurdle, conditional on participation, a potential donor decides 
to add to a baseline donation given the treatment solicitations they received. We will refer to this 
hurdle as a participation intensity hurdle. For example, suppose a donor receives a 4_part IPA 
treatment. If she only makes a donation using the first line (figure 1) and leaves the rest of the lines 
blank, then she is a “baseline” intensity donor. She could, of course, choose to add to her baseline 
donation once, twice or three times to be a higher intensity donor. This second hurdle is analyzed 
using an ordered probit model to identify factors that influence the donation intensity of 
participating donors. Finally, in the third hurdle, conditional on the donation intensity, the 
determinants of a donor’s contribution are identified using a log-normal regression. To estimate 
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all the stages simultaneously we will use a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method 
which uses the full probability distribution of all stages.  
Figure 2-3: Illustration of a three-tiered participation-donation model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.2. Multi-tiered approach 
            To derive the likelihood function, we start at the first hurdle where the households are 
identified as participants or non-participants using a probit model. Let 𝑦1
∗ denote the propensity 
for market participation and 𝑦1 denote the binary indicator of whether to participate or not, with 
𝑦1 = 1 for participants and 𝑦1 = 0 for non-participants. Then,   
𝑦1 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ > 0                                                                                                                        (2.1) 
𝑦1 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1
∗ = 0                                                                                                                        (2.2) 
If we let 𝑥1 represent the independent variables for the first stage, then, following a standard 
probit model,  
determining factors: 
Socio-demographics 
Previous mail-order 
responsiveness  
Environmental 
donation behavior   
Treatment variables 
Decision to 
participate 
Intensity of 
participation 
Final contribution 
Hurdle 1 Hurdle 2 Hurdle 3 
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Pr(𝑦1|𝑥1, 𝛾) = Φ(𝑥1𝛾)                                                                                                              (2.3) 
Pr(𝑦0|𝑥1,𝛾) = 1 −  Φ(𝑥1𝛾)                                                                                                       (2.4)  
where Pr (. ) denotes the probability operator, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function and 𝛾 is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Thus, the full distribution of 𝑦1 is: 
𝑓(𝑦1|𝑥1) = [1 − Φ(𝑥1𝛾)]
1[𝑦1
∗=0][Φ(𝑥1𝛾)]
1[𝑦1
∗=1].                                                                    (2.5) 
            At the second hurdle, participants either respond to the standard flat-rate solicitation for 
donation or the IPA solicitation. Let DF = 1 if a donor receives a standard flat-rate solicitation and 
DF = 0 if they receive an IPA treatment.  
 Now we define the intensity of contribution 𝑦2 as an ordered indicator as follows: 
𝑦2 = 0 if a donor never added to a baseline donation;  
𝑦2 = 1 if a donor added to a baseline contribution once; 
𝑦2 = 2 if a donor added to a baseline contribution twice; 
𝑦2 = 3 if a donor added to a baseline contribution thrice. 
If we let 𝑦2
∗ denote a latent variable and 𝑥2 denote the independent variables affecting the second 
stage decision of intensity of donation, then following an ordered probit model, 
𝑦2
∗ = 𝑥2𝛽 + 𝜖 where 𝜖|𝑥2  ~ 𝑁(0,1).                                                                                        (2.6) 
Let 𝛼1 < 𝛼2 < 𝛼3 be unknown threshold parameters such that, 
𝑦2 = 0 if 𝑦2
∗ < 𝛼1                                                                                                                       (2.7)  
𝑦2 = 1 if 𝛼1 <  𝑦2
∗ < 𝛼2                                                                                                            (2.8) 
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𝑦2 = 2 if 𝛼2 <  𝑦2
∗ < 𝛼3                                                                                                            (2.9) 
𝑦2 = 3 if 𝑦2
∗ > 𝛼3.                                                                                                                    (2.10) 
So we get the following probabilities: 
Pr(𝑦2 = 0|𝑥2, 𝛼, 𝛽) = Pr(Df = 1)Pr(y2 = 0|x2, β, Df = 1) + Pr(Df = 0) Pr(𝑦2 = 0| 𝑥2, 𝛼, β, Df = 0) 
                                    =  Pr(Df = 1) Φ(−𝑥2𝛽) + Pr(Df = 0)(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝛽)                                        (2.11) 
Pr(𝑦2 = 1|𝑥2, 𝛼, 𝛽) = Pr(Df = 0)[ Φ(𝛼2 − 𝑥2𝛽) − Φ(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝛽)]                                              (2.12) 
Pr(𝑦2 = 2|𝑥2, 𝛼, 𝛽) = Pr(Df = 0)[Φ(𝛼3 − 𝑥2𝛽) − Φ(𝛼2 − 𝑥2𝛽)]                                               (2.13) 
Pr(𝑦2 = 3|𝑥2, 𝛼, 𝛽) = Pr(Df = 0)[1 − Φ(𝛼3 − 𝑥2𝛽)]                                                                 (2.14) 
Therefore, the distribution of 𝑦2 is 
𝑓(𝑦2|𝑥2) = [Pr(Df = 1)Φ(−x2β)
1[Df=1] + Pr(Df = 0)Φ(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝛽)
1[𝐷𝑓=0]]
1[𝑦2=0]
[Pr(Df = 0)[Φ(𝛼2 −
𝑥2𝛽) − Φ(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝛽)]]
1[𝑦2=1][Pr(Df = 0) [Φ(𝛼3 − 𝑥2𝛽) − Φ(𝛼2 − 𝑥2𝛽)]]
1[𝑦2=2][Pr(Df = 0)[1 −
Φ(𝛼3 − 𝑥2𝛽)]]
1[𝑦2=3]
                                                                                                                    (2.15) 
            Finally, the third hurdle of the decision-making process relates to the contribution made by 
a donor conditional on the intensity of contribution. Let 𝑦 = [𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6] represent the vector of 
contributions made by donors of intensity 𝑦2 = [0 1 2 3], where the elements of 𝑦 respectively 
correspond to the elements of 𝑦2 and let 𝑥𝑑 = [𝑥3 𝑥4 𝑥5 𝑥6] be the independent variables 
associated with this final contribution stage. Then the distribution of 𝑦3, 𝑦4, 𝑦5 and  𝑦6 is as 
follows: 
Pr(y3|𝑥3, 𝛿3) = Pr(Df = 1) Pr(𝑦3|𝑥3, 𝛿3, 𝐷𝑓 = 1) + Pr(𝐷𝑓 = 0) Pr(𝑦3|𝑥3, 𝛿3, 𝐷𝑓 = 0) 
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                          = Pr(Df = 1)
𝜙[
{log(𝑦3 )−𝑥3 𝛿3 }
𝜎3
]
𝑦3 𝜎3 
+ Pr(Df = 0)
𝜙[
{log(𝑦3 )−𝑥3 𝛿3 }
𝜎3
]
𝑦3 𝜎3 
                                    (2.16) 
Pr(𝑦4|𝑥4, 𝛿4) = Pr(Df = 0)
𝜙[
{log(𝑦4 )−𝑥4 𝛿4 }
𝜎4
]
𝑦4 𝜎4 
                                                                            (2.17) 
Pr(𝑦5|𝑥5, 𝛿5) = Pr(Df = 0)
𝜙[
{log(𝑦5 )−𝑥5 𝛿5 }
𝜎5
]
𝑦5 𝜎5 
                                                                            (2.18) 
Pr(𝑦6|𝑥6, 𝛿6)  = Pr(Df = 0)
𝜙[
{log(𝑦6 )−𝑥6 𝛿6 }
𝜎6
]
𝑦6 𝜎6 
                                                                           (2.19) 
where 𝜙 is the standard normal probability density function and 𝜎 = [𝜎3 𝜎4 𝜎5 𝜎6]  is the standard 
deviation of 𝑦 = [𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6]. At this point, it should be noted here that, like the double hurdle 
models, there are no restriction regarding the elements of the independent variables 
(𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5 and 𝑥6), so they can be the same or different in each stage (Burke, 2009). Next, 
to derive our likelihood function, if we let 𝜃 = [𝛾 𝛽 𝛿 𝜎], then the joint distribution of 
𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3, 𝑦4, 𝑦5, 𝑦6 is given as:
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𝑓(𝑦1, 𝑦2, 𝑦3, 𝑦4, 𝑦5, 𝑦6|𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5, 𝑥6, 𝜃) = [1 − Φ(𝑥1𝛾)]
1[𝑦1=0] [Φ(𝑥1𝛾) {[Pr(Df = 1)
2[Φ(−𝑥2𝛽)
𝜙[
{log(𝑦3)−𝑥3𝛿3}
𝜎3
]
𝑦3𝜎3
]1[𝐷𝑓=1] + Pr(Df =
0)2[Φ(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝛽)
𝜙[
{log(𝑦3)−𝑥3𝛿3}
𝜎3
]
𝑦3𝜎3
]1[𝐷𝑓=0]]
1[𝑦2=0]
[Pr(Df = 0)
2 (Φ(𝛼2 − 𝑥2𝛽) − Φ(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝛽))
𝜙[
{log(𝑦4)−𝑥4𝛿4}
𝜎4
]
𝑦4𝜎4
]
1[𝑦2=1]
 [Pr(Df = 0)
2(Φ(𝛼3 −
𝑥2𝛽) − Φ(𝛼2 − 𝑥2𝛽))
𝜙[
{log(𝑦5)−𝑥5𝛿5}
𝜎5
]
𝑦5𝜎5
]
1[𝑦2=2]
 [Pr(Df = 0)
2(1 − Φ(𝛼3 − 𝑥2𝛽))
𝜙[
{log(𝑦6)−𝑥6𝛿6}
𝜎6
]
𝑦6𝜎6
]
1[𝑦2=3]
 }]
1[𝑦1=1]
                          (2.20) 
Therefor the log-likelihood function for a given observation 𝑖 is given by, 
ℓ𝑖(𝜃) = 1[y1i = 0] log[1 − Φ(x1iγ)] + 1[y1i = 1] [log[Φ(x1iγ)] + 1[y2i = 0] (1[Df = 1] [2 log Pr(Df = 1) + logΦ(x2β) − log(y3i) −
1
2
 log(σ3
2) −
1
2
log(2π) −
1
2
[
{log(y3i)−x3iσ3}
2
σ3
2 ]] + 1[Df = 0] [2 log Pr(Df = 0) + logΦ(α1 − x2β) − log(y3i) −
1
2
 log(σ3
2) −
1
2
log(2π) −
1
2
[
{log(y3i)−x3iσ3}
2
σ3
2 ]]) (log[Φ(α1 − x2iβ)] − log(y3i) −
1
2
 log(σ3
2) −
1
2
log(2π) −
1
2
[
{log(y3i)−x3iσ3}
2
σ3
2 ]) + [y2i = 1] (2 log Pr(Df = 0) +
log(Φ(α2 − x2iβ) − Φ(α1 − x2iβ)) − log(y4i) −
1
2
log(σ4
2) −
1
2
log(2π) −
1
2
[
{log(y4)−x4iσ4}
2
σ4
2 ]) + [y2i = 2] (2 log Pr(Df = 0) +
log(Φ(α3 − x2iβ) − Φ(α2 − x2iβ)) − log(y5i) −
1
2
log(σ5
2) −
1
2
log(2π) −
1
2
[
{log(y5)−x5iσ5}
2
σ5
2 ]) + [y2i = 3] (2 log Pr(Df = 0) +
log(1 − Φ(α3 − x2iβ)) − log(y6i) −
1
2
log(σ6
2) −
1
2
log(2π) −
1
2
[
{log(y6)−x6iσ6}
2
σ6
2 ])]                                                                (2.21) 
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            We will maximize equation 2.21. As the likelihood function is separable, the MLE of 𝛾 can 
be obtained by a probit regression of 𝑦1 on 𝑥1, the MLE of 𝛽 can be obtained from an ordered 
probit regression of 𝑦2 on 𝑥2 using the observations for whom 𝑦1 = 1, the MLE of 𝛿3 can be 
obtained by regressing 𝑦3 on 𝑥3 using only those observations where 𝑦2 = 0 , the MLE of 𝛿4 can 
be obtained by regressing 𝑦4 on 𝑥4 using only those observations where 𝑦2 = 1, the MLE of 𝛿5 can 
be obtained by regressing 𝑦5 on 𝑥5 using only those observations where 𝑦2 = 2 , and the MLE of 
𝛿6 can be obtained by regressing 𝑦6 on 𝑥6 using only those observations where 𝑦2 = 3. However, 
even if there is separability in estimation, to determine the overall effect of an explanatory variable 
we need to consider all parameter estimates simultaneously.  
Next, the results from maximizing 2.21 can be used to predict the following probabilities: 
Probability of not participating: Pr(𝑦1𝑖 = 0|𝑥) = 1 − Φ(𝑥1𝑖𝛾)                                             (2.22) 
Probability of a baseline participant: Pr(𝑦1𝑖 = 1, 𝑦2𝑖 = 0|𝑥) = Φ(x1i𝛾)[Pr(Df = 1) Φ(−x2β) +
Pr(Df = 0) Φ(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝑖𝛽)]                                                                                                          (2.23) 
Probability of a low-intensity participant:  Pr(𝑦1𝑖 = 1, 𝑦2𝑖 = 1|𝑥) = Φ(x1i𝛾) Pr(𝐷𝑓 = 0) (Φ(α2 −
x2iβ) −  Φ(𝛼1 − 𝑥2𝑖𝛽))                                                                                                              (2.24)                                                                                                                               
Probability of a medium-intensity participant:  Pr(𝑦1𝑖 = 1, 𝑦2𝑖 = 2|𝑥) = Φ(x1i𝛾) Pr(𝐷𝑓 =
0) (Φ(α3 − x2iβ) −  Φ(𝛼2 − 𝑥2𝑖𝛽))                                                                                       (2.25)                                                                             
Probability of a high-intensity participant:  Pr(𝑦1𝑖 = 1, 𝑦2𝑖 = 3|𝑥) = Φ(x1i𝛾) Pr(𝐷𝑓 = 0) (1 −
 Φ(𝛼3 − 𝑥2𝑖𝛽))                                                                                                                          (2.26) 
And finally, we can also predict the expected contributions of participants of varying intensity of 
participation as follows: 
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𝐸𝑖(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑦3𝑖|𝑥) = Pr(Df =
1)2 Φ(x1iγ)Φ(−x2iβ) exp (x3iδ3 +
σ3
2
2
) + Pr(Df = 0)
2 Φ(x1iγ)Φ(α1 − x2iβ)exp (x3iδ3 +
σ3
2
2
)   (2.27)                                                                                                          
𝐸𝑖(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡) = E(y4i|x) = Pr(Df = 0)
2 Φ(x1iγ)(Φ(α2 −
x2iβ) −  Φ(α1 − x2iβ))exp (x4iδ4 +
σ4
2
2
)                                                                                      (2.28) 
𝐸𝑖(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡) = E(y5i|x) = Pr(Df = 0)
2 Φ(x1iγ)(Φ(α3 −
x2iβ) −  Φ(α2 − x2iβ))exp (x5iδ5 +
σ5
2
2
)                                                                                      (2.29) 
𝐸𝑖(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡) = E(y6i|x) = Pr(Df = 0)
2 Φ(x1iγ)(1 −
 Φ(α3 − x2iβ))exp (x6iδ6 +
σ6
2
2
)                                                                                                 (2.30) 
2.7.3. Average partial effects 
            Since the likelihood function is non-linear, we need to compute the partial effects to find 
the impact of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable of interest. As we are interested 
in the average contribution of donors, we find the partial effects of a continuous explanatory 
variable 𝑥𝑘 on the expected contribution as follows: 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦6𝑖|𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑥𝑘𝑖
= γk Pr(Df = 0)
2 ϕ(x1iγ) (1 −  Φ(α3 − x2iβ)) exp (x6iδ6 +
σ6
2
2
)
+ βk Pr(Df = 0)
2 Φ(x1iγ)ϕ(1 − (α3 − x2iβ)) exp (x6iδ6 +
σ6
2
2
)
+ δ6k Pr(Df = 0)
2 Φ(x1iγ)(1 −  Φ(α3 − x2iβ)) exp (x6iδ6 +
σ6
2
2
) 
                                                                                                                                                  (2.31) 
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 Several points follow from 2.31. First, we can find the partial effects of 𝑦3, 𝑦4, and 𝑦5 the 
same way as we did for 𝑦6. Second, even if the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑘 is not included in every 
step, the partial effect depends on the parameters and explanatory variables of every step. And 
third, in case of binary explanatory variables, the partial effect equals the value of the expected 
contribution when the binary explanatory variable equals 1 and other covariates are kept fixed at 
their means minus the value of the expected contribution when the binary explanatory variable 
equals 0 and other covariates are kept fixed at their means (Williams, 2012).  
 
2.8. Results 
2.8.1. Summary statistics by treatment and year 
After accounting for non-deliverable addresses 4,835 and 8,611 homes received a pledge 
request from the Bobolink Project in 2013 and 2014, respectively. In 2015 only 322 homes 
received pledge requests, and these were previous donors to the project in 2013 or 2014. During 
the pilot year, 210 contributors participated. Over the years the number of contributors increased 
to 229 in 2014 and 340 in 2015. Contributions from donors ranged from $5 to $5,000. The average 
(non-zero) contributions for 2013, 2014 and 2015 were $145.66, $139 and $152, respectively. 
While it is entirely possible that some of the non-responders never opened their packages, and 
therefore, never saw the pledge cards, our model assumes that all the non-responders have a zero 
propensity to contribute for bird-habitat. Tables 2-2, 2-3 and 2-4 summarize the average 
contribution by the donors by year and by different treatment variables. In both 2014 and 2015, 
the IPA treatments generated a higher average contribution from donors compared to the standard 
solicitation approach. Also, each year setting up a higher outcome target within different IPA 
scenarios mostly led to higher contribution on average (except IPA_60 in 2015).  
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Table 2-2: Average contribution by treatment variables in 2013 
 Average  N Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
All observation  145.66 210 252.75 5 2520 
By field target*       
IPA_5 107.13 53 88.82 5 500 
IPA_10 129.58 71 161.45 20 1000 
IPA_20 130.26 84 106.10 12 500 
By field interval*      
4-part 137.48 112 153.89 20 1000 
5-part 108.56 96 73.83 5 500 
By solicitation style*      
Per-field 122.67 102 120.06 12 1000 
Total 125.66 106 128.49 5 1000 
By farmer availability*      
Farmer_10 122.83 114 118.16 5 1000 
Farmer-some 125.71 94 131.65 12 1000 
By suggested 
contribution* 
     
Sug_high 140.97 101 133.14 12 1000 
Sug_low 108.24 107 113.34 5 1000 
* After removing two contributions of $2250 and $2520 as outliers above $1000.  
Table 2-3: Average contribution by treatment variables in 2014 
 Average  N Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
All observation 139.54 229 338.28 10 5000 
By solicitation format*      
IPA 136.29 105 114.38 10 500 
Flat  102.80 123 87.73 10 500 
By field target*       
IPA_20 133.75 32 112.17 20 500 
IPA_40 136.43 35 121.47 10 500 
IPA_100 138.29 38 112.53 25 500 
Flat_20 81.30 46 58.82 20 300 
Flat_40 125.83 36 123.61 10 500 
Flat_100 106.71 41 72.01 10 300 
* After removing the sole $5,000 donor as an outlier, since the next highest contribution was $500. 
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Table 2-4: Average contribution by treatment variables in 2015 
 Average  N Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
All observation  151.57 340 313.16 10 5000 
By solicitation format*       
Flat  99 60 87.11 15 500 
IPA_40 138.75 48 148.25 10 800 
IPA_60 129.39 115 119.05 10 500 
IPA_100 148.30 115 162.07 10 1000 
By provision point*      
Yes 132.72 230 136.82 10 1000 
No 129.72 108 133.34 10 800 
By field interval*      
1-part (flat) 99 60 87.11 15 500 
2-part 122.66 92 137.21 10 1000 
4-part 146.83 186 145.46 10 1000 
By recognition*      
Yes 134.13 86 109.41 10 500 
No  130.95 252 143.54 10 1000 
By online calculator*      
Yes  142.78 169 137.20 10 1000 
No  132.71 109 151.97 10 1000 
* After removing two contributions of $2000 and $5000 as outliers above $1000 
 
2.8.2. Results from the pilot year 
2.8.2.1. Triple hurdle model 
Triple hurdle model estimation results from the pilot year are presented in table 2-5. All 
estimation is done using STATA 15. Column (i) shows the estimates from the first stage or, the 
participation stage of the model. The participation equation is important as it helps identify 
potential contributors and what aspects of the treatments are more likely to lead people to respond 
to such fundraising efforts. We model the participation behavior using the treatment variables for 
the pilot year (table 2-1) and the demographic variables. The treatment variables include dummy 
indicators for different field targets for the IPA scenarios: IPA_10 and IPA_20, while IPA_5 is 
used as the baseline. Other treatment variables include information on farmer availability 
(farmer_10 = 1 if the donors were told 10 farmers were available), contribution style (per-field = 
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1 if the donors were asked to provide a per-field donation), a suggested donation amount (sug_high 
= 1 if the donors were provided a high suggested donation amount) and the number of field 
intervals used in the solicitation (5-part = 1 if the donors were provided a 5-part solicitation). The 
demographic variables include a dummy variable for gender (=1 if female), age (=1 if aged below 
65 years), past environmental donor (=1 if donated to environmental causes before) and marital 
status (=1 if married). Various income categories included dummy variables for households with 
annual income below $150,000 (inc_cat_1), and income between $150,000 and $199,999 
(inc_cat_2), with annual income above $200,000 being the baseline category.   
 
Table 2-5: Triple hurdle model estimates of participation and contribution in the Bobolink 
market in the pilot year 2013 
 Stage 1: Stage 2: Stage 3: 
 
Participation 
Intensity of 
participation 
Contribution  
 
  Baseline 
donor 
Low 
intensity 
donor 
Medium 
intensity 
donor 
High 
intensity 
donor 
 
      
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
IPA_10 0.145*   -0.521**  0.096    1.439**  1.091*** 0.757**  
 (0.08)    (0.23)    (0.19)    (0.61)    (0.13)    (0.37)    
 [0.070]    [0.024]   [0.618]    [0.019]    [0.000]    [0.040]    
IPA_20 0.212*** -0.671*** 0.145    1.354*** 0.836*** 0.654*   
 (0.08)    (0.21)    (0.18)    (0.28)    (0.21)    (0.39)    
 [0.007]    [0.001]    [0.433]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.092]    
5-part -0.074    -0.052    -0.186    0.110    -0.365**  -0.655*   
 (0.06)    (0.18)    (0.15)    (0.23)    (0.18)    (0.35)    
 [0.242]    [0.768]    [0.200]    [0.635]    [0.045]    [0.063]    
Below65 -0.002    -0.209    -0.379    1.308*** 1.614*** 0.082    
 (0.05)    (0.36)    (0.29)    (0.32)    (0.33)    (0.20)    
 [0.973]    [0.562]   [0.197]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.682]    
Female 0.093    -0.544        
 (0.07)    (0.44)        
 [0.188]    [0.216]        
continued 
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Stage 1: Stage 2: Stage 3:  
Participation Intensity of 
participation 
Contribution 
   
Baseline 
donor 
Low 
intensity 
donor 
Medium 
intensity 
donor 
High 
intensity 
donor        
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Inc_cat_1 -0.025    -0.264    -0.493*   -0.118    3.630*** 0.575     
(0.05)    (0.43)    (0.28)    (0.40)    (0.79)    (0.36)     
[0.654]    [0.539]    [0.083]    [0.770]    [0.000]    [0.106]    
Inc_cat_2 0.015    0.241    -0.443    -1.317*** 2.303*** 0.062     
(0.06)    (0.42)    (0.36)    (0.43)    (0.70)    (0.41)     
[0.807]    [0.563]    [0.218]    [0.002]    [0.001]    [0.880]    
Married 0.042    -0.920*   0.074    -0.567    0.398**  0.039     
(0.07)    (0.51)    (0.40)    (0.49)    (0.17)    (0.30)     
[0.544]    [0.072]    [0.853]    [0.248]    [0.019]    [0.896]    
Envdonor 0.103**  
     
 
(0.05)    
     
 
[0.048]    
     
Farmer_10 0.096    -0.045    0.114    0.459    0.336*   0.100     
(0.06)    (0.18)    (0.16)    (0.30)    (0.19)    (0.36)     
[0.127]    [0.805]    [0.466]    [0.126]    [0.081]    [0.781]    
Per-field -0.019    0.067    -0.062    0.345    0.096    0.382     
(0.06)    (0.17)    (0.15)    (0.34)    (0.14)    (0.28)     
[0.764]    [0.695]    [0.671]    [0.317]    [0.491]    [0.168]    
Sughigh -0.025    0.047    0.196    0.525*** 0.786*** 0.666***  
(0.06)    (0.18)    (0.15)    (0.20)    (0.21)    (0.24)     
[0.694]    [0.798]    [0.189]    [0.008]    [0.000]    [0.005]    
Constant -1.918*** 
 
3.154*** 3.474*** -0.247    4.274***  
(0.13)    
 
(0.45)    (0.92)    (1.61)    (0.49)     
[0.000]    
 
[0.000]    [0.000]    [0.878]    [0.000]    
 
 
 
-1.624**  
    
 
(0.63)    
    
  
[0.010]    
    
 
 
 
-1.200*   
    
 
(0.63)    
    
  
[0.056]    
    
 
 
 
-0.809    
    
 
(0.64)    
    
  
[0.206]    
    
N 4974 210 149 26 16 19 
Standard errors in parentheses, p-values in square brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Our results indicate that none of the treatment variables are significant in determining 
participation, except for the field target levels. Compared to the baseline target of five fields, a 
higher target of 10 and 20 fields significantly increases participation. Based on this observation 
we decided to modify our solicitation in 2014 and 2015 with a higher target. Being a previous 
donor to environmental causes also leads to higher participation in the Bobolink market.  
Conditional on participation, in the second stage of the model, participants decide the 
intensity of participation in terms of how many times they add to a baseline donation, given the 
treatment they received. Column (ii) reports the coefficient estimates for predicting the probability 
of being a donor at various intensity level using an ordered probit model. In the second stage, a 
positive coefficient implies that as explanatory variables increase, observations are more likely to 
be in the higher intensity category i.e., more likely to be a low-intensity donor than a baseline 
donor, more likely to be a medium-intensity donor than a low-intensity donor and more likely to 
be a high-intensity donor than a medium-intensity donor. Results indicate that presenting a higher 
field target leads a potential donor to a lower intensity donor category. Also, being married leads 
a donor into a lower intensity category.  
Columns (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) present the coefficient estimates from stage 3, the 
contribution stage. In all columns of stage 3, the dependent variable is the log of contribution. 
Results indicate that for a baseline donor, none of the treatment variables are significant in 
determining contribution, except for inc_cat_1, which is negative and significant implying that a 
lower income category reduces contribution compared to the baseline income of $200,000. For the 
low, medium and high intensity donors, a higher field target increased average contribution, which 
is consistent with our second hypothesis. Among the treatment variables, use of a 5-part 
solicitation reduced contribution for the medium and high intensity donors, which could be an 
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indication of respondent fatigue. This observation led us to modify our solicitation efforts for 2014 
and 2015 by reducing the number of field intervals to two and four. A higher suggested 
contribution led to higher donation for the low, medium and high intensity donors. This 
observation led us to modify our efforts in 2014 and 2015 by keeping the suggested donation at a 
high level for all the potential donors, and not use it as a treatment variable.  
2.7.2.2. Average Partial effects 
The coefficients estimated in table 2-5 are not partial effects as the likelihood function is 
nonlinear, so we can only analyze the direction and statistical significance of the explanatory 
variables.  In this section, we present the partial effects of the treatment variables on the donor 
contribution of various intensity (table 2-6). None of the treatment variables are significant for the 
baseline donors. For the low intensity donors, use of an IPA solicitation that provided a maximum 
of 10 fields increased the contribution by 9.5 percentage points, while an IPA solicitation that 
provided a maximum of 20 fields increased the contribution by 7 points compared to the 
solicitation that provided a maximum of 5 fields. For medium and high intensity donors, the 
increment is higher: IPA_10 leading to an increase of 16 and 25.5 percentage points and IPA_20 
to 10 and 21.8 percentage points to the donation compared to IPA_5. This observation implies that 
as the intensity of contribution increases, the magnitude of contribution is also increasing. For the 
medium intensity donors, a 5-part solicitation increased contribution 56.1 percentage points, 
however, for high intensity donors a 5-part solicitation eventually decreased contribution by 32.7 
percentage points.  For low, medium and high intensity donors, a higher suggested donation 
amount led to an increase in the contribution by 26.3, 39.4 and 33.3 percentage points, respectively.   
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Table 2-6: Average partial effects (APE) on expected contribution (pilot year) 
  
APE for baseline 
donor 
APE Low intensity 
donor 
APE for Medium 
intensity donor 
APE for High 
intensity donor 
IPA_10 0.032 (0.064) 0.095*** (0.127) 0.159** (0.044) 0.255** (0.124) 
IPA_20 0.048 (0.061) 0.074*** (0.087) 0.100*** (0.069) 0.218* (0.129) 
5-part -0.092 (0.072) 0.235 (0.398) 0.561** (0.091) -0.327* (0.176) 
Farmer_10  0.057 (0.078) 0.231 (0.151) 0.169* (0.097) 0.051 (0.182) 
Perfield  -0.031 (0.072) 0.173 (0.172) 0.048 (0.070) 0.191 (0.138) 
Sug_high 0.097 (0.074) 0.263*** (0.099) 0.394*** (0.105) 0.333*** (0.119) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
2.8.3. Results from 2014 and 2015 
To analyze the data from 2014 - 2015 using our tiered approach, we only included the 
treatment variables that were common for both years and included a year-dummy in the regression 
analysis. Paired t-tests of the rest of the treatment variables (that are not common to both years) 
are presented in table 2-7. A paired t-test reveals that inclusion of a provision point led to a higher, 
but not statistically significant, donation on average. A paired t-test shows that those who received 
treatment with a recognition title donated a higher amount on average compared to those that did 
not receive a recognition title, however, the difference was not statistically significant. Among 
those that received treatment with a recognition title, “Bobolink Community Builder” generated a 
significantly higher contribution on average compared to “Bobolink Baseline Supporter”. 
Providing a calculator for online donors increased average contribution, but the difference was not 
statistically significant. 
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Table 2-7: paired t-test of average donation 
Year 2015 
 Average donation (N) 
By provision point   
Yes 132.72 (230) 
No 129.72 (108) 
t-stat -0.19  
Pr(T>t) 0.57  
By recognition    
Yes  134.13 (86) 
No  130.95 (252) 
t-stat 0.21  
Pr(T > t) 0.41  
By recognition level    
Bobolink Baseline Supporter 105.11 (46) 
Bobolink Community Builder 167.5 (40) 
t-stat 2.73  
Pr(T > t) 0.003  
By calculator   
Yes 142.78 (169) 
No 132.71 (109) 
t-stat -0.56  
Pr(T > t) 0.71  
 
2.8.3.1. Triple hurdle model 
Triple hurdle model estimation results from 2014-2015 are presented in table 2-8. Column 
(i) reports the coefficient estimates from the participation stage of the model. We model the 
participation behavior using the treatment variables and demographic variables. The treatment 
variables include dummy indicators for different target numbers of fields for the IPA scenarios: 
IPA_20, IPA_40, IPA_60, and IPA_100. These IPA scenarios are compared against the baseline 
of a standard solicitation treatment (flat). The demographic variables included dummy variables 
for gender (=1 if female), marital status (=1 if married), responsiveness to mail orders in last six 
months (prev_mail = 1 if yes), past environmental donors (env_donor=1 if yes). The demographics 
also included various age categories: between 40 and 65 years of age (age_40_65) and above 65 
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years of age (age_above_65), with below 40 years being the baseline category. Various income 
categories included dummy variables for household with annual income below $100,000 
(inc_cat_I), income between $100,000 and $149,999 (inc_cat_II), and income between $150,000 
and $199,999 (inc_cat_III), with annual income above $200,000 being the baseline category.  
Our results indicate that the use of a standard solicitation (flat) increased participation. 
Among the IPA treatments, the use of IPA_20 decreased participation and use of IPA_60 increased 
participation, while IPA_40 had no significant impact on participation compared to the baseline of 
IPA_100. Results also show that married people are less likely to respond. Participants with 
previous experience with responding to mail orders (within last six months) and donating to 
environmental causes (within last six months) are more likely to respond to our marketing 
campaign. Female donors are more likely to respond. 
Conditional on participation, in the second stage of the model, participants decide the 
intensity of participation in terms of how many times they add to a baseline donation, given the 
treatment they received. Column (ii) presents coefficient estimates for predicting the probability 
of being donors with varying intensities, conditional on being a participant using an ordered probit 
regression. In the second stage, positive coefficient estimates imply that as explanatory variables 
increase, observations are more likely to be in the higher intensity category. Presenting a higher 
target number of fields increases the chances that move a potential donor into a higher intensity 
category compared to IPA_20. The coefficient for married is negative and significant, implying 
that being married leads a donor into a lower intensity category. Previous experience with being 
an environmental donor and responding to mail orders leads a donor into a higher intensity 
category. 
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In table 2-8, columns (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) report the coefficient estimates for predicting 
the contributions of donors of varying intensity of participation (stage 3). In all columns of stage 
3, the dependent variable is the log of contribution. The robust standard errors are in parentheses 
below each estimate. Results indicate that, for a baseline donor, use of a standard solicitation 
format significantly reduces contribution relative to the treatment IPA_100. Demographically, 
older people tend to donate more when they are baseline and low intensity donors, however, 
younger people donate more when they are high-intensity donors. Participants who donated to 
environmental causes previously tend to donate more when they are medium intensity donors, 
however, they donate less when they decided to be baseline donors. 
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Table 2-8: Triple hurdle model estimates of participation and contribution in the Bobolink 
market  
  Stage 1: Stage 2: Stage 3: 
 Participation 
Intensity of 
participation 
Contribution  
     Baseline donor 
Low 
intensity 
donor 
Medium 
intensity 
donor 
High 
intensity 
donor 
 
      
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Flat  1.3555*** -0.3137*      
 (0.1809)     (0.1835)       
IPA_20 -0.3256*** -0.1882    -0.7755    0.9750    1.3006*** 
 (0.1250)     (0.1901)    (0.5522)    (0.8565)    (0.4207)    
IPA_40 -0.0377    0.4854*** -0.2050    0.1362    -0.2310    -0.3931    
 (0.1032)    (0.1881)    (0.1412)    (0.2383)    (0.8422)    (0.3714)    
IPA_60 0.4478*** 0.6865*** -0.1310    0.0382    -1.3545*** -0.4252**  
 (0.1662)    (0.2001)    (0.1458)    (0.1992)    (0.3594)    (0.1929)    
IPA_100  0.4375**      
  (0.1774)        
Age_40_65 -0.3481*** 0.0341    0.3702**  0.6042**  -38.0084    -1.8368*** 
 (0.1089)    (0.2096)    (0.1850)    (0.2347)    (30.2071)    (0.2726)    
Age_above_65 -0.1635    0.0078    0.4228**  0.7914*** -36.5472    -1.7642*** 
 (0.1127)    (0.2140)    (0.1841)    (0.2376)    (30.1493)    (0.2592)    
Female  0.2018**  0.0783        
 (0.0905)    (0.1158)        
inc_cat_I 0.0499    0.0895    -0.3286**  -0.6124*** -0.8655*** -0.7390*** 
 (0.1059)    (0.1483)    (0.1326)    (0.2027)    (0.2052)    (0.2801)    
inc_cat_II -0.0293    0.0920    0.1218    -0.3116    0.3918    -0.3667    
 (0.0998)    (0.1602)    (0.1347)    (0.2419)    (0.3939)    (0.3908)    
inc_cat_III -0.0242    0.1957    0.2518    0.3218    2.7537*** -2.4334*** 
 (0.1117)    (0.1794)    (0.1695)    (0.2764)    (0.9223)    (0.3212)    
Married  -0.3261*** -0.3851*** -0.0654    -0.0763    0.1544    -0.1104    
 (0.1020)    (0.1207)    (0.1174)    (0.1947)    (0.7604)    (0.1971)    
line_4 1.4717*** 0.5768*** -0.1578       
 (0.1726)    (0.1277)    (0.1729)       
env_donor 2.5721*** 1.5833*** -0.2494*   -0.3108    1.5715*   0.6264    
 (0.1480)    (0.1657)    (0.1428)    (0.2415)    (0.9313)    (0.4427)    
prev_mail 1.7260*** 1.0679*** -0.0876    0.1208    2.0750**  -0.9425*** 
 (0.0724)    (0.1201)    (0.1148)    (0.2434)    (0.8125)    (0.3040)    
data_2015 1.9961*** -0.0892     -0.1512    -1.7376**  -0.2989    
 (0.2480)    (0.1613)     (0.1779)    (0.8186)    (0.2432)    
 
Continued 
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Stage 1: Stage 2: Stage 3:  
Participation Intensity of 
participation 
Contribution 
 
    Baseline 
donor 
Low 
intensity 
donor 
Medium 
intensity 
donor 
High 
intensity 
donor        
 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Constant -3.3515*** 4.6981*** 4.4838*** 39.9545    8.1140***  
(0.2302)    
 
(0.3033)    (0.3611)    (28.5923)    (0.5370)           
 
 
 
3.6500*** 
   
 
(0.2694)    
    
 
 
 
4.3851*** 
   
 
(0.2759)    
    
 
 
 
4.6435*** 
   
 
(0.2825)    
    
N 8934 569 431 90 31 17 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
2.8.3.2. Average partial effects 
In this section, we present the average partial effects of the treatment variables from 2014 
and 2015 on the donor contribution at different levels of contribution intensity (table 2-9). For the 
baseline donors, use of a standard solicitation reduced average contribution by 15.5 percentage 
points and use of an IPA_40 solicitation reduced average contribution by 3.8 percentage points. 
For the low intensity donors, the use of IPA_20 reduced contribution by 11.6 percentage points. 
For both medium and high intensity donors, IPA_60 reduced contribution, by 2.5 and 0.8 
percentage points respectively. For high intensity donors, IPA_20 led to a higher contribution. 
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Table 2-9: Average partial effects (APE) for 2014 – 2015 
 
Baseline 
donor 
Low 
intensity 
donor 
Medium 
intensity 
donor 
High 
intensity 
donor 
Flat  -.156* - - - 
 (.086)    
IPA_20 -.034 -.116* .126 .188*** 
 (.029) (.089) (.148) (.065) 
IPA_40 -.038* .021 -.062 -.073 
 (.023) (.043) (.158) (.062) 
IPA_60 -.002 .0002 -.025* -.008** 
 (.002) (.004) (.007) (.003) 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
2.9. Double hurdle model comparison  
 Our goal in this paper is to analyze the donor behavior in an experimental market for 
Bobolink habitat. We implemented an IPA-inspired solicitation approach to generate revenue. This 
IPA approach calls for a multiple level solicitation strategy that links successive donations (or 
pledges) to the ability of a fundraiser to support higher levels of outcome for the quantity of a local 
public good. This solicitation strategy based on outcome success is different from a standard 
approach where an individual donor makes a flat donation irrespective of the outcome. Our multi-
tiered approach in the preceding sections incorporates donation intensity as a separate hurdle and 
the approach models donors with varying donation-intensity separately. In this section, we model 
the donor behavior using a simpler, double hurdle model, and we assume that the donors have the 
same intensity of donation. In this model, the first hurdle is the same as the previous model; the 
decision to participate or not. When a potential donor crosses this hurdle, she chooses a level of 
donation in the second hurdle. The hurdles are modeled jointly (by FIML) using a probit regression 
and a log-linear regression respectively.  
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 The results from a double hurdle model indicate that use of a standard solicitation 
increased participation. On the other hand, the use of IPA_20 decreased participation and IPA_60 
increased participation compared to IPA_100. This observation is similar to the triple-hurdle 
model. none of the treatment variables have any impact on the participation decision. While a 
standard solicitation had a positive influence on participation, it reduced the actual contribution 
from donors. In terms of the demographics, younger donors are more likely to participate. 
However, older participants are more likely to donate more. Again, this observation is similar to 
the triple-hurdle model for the baseline and low-intensity participants. But, the triple-hurdle model 
is more informative as it can provide us a different donor profile for various-intensity donors, 
where we observe that the high-intensity donors are more likely to be younger people. Lower 
income category and married people are less likely to respond while people with previous 
experience with mail order purchases and environmental donation are more likely to respond. The 
participation estimates are similar for the double hurdle and the triple hurdle model.  
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Table 2-10: Double hurdle model estimates of participation and contribution in the 
Bobolink market 
                  
 Replied  Ln(contribution) 
Flat   1.2672*** -0.2903**  
 (0.1806)    (0.1347)    
IPA_20 -0.2113*   -0.1910    
 (0.1183)    (0.1741)    
IPA_40 -0.0378    -0.1356    
 (0.1012)    (0.1172)    
IPA_60 0.4564*** -0.0962    
 (0.1748)    (0.1083)    
Line_4 -1.3946*** 0.0143    
 (0.1670)    (0.1162)    
Age_40_65 -0.3297*** 0.3932*** 
 (0.1096)    (0.1314)    
Age_above_65 -0.1586    0.3995*** 
 (0.1129)    (0.1340)    
Female  0.2203**  -0.0677    
 (0.0902)    (0.0823)    
inc_cat_I 0.0489*    -0.3314*** 
 (0.1014)    (0.1017)    
inc_cat_II -0.0163*    0.1227    
 (0.0961)    (0.1072)    
inc_cat_III -0.0234    0.2241*   
 (0.1086)    (0.1351)    
Married  -0.3198*** -0.0998    
 (0.1008)    (0.0836)    
data_2015 2.6075*** -0.1297    
 (0.1385)    (0.1176)    
env_donor 1.7337*** 0.0153    
 (0.0705)    (0.1139)    
prev_mail 1.9722*** -0.0892    
 (0.2407)    (0.0845)    
Constant  -3.3013*** 4.6269*** 
 (0.2324)    (0.2612)    
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.  
2.9. Conclusion 
Marketing ecosystem services to private individuals is challenging. This paper draws 
insight from lab experiments on public good provision and implements it in the field using different 
solicitation mechanisms. The main challenge is to develop mechanisms so that entrepreneurs can 
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motivate consumer contributions to ultimately develop the potential for market approaches which 
will lead to valuable impacts for ecosystem services. The private action through the experimental 
market can complement or improve upon the philanthropic actions that are already being taken to 
provide ecosystem services. 
Our result from the hurdle model shows that the participants of our ES market in Vermont 
supported the overall concept of the project, but they were reluctant to incur the mental/ time cost 
of understanding the Lindahl mechanism, the IPA, which is unfamiliar to them as opposed to a 
standard flat-rate donation approach used by the fundraising organizations. Use of the IPA 
solicitation approach reduced participation but led to a higher contribution on average from the 
donors who did use the IPA format. Our result also indicates that participants are motivated by 
higher outcome targets and they contribute more to achieve a higher outcome. Therefore, even if 
a Lindahl mechanism enables fundraisers to capture consumer benefits by incentivizing 
contributors to name a price based on their own valuation of the good, it reduces participation 
because of the complexity of the mechanism. So, for fundraisers, the main challenge that remains 
is to design mechanisms to capture the full willingness to pay of the contributors but at the same 
time make it simple enough so as not to lose revenue from less participation. 
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Chapter 3 
Essay 2: The Effectiveness of Screening Criteria in 
Reverse Auctions to provide Ecosystem Services: Lab 
Experiment Evidence 
 
Abstract 
We introduce a uniform price auction with screening criteria, motivated by the challenges of 
acquiring private land to provide ecosystem services. We design the screening criteria to classify 
ecosystem service suppliers (bidders) into two groups and the criteria are determined so that a 
bidder cannot influence her group assignment. The outcomes of the screening auction are 
compared with a conventional discriminatory auction and uniform price auction under two 
different budget scenarios and, using two different subject pools.  Results from a laboratory 
experiment show that the offers generated under a screening auction and a uniform price auction 
are significantly lower than the offers generated under a discriminatory auction with both a low 
and a high budget scenario for both subject pools. The uniform price auction performed better than 
the discriminatory auction while the screening auction performed no worse than the discriminatory 
auction in terms of the number of units acquired. Under an alternative unit computation scenario 
for discrete units, the screening auction is the most cost effective compared to the other two 
auctions. We also analyze and compare the efficiency of the three auction rules. 
 
Keywords: Uniform price auction, screening auction, induced value experiment 
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3.1. Introduction 
When designing market mechanisms to implement payments for ecosystem services (PES), 
conservation agents often face the problem of asymmetric information (e.g., adverse selection and 
moral hazard). This problem can weaken the effectiveness of the proposed PES scheme. When 
landowners have better information than the conservation agent regarding the opportunity cost of 
providing ecosystem services (ES), landowners may exploit this advantage to gain information-
rent through a conservation auction that fails to create incentives for landowners to reveal their 
reservation price truthfully. To mitigate the asymmetric information problem and reduce the 
associated information rent, conservation agents can gather more information on the landowners, 
offer screening contracts based on landowner characteristics, or use procurement auctions that 
provide incentives to landowners to reveal their opportunity costs as their reservation prices 
(Ferraro, 2008). In this chapter, we design and implement a new reverse auction mechanism that 
potentially incorporates landowners’ observable characteristics to encourage the provision of ES 
more cost-effectively.   
This study builds on an existing, market-based conservation program called the Bobolink 
Project (BP), discussed in chapter 2 (Swallow et al. 2018, Chakrabarti et al. 2018). The BP created 
an experimental market through which researchers negotiated contracts with the local landowners 
who agreed to postpone hay harvesting during the nesting season of grassland birds in the 
Champlain Valley region in Vermont. These landowner contracts were funded through crowd-
sourced donations. The BP used a uniform-price reverse procurement auction to obtain 
landowners’ bids to enroll 10-acre hay fields in bird-friendly management. Winning bidders were 
all paid the same price, and the winning price was determined by the lowest rejected offer price.  
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In 2013, which was the first year of the BP’s experimental market in Vermont, the BP 
received bids from eight interested landowners offering a total of 200 acres, and their bids ranged 
from $30/acre to $150/acre. The experimental market raised enough in consumer donations to 
enroll all 200 acres of hayfield that was offered and paid $160/acre to all the participating 
landowners in 2013. In subsequent years, as visibility increased, the BP received offers from more 
landowners leading to more competition among participants. In 2014, the BP enrolled 340 acres 
of hayfields in total and paid $96.16/acre to the winning bidders, and in 2015 it enrolled 549 acres 
and paid $90.63/acre. For these years, landowners’ offers ranged from $25 to $200. In 2014 and 
2015 the BP was unable to enroll an additional 694 acres and 251 acres, respectively, that were 
offered by landowners, but for which the BP lacked sufficient donations from the consumer side 
to cover higher payment under a uniform price auction.  
Informal feedback from the public, and from conservation practitioners, has raised the 
question of whether paying a uniform price in the procurement auction wastes funds by paying a 
substantial premium to landowners who are willing to accept a low amount per acre relative to the 
offered bid of the marginal farm owner. Paying a uniform price provides landowners the incentive 
to reveal their opportunity costs truthfully, in theory, but it potentially decreases the acres enrolled 
by paying a substantial premium to landowners who are willing to accept a low amount per acre. 
Moreover, other than confirming habitat suitability, the BP did not use any specific screening 
criteria to select the landowners to participate in the program. 
In this chapter, we implement screening criteria that are entirely, or mainly, out of the 
control of landowner-bidders in an auction. The auction acquires units under a modified reverse 
procurement auction to solicit the minimum price a landowner would accept to improve the cost-
effectiveness of the program. The BP could use these screening criteria to put landowners in 
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categories with similar opportunity costs for their acres and then have landowners in each category 
bid in a modified uniform price reverse auction to identify who will be accepted, from each 
category. We do not elaborate on the design of the screening criteria per se, but focus on the design 
of the reverse auction with the screening criteria and compare the results of the screening auction 
with the more familiar discriminatory auction and uniform price auction.  
3.2. Literature review 
An auction is a common method, which involves competitive bidding to obtain goods and 
services for which there is no established market, to reduce strategic behavior by the participating 
landowners. In conservation auctions, participating landowners make bids which reflect a trade-
off between their expected payoff and the probability of getting accepted. A higher bid increases 
the expected payoff but might reduce the probability of acceptance. Therefore, the use of 
competitive bidding can encourage offers closer to a landowner’s (ES provider’s) true opportunity 
cost and, in the process, reduces the information rent.  
Auctions are increasingly being used for environmental conservation to purchase ES 
(Stoneham et al. 2003, Cummings et al. 2004, Horowitz et al. 2009).  Prior research has shown 
that auctions are an efficient way of revealing (imperfectly) a landowner’s real opportunity cost of 
participation. In their seminal work, Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) show that 
auctions can achieve broader program goals for a given budget compared to a flat-rate offer system 
by reducing the “windfalls” that a landowner receives by enrolling land with a lower-than-average 
opportunity cost. Horowitz et al. (2009) also report, for the Maryland Agricultural Land 
Preservation Foundation (MALPF), that a reverse auction can enroll 5% to 12% more acres than 
a take-it-or-leave-it offer would have enrolled under the same budget conditions. Stoneham (2003) 
compared a discriminatory price auction with a hypothetical fixed-price scheme for Australia’s 
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Bush Tender trial and concluded that the fixed-price scheme would have cost seven times more 
than the actual budget to achieve the same biodiversity quality as the discriminative price auction.  
Cason and Gagadharan (2004) find that, in a laboratory setting with multiple rounds, a 
discriminatory price auction performs better compared to a uniform price auction. Even if the 
uniform price auction creates incentives to reveal the true opportunity cost of a landowner 
compared to a discriminatory price auction, the heterogeneity of landowners’ costs leads to a 
significant “over-payment” for some of the landowners, thereby reducing the cost-effectiveness of 
the uniform price auction. This result is similar to the inefficiency resulting from a fixed-price 
scheme as discussed in Stoneham (2003). Cason and Gangadharan (2004) also show that revealing 
the environmental benefits associated with management options reduces auction performance, in 
terms of fewer projects being funded given a fixed conservation budget as (seller) participants 
strategically raise their offer prices for higher benefit projects.  The researchers find similar 
experimental evidence in Cason and Gangadharan (2005), where they show that a discriminatory 
price auction tends to deliver reductions in non-point source pollution more efficiently than a 
uniform price auction. Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007) compared the performance of a 
discriminatory auction and an equivalent fixed-rate payment mechanism in a lab experiment and 
found that overall the discriminatory price auction performs better in a static (one-shot) market 
setting. However, as the bidders learn from their decisions and update their bids in a dynamic 
(repeated rounds) market setting, the fixed-rate payment can perform as well as the discriminatory 
price auction (Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007).  
The auctioneer’s goal is to set the payment rule to maximize the output (e.g., the supply of 
ES) given a fixed conservation budget. In this paper, we propose a new payment rule that modifies 
a uniform price reverse auction to improve the cost-effectiveness of a conservation program. 
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Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005) proposed the use of bidding-pools to increase the cost-
effectiveness of conservation management, and to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 
application of the proposed idea. The idea of the bidding-pool is that the auctioneer knows that 
there are two distinct types of auction participants: one type with higher opportunity cost and 
another with the relatively lower opportunity cost of conservation management. The conservation 
agent would accept bids up to a higher level from the higher cost pool compared to the lower cost 
pool. Implementing a bidding-pool is effective when the participating landowners are 
heterogeneous (regarding farm types, production systems, soil types, regions, etc.). Use of a 
bidding-pool ensures that the conservation agency gets a mix of land and farm types, rather than 
just enrolling the “least profitable land.” On the downside, the bidding-pool might reduce overall 
competition by putting participants in separate pools (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  
One crucial consideration that arises in designing a conservation auction is determining 
whether the auction should be “one-shot” or “repetitive”, in situations where the participants have 
“low levels of understanding” regarding their opportunity costs as the product they offer are 
relatively unfamiliar to them (e.g., typically environmental improvements), the auction process 
and the degree of competition involved (Rolfe at al 2009). Several studies show that single bidding 
round is appropriate for conservation auctions, as a single round provides incentives to reveal true 
opportunity costs, avoid strategic behavior, and reduce administrative and transaction costs 
(Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1997; Stoneham et al. 2003). However, a strong case 
can be made to employ multiple bidding rounds to help participants learn, receive market feedback 
and understand why they should reveal their true opportunity costs (List and Shogren, 1999; Cason 
and Gangadharan, 2004; Bernard 2005; Rolfe et al. 2009).  
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3.3. Auction rules 
A goal of this chapter is to compare the performance of a screening auction with the 
familiar uniform price and discriminatory auctions to search for a potentially more cost-effective 
auction to use in real efforts to acquire land for conservation projects. Each auction rule presents 
different incentives for the program participants. Using an induced value experiment, we compare 
the three auctions mechanisms from several aspects, including i) the total number of units (or 
number of acres) acquired, ii) the offer prices from the participants, and iii) the rent (deviation of 
offer prices from the induced value) generated under each auction rule. In this section, we describe 
the auction rules formally that we used in the experiment. In the laboratory experiment with student 
subjects, participants were told that they own a fictitious asset which they would be selling to the 
auction moderator to earn a profit and their offers will be assessed based on different auction rules. 
Our lab experiment with student subjects allows us to keep the laboratory experiment context-free. 
Nonetheless, we also implement a laboratory experiment with real landowners as participants. In 
this case, the farmers were told that they own a 10-acre piece of land which they would be offering 
to enroll in a conservation program. For the farmer experiment, the 10-acre piece of land was still 
fictitious, with an induced value as its opportunity cost. Throughout the following presentation, 
we refer to the units being acquired in the auction as land units or farm fields, for both the student 
and the farmer experiments.  
3.3.1. Discriminatory Auction (DA) 
In a discriminatory auction (DA), participants submit sealed bids to the auction moderator 
to enroll a parcel of land in a conservation program. The moderator accepts bids, starting with the 
lowest bid first, and continues to accept bids until the budget is exhausted. The winning bidders 
are accepted into the program and receive the payment stated in their bids. Losing bidders receive 
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no payment. Let 𝑣𝑖 represent the true opportunity cost of the participant and she makes an offer 𝑏𝑖 
to enroll her land. In this case, a participant’s payoff from participating in the conservation program 
is given by the following: 
𝜋𝑖 = {
(𝑏𝑖 − 𝑣𝑖), if the offer is accepted
0, if the offer is rejected
                                                                                    (3.1) 
Note that, in the DA, the number of units acquired K is maximized subject to the constraint  
∑ 𝑏𝑘 ≤ 𝐵𝑘 , where 𝐵 is the overall budget. Also, if 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖, the bidder receives a loss (or negative 
profit) if her bid is accepted by the moderator.  
3.3.2 Uniform Price Reverse Auction (UPRA) 
In a Uniform Price Reverse Auction (UPRA), participants submit sealed bids to the auction 
moderator to enroll a parcel of land in a conservation program. The moderator accepts bids, starting 
with the lowest bid first, and keeps accepting bids until the budget is exhausted. However, unlike 
the DA, in the UPRA the winning (accepted) bidders all receive the same cut-off price as their 
payment. The cut-off price is determined by the lowest bid that the moderator could not accept 
within the available budget while paying all winning bidders a price equal to that lowest rejected 
bid (this price is the bid of the first rejected participant). Let 𝑣𝑖 represent the true opportunity cost 
of the participant and she makes an offer 𝑏𝑖 to enroll her land. Following the rules of the auction, 
the cut-off price for the winning bidder is determined to be 𝑃. Then the bidder’s payoff from 
participating in the conservation program is given by the following: 
𝜋𝑖 = {
(𝑃 − 𝑣𝑖), if the offer is accepted
0, if the offer is rejected
                                                                                    (3.2) 
where 𝑃 ∈ (𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑘, … , 𝑏𝑁) such that  
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𝑃 ∗ 𝐾 ≤ 𝐵 < 𝑃 ∗ (𝐾 + 1) with 𝑃 = 𝑏𝑘+1, if 𝐵 ≥ 𝑏𝑘+1 ∗ 𝐾, where 𝐵 is the available budget
6.  
3.3.3. Screening Auction (SA) 
The Screening Auction (SA) rule recognizes that some participants may have higher 
opportunity costs for their land while others may have lower costs. Therefore, participants in these 
two groups might accept different cut-off prices to enroll their land in a conservation project. For 
this auction, we classify the participants into two groups7:  participants with higher opportunity 
cost, and participants with lower cost for their land. The auctioneer’s goal is to enroll as many 
acres as possible, in total, from both the groups, by paying two different uniform prices to the 
winning bidders within each of the two groups. The auctioneer’s optimization problem is given by 
the following: 
                                                                    𝑀𝑎𝑥  (𝑄1 + 𝑄2)                                                     (3.3)                       
                                                         𝑠. 𝑡     𝑃1𝑄1 + 𝑃2𝑄2 ≤ 𝐵                                                    (3.4) 
                                                                   𝑃1 = 𝑚𝑐1(𝑄1)                                                                           (3.5) 
                                                                   𝑃2 = 𝑚𝑐2(𝑄2)                                                                      (3.6) 
where 𝑄𝑗 is the number of acres enrolled from group 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, 2, 𝑃𝑗  is the uniform price paid to the 
successful participants of group 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2 and 𝐵 is the available conservation budget. Solving the 
auctioneer’s optimization problem provides the following equilibrium condition: 
                                                          
6 This pricing rule might lead to a budget surplus. A sensitivity analysis needs to be done for budget exhaustion 
which employs the following modified pricing rule, 𝑃 =
𝐵
𝐾
  if 𝐵 < 𝑏𝑘+1. 𝐾. 
7 The two-group classification is motivated by actual farmer participation in the Bobolink Project, where we 
observed that some participants were lifestyle or recreational farmers, who tended to make lower bids (offers), 
while others were farming for primary income and tended to make higher offers, possibly reflecting higher cost.  
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𝜕𝑚𝑐(𝑄1)
𝜕𝑄1 
+ 𝑚𝑐(𝑄1) =
𝜕𝑚𝑐(𝑄2)
𝜕𝑄2
+ 𝑚𝑐(𝑄2)                                           (3.7) 
From (3.7), it follows that 
𝑃1
𝑃2
=
1+
1
𝜂2(𝑃2)
1+
1
𝜂1(𝑃1)
 , where 𝜂𝑗 is the supply elasticity. The condition implies 
that the group with a higher elasticity of supply will receive a higher cut-off price, if some 
participants of both groups have winning bids.8 
The Screening Auction establishes competition that lets participants compete primarily 
within their group. For this auction, participants from each group submit sealed bids to the auction 
moderator to enroll their land with the conservation project. After the moderator receives the bids 
from the participants, the moderator ranks the bids from members of each group based on the bids 
offered within that group. The moderator accepts bids, starting with the lowest bid first and keeps 
accepting bids from both the groups to enroll as many acres as possible within the budget. The 
moderator does so while balancing the cost of enrolling from each of the two groups. The winning 
bidders within each group are paid the cut-off price of their group. The cut-off price equals the 
lowest bid for each group that the moderator could not accept within the available budget.9 Let 𝑣𝑖 
represent the true opportunity cost of the participant and she makes an offer 𝑏𝑖 to enroll her land. 
Following the rules of the screening auction, the cut-off price satisfying (3.3) – (3.7), is determined 
                                                          
8 Use of the pricing rule in the SA with discrete units and bids leads to an implementation that departs from 
equation 3.7 to maximize the number of units. In section 3.10 we will run a sensitivity analysis with an alternative 
maximization rule for discrete units which allows rearranging of the units, previously obtained through equation 
3.7, across groups to maximize the total enrollment.    
9 For this experiment we focused on a pricing rule solely based on the “first rejected offer” for both the UPRA and 
the SA treatment. Therefore, in some periods, we may have surplus budget after the auction settled. Moreover, in 
case of discrete number of units, the search algorithm used for SA may not necessarily guarantee the maximized 
number of enrolled units as would have happened in case of continuously divisible units as indicated in equation 
3.7.  
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to be 𝑃𝑗 for group 𝑗. Then a winning bidder’s payoff in group 𝑗 from participating in the 
conservation program is given by the following: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗 = {
(𝑃𝑗 − 𝑣𝑖), if the offer is accepted
0 , if the offer is rejected
                                                                                  (3.8) 
3.3.3.1 A numerical example of a Screening Auction 
 We further explore the properties of the SA using a numerical example. Assume that there 
are nine potential participants, each submitting bids to enroll one unit of land in a conservation 
project. Their induced values (true opportunity cost) and offer prices are presented in tables 3-1 
and 3-2 respectively.   
Table 3-1: High-Value Group (group 1)                   Table 3-2: Low-Value Group (group 2) 
 
We assume that the auction moderator has a $30 budget in total for both the groups. In this 
example, persons A, B, D, E, and G are identified as belonging to the low-value group (tending to 
have lower opportunity costs of enrolling land in conservation contracts) and persons C, F, H and 
I are identified as belonging to the high-value group (tending to face higher opportunity costs) 
based on some screening criteria used by the auctioneer. For implementation in a real auction, a 
conservation agent can use information on the amount of time the participant spends on or off the 
farm, the amount of income coming from on or off-farm activities, the number of animals (cattle, 
sheep, goat, horse etc.) owned, number of operating acres, etc., to design a scoring system and 
assign participants into two different groups based on the score. For the lab experiment, the 
 
Induced value Offer price 
Person C $5.00 $5.00 
Person F $8.00 $8.00 
Person H $11.00 $11.50  
Person I $12.50 $12.50  
 
Induced value  Offer price 
Person A $2.00 $3.00  
Person B $4.00 $5.00  
Person D $6.00 $7.50  
Person E $7.00 $8.00  
Person G $9.00 $9.00 
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participants are assigned a probability of being in the high-value or the low-value group (details in 
section 3.5).  
The auctioneer’s goal is to enroll as many units as possible. In this example, person A is 
the first to be enrolled in the program. The auctioneer now compares the cost of enrolling a unit 
from the two groups: enrolling from the cheapest group 1 participant, person C, costs the 
auctioneer $5 and enrolling from the next cheapest group 2 participant, person B, costs the 
auctioneer an additional $7. This $7 includes the $5 offer price (bid) submitted by person B plus 
the $2 added to the payment that would now be committed to person A. Therefore, person C is the 
next one to be enrolled in the program. The auctioneer then compares the costs of buying from the 
next cheapest participants from the two groups: the next group 2 participant, person B, costs an 
additional $7 and enrolling the next group 1 participant, person F, costs an additional $11. So, 
person B is the next participant to be accepted in the program. The auctioneer follows the same 
process and keeps enrolling units until the budget runs out. In the present example, the two lowest 
group 2 participants are accepted in the program, and they are paid $7.50 each, the price offered 
by the first rejected group 2 participant (person D). From group 1, only the first participant is 
accepted and is paid $8.00, the price offered by the first rejected group 1 participant (person F) 
and there is a budget surplus of $8.  
 
3.3.4. Theoretical expectation  
 Discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions have been studied widely in the 
literature in the context of conservation.  McKee and Berrens (2001), Cason and Gangadharan 
(2005), and Anderson and Holland (2006) find that DA is less costly than UPRA for a given 
conservation target, while Hailu et al. (2007) and Boxall et al. (2013) find UPRA to be more cost 
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efficient compared to DA. Deciding on the auction format is, therefore, an empirical question, 
which is sensitive to the context and bidders involved.  
In the case of a DA, the participants receive the exact offer price stated in their bids. 
Therefore, the participants have an incentive to overstate their true opportunity costs. As each 
participant also knows the cost distribution of the competing participants, we expect the lower-
cost participants to make offers that overstate their opportunity costs by more than the higher-cost 
participants. In the case of UPRA, the uniform price in the market is determined by the first 
rejected offer price. As a participant’s compensation is not determined by her offer, she has no 
incentive to make an offer that overstates her true opportunity cost. As a result, we expect the offer 
prices to match the induced values under the UPRA.   
The rationale behind implementing a SA lies in the cost heterogeneity of the participant 
pool. Once the participants are classified into two groups based on observable screening criteria, 
the auctioneer compares the cost of adding an additional unit from both the groups. Following 
equation 3.7, the auctioneer compares area ABCDEF (figure 3-1) and area GHIJKL (figure 3-2) 
and enrolls the unit with the lower cost. As the winning bidders are paid according to the cut-off 
price set by the first rejected bid within each group, we expect the bidding behavior under a SA to 
be similar to that of a UPRA. An auctioneer will switch from one group to the other (figure 3-1 
and 3-2) in a screening auction only when the starting bid differs for the two groups and the group 
with the lower starting bid has a steeper (or equally sloped) supply curve. 
3.4. Hypotheses 
We test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Bids generated under a screening auction (SA) are the same as bids generated 
under a uniform price reverse auction (UPRA). Because for both SA and UPRA, the cut-off prices 
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are not determined by the bids of the participants, these two auctions have the same incentive 
structure. Therefore, we expect the bids to be similar under these two auctions.  
Hypothesis 2: A Screening Auction (SA) is more cost-effective (acquires more units) for a given 
budget than a Uniform Price Auction (UPRA). The SA is designed to distribute some of the 
producer’s surplus created under UPRA to buy more units, while the incentive for the bidder is 
similar under UPRA and SA, we expect the screening auction to generate more units for a given 
budget.   
Hypothesis 3: The rents earned by the participants are lower in a SA and a UPRA compared to a 
DA. As the participants are paid their bids in a DA, they have an incentive to inflate their bids 
(relative to their true opportunity cost), while the participants have no incentive to inflate their bids 
in a SA and a UPRA. Therefore, we expect the rent to be higher under a DA compared to a SA 
and a UPRA.  
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Figure 3-1: Bidding under SA, group 2                                              Figure 3-2: Bidding under SA, group 1
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3.5. Treatments and Experimental Design (student subjects) 
We conducted 12 experiment sessions in the Department of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics at the University of Connecticut during November 2017 and April 2018. Most of the 
subjects were recruited through UCONN Daily Digest, a university-wide electronic newsletter 
reaching undergraduate students from various academic majors. We conducted experiments 
through networked computer terminals using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
Each session consisted of 10 participants. Each participant received a $5 show-up fee. Each 
experimental session lasted between 90 to 120 minutes with an average individual payoff around 
$26. Participants were not allowed to talk to each other during the sessions and could not observe 
each other’s choices. Experiment instructions were read out aloud (see appendix 2 for the 
instruction sheet).   
The participants in the laboratory experiment were told that they own a fictitious asset that 
they needed to sell to the auction moderator to earn profits. The value of the asset was 
predetermined and given to the participants at the beginning of each period. The range of induced 
(asset) values was generated from the actual offers that we collected from real landowners during 
a preliminary field experiment associated with the BP in Spring 2017.10  We used a within-subject 
experimental design where each participant made decisions under three different treatment plans: 
(i) a discriminatory auction (DA), (ii) a uniform price reverse auction (UPRA) and (iii) a screening 
auction (SA). Within each treatment, we used two different budget scenarios: a low budget 
scenario and a high budget scenario.  
We used two different variations of the screening auction: the first variation is used as the 
baseline, where the auction moderator has perfect information regarding the true value of the asset 
                                                          
10 During our field experiment in 2017 with farmers we received offers within the range of $500 to $6000 for a 10-
acre parcel of land.  
63 
 
of each participant and, therefore, can perfectly screen the participants from the lowest to highest 
asset values. The lowest five participants were assigned to the “low value” group, and the highest 
five participants were assigned to the “high value” group. In the second variation, which captures 
a likely feature of real auctions, the auction moderator has imperfect information regarding the 
true value of the asset and, therefore, uses some (observable) screening criteria to assign bidders 
to groups. Here the participants with the lower induced values are more likely to be assigned to 
the “low value” group, and the participants with higher induced values are more likely to be 
assigned to the “high value” group.  The probability of being in the low-value group is computed 
as 1 −  
𝑣𝑖−𝑣𝑙
𝑣ℎ−𝑣𝑙
, where 𝑣𝑙 and 𝑣ℎ are the lower and upper bound of the value distribution and 𝑣𝑖 is the 
induced value of participant 𝑖. The probability of being in the high-value group is 
𝑣𝑖−𝑣𝑙
𝑣ℎ−𝑣𝑙
. Under the 
imperfect screening scenario, a low-value participant can still be assigned to a high-value group 
and vice-versa. The order of the treatments was varied between sessions. Each treatment consisted 
of 30 decision-making rounds under two different budget scenarios, and each session consisted of 
180 rounds. The order of the treatments is presented in table 3-3. This sequence of experiments 
yielded a total of 21,600 bid-level observations. 
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Table 3-3: Treatment Arrangement of Experimental Sessions with students 
 1st  
(30 pds) 
2nd  
(30 pds) 
3rd  
(30 pds) 
4th  
(30 pds) 
5th  
(30 pds) 
6th  
(30 pds) 
Session 1 DA-L UPRA-L SA(IPS)-L DA-H UPRA-H SA(IPS)-H 
Session 2 DA-L SA(PS)-L UPRA-L DA-H SA(PS)-H UPRA-H 
Session 3 UPRA-L DA-L SA(IPS)-L UPRA-H DA-H SA(IPS)-H 
Session 4 UPRA-L SA(PS)-L DA-L UPRA-H SA(PS)-H DA-H 
Session 5 SA(IPS)-L UPRA-L DA-L SA(IPS)-H UPRA-H DA-H 
Session 6 SA(PS)-L DA-L UPRA-L SA(PS)-H DA-H UPRA-H 
Session 7 DA-H UPRA-H SA(IPS)-H DA-L UPRA-L SA(IPS)-L 
Session 8 DA-H SA(PS)-H UPRA-H DA-L SA(PS)-L UPRA-L 
Session 9 UPRA-H DA-H SA(IPS)-H UPRA-L DA-L SA(IPS)-L 
Session 10 UPRA-H SA(PS)-H DA-H UPRA-L SA(PS)-L DA-L 
Session 11 SA(IPS)-H UPRA-H DA-H SA(IPS)-L UPRA-L DA-L 
Session 12 SA(PS)-H DA-H UPRA-H SA(PS)-L DA-L UPRA-L 
DA= Discriminatory Auction, UPRA = Uniform Price Reverse Auction, SA = Screening Auction, L = Low Budget, 
H = High Budget, PS = Perfect Screening, IPS = Imperfect Screening  
 
3.6. Result: Induced value lab experiment with student subjects  
We tested the performance of the three auction rules based on the following outcome 
variables of interest: the offers made by the participants, the rent (absolute difference between 
offers and induced value) sought by the participants and the total number of units acquired. 
Table 3-4 provides the summary statistics for each treatment.  Graphs of the three performance 
indicators are presented in the Appendix 1. A total of 120 students made decisions on each of the three 
auction rules under two budget scenarios for 30 periods, so we have 3600 individual-period level 
observations. As we expected, the offers made by the participants under the DA treatment are 
higher compared to the offers made under the UPRA (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=18.43, p<0.001) 
and SA (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=18.28, p<0.001) treatments under both the low budget and 
high budget scenario, while the offers under the UPRA and SA treatments are similar in magnitude 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=0.158, p=0.874). The rent sought by the participants, the deviation 
between the induced values and the offer prices, is maximum for the DA treatment compared to 
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the other two treatments. The rent is higher under SA compared to UPRA in the low budget 
scenario (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z= 4.845, p=0.001). However, the rent is similar in magnitude 
for the SA and the UPRA treatment in the high budget scenario (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z= -
0.489, p= 0.6245). We also see that the DA treatment acquired the maximum number of units 
under both the budget scenarios compared to the UPRA and SA treatments. The UPRA treatment 
acquired more units under the low budget scenario compared to the SA treatment (Wilcoxon rank 
sum test, z= -12.007, p=0.001) while the SA treatment acquired more under the high budget 
scenario (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z=12.87, p=0.001).  
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Table 3-4: Summary of performance indicators by treatment in the student experiment 
Budget 
Scenario 
Performance 
Indicator  
Auction 
rule  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No. of 
observation 
Low 
budget 
Offer price 
DA 3470.65 1448.59 519 8000 3600 
UPRA 3220.82 1644.74 509 8000 3600 
SAa 3252.23 1646.30 501 8000 3600 
 SA PS 3159.11 1671.58 501 8000 1800 
 SA IPS 3345.34 1615.73 503 8000 1800 
Units acquired  
DA 3.26 0.22 2.83 3.75 30 
UPRA 2.86 0.19 2.5 3.33 30 
SAa 2.62 0.18 2.25 2.83 30 
 SA PS 2.80 .28 2.33 3.33 30 
 SA IPS 2.44 .21 2 2.83 30 
Rent 
DA 303.16 546.53 0 6252 3600 
UPRA 191.40 502.99 0 5203 3600 
SAa 294.17 727.22 0 7220 3600 
  SA PS 270.66 696.59 0 5371 1800 
  SA IPS 177.56 490.23 0 7220 1800 
High 
Budget  
Offer price 
DA 4097.11 1165.28 507 8000 3600 
UPRA 3398.92 1538.83 501 8000 3600 
SAa 3380.87 1528.70 504 8000 3600 
 SA PS 3394.60 1533.51 504 8000 1800 
 SA IPS 3367.14 1524.18 512 8000 1800 
Units acquired 
DA 6.54 0. 23 6.17 7.25 30 
UPRA 5.71 0.22 5.33 6.17 30 
SAa 6.00 0.23 5.67 6.58 30 
 SA PS 6.28 0.32 5.67 7.00 30 
 SA IPS 5.72 0.37 5.16 6.67 30 
Rent 
DA 824.81 989.61 0 6558 3600 
UPRA 284.78 601.21 0 4719 3600 
SAa 268.61 589.69 0 4728 3600 
  SA PS 255.14 593.20 0 4728 1800 
  SA IPS 282.07 586.02 0 4021 1800 
Note: DA= Discriminatory auction, UPRA=Uniform price reverse auction, SA= Screening auction, PS= Perfect 
screening, IPS= Imperfect screening 
a SA gives statistics for the PS and IPS versions pooled. 
 
3.6.1. Offer prices  
We next present a more detailed analysis of individual offers using a random effects 
regression model. Our within-subjects experiment design resulted in a nested data structure, where 
the participants are nested within periods and periods are nested within sessions. Following the 
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linear hierarchical model language (Garson, 2012), we have a three-level model with participants 
being level 1, periods being level 2 and sessions being level 3. Under this framework, responses 
of participants within the same session could be more alike than responses of participants from 
different sessions. Also, responses of one participant within multiple periods of the same treatment 
are likely to be correlated. Therefore, incorrectly modeling the dependency in the data structure 
could produce biased standard errors (Garson, 2012). To analyze individual bidding behavior, we 
employ the following regression model: 
                                      𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑘 =  𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘𝛽 +  𝑠𝑘 + 𝑢𝑗𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘                                                   (3.9) 
where 𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the offer made by participant 𝑖 in period 𝑗 in session 𝑘; 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘 includes the induced 
values assigned to the participants (value), the treatment dummies for different auctions (UPRA 
and SA) with DA being the baseline treatment, result from previous period (result, which equals 1 
if the participant’s offer was accepted in the previous period, 0 otherwise), a dummy for perfect 
screening treatment (Pscreening), order of the treatments, and the interactions of treatment 
dummies with the order.  We include two random effects; 𝑠𝑘 is session specific effect and 𝑢𝑗𝑘 is 
period specific effect. Finally, 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the residual error term.  A log-likelihood ratio test between 
the random effects model and the linear regression result provides justification for the use of a 
random effects model (table 3-5).  
Results from the random effects model are presented in table 3-5. Columns 1, 2 and 3 
present results from the low budget scenario, while columns 4, 5 and 6 present the high budget 
scenario. Of the three columns for each of the budget scenarios, the first column presents results 
from the first 15 periods, the second one presents the last 15 periods and the third column presents 
results from all 30 experimental periods. As the subjects gained experience through repeated 
bidding over periods, we focus on the last 15 periods as their final bidding strategy under each 
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auction and each budget scenario. Results show that the offers of the subjects in the last 15 periods 
are significantly lower for the SA and the UPRA treatment compared to the baseline treatment DA 
under both the budget scenarios. 
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Table 3-5: Random-effects regression results of participant offers (student subjects) 
 Low budget High budget 
 First 15 periods Last 15 periods All 30 periods First 15 periods Last 15 periods All 30 periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
                      
Value 0.8617*** 0.8615*** 0.8608*** 0.6081*** 0.5162*** 0.5609*** 
 (0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0065) (0.0100) (0.0091) (0.0068)    
SA 136.2551 -386.8660*** -106.0737* -1992.3288*** -2433.5058*** -2238.4541*** 
 (88.9519) (78.3162) (60.1032) (90.0888) (83.1688) (62.6334)    
UPRA -270.9776*** -444.8903*** -352.0560*** -1736.8848*** -2038.7799*** -1913.5062*** 
 (80.2710) (70.9036) (54.1754) (81.3818) (76.5428) (56.8087)    
value x SA 0.0887*** 0.1346*** 0.1116*** 0.3292*** 0.4339*** 0.3833*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0123) (0.0092) (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0103)    
value x UPRA 0.0985*** 0.1083*** 0.1041*** 0.2871*** 0.3655*** 0.3280*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0121) (0.0092) (0.0145) (0.0139) (0.0101)    
SA x PScreening -173.8609** -77.0457 -141.7090*** 177.0458** 43.5142 101.3621*   
 (75.1042) (65.8939) (51.3774) (74.2462) (68.6155) (53.0350)    
SA x Result x value -0.0642*** -0.0489*** -0.0580*** -0.0134 -0.0012 -0.0075    
 (0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0061)    
UPRA x Result x value -0.0216** 0.0041 -0.0096 -0.0145* -0.0060 -0.0101*   
 (0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0060)    
Constant 385.0604*** 565.7518*** 472.0446*** 2239.5269*** 2568.1887*** 2423.7153*** 
 (77.7345) (67.3211) (62.6914) (69.8093) (61.1392) (54.1814)    
Order effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Order-treatment interaction effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
log likelihood -42605.76 -41912.127 -84608.26 -41741.786 -42427.615 -84222.187 
N 5,400 5,400 10,800 5,400 5,400 10,800 
LR test vs. linear regression p <0.0001 p <0.0001 p <0.0001 p <0.0001 p <0.0001 p <0.0001 
*p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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 These findings are consistent with the incentive properties of the auctions. Since the 
winning participants receive the offers stated in their bids under DA, they have the incentive to 
inflate their offers above their induced opportunity cost to maximize profit, whereas in UPRA and 
SA the participants’ offers do not determine their payments, so they have little incentive to inflate 
their offers. The DA offers start from a significant, positive constant rather than from zero, 
consistent with rent-seeking incentives. The reduction in the offer is higher for UPRA in the low 
budget scenario (column 2, UPRA) while the reduction is higher for SA in the high budget scenario 
(column 5, SA), after controlling for the order and order-treatment interactions. The coefficient for 
the induced value (value) is positive under both the budget scenarios which implies that a 
participant offers a higher bid if she has a higher induced value. The interaction terms between the 
induced value (value) and treatment dummies (UPRA and SA) are positive and significant, which 
indicates that individuals with higher induced values offer a higher bid under SA and UPRA. The 
increment is higher in magnitude for SA in both the budget scenarios (column 2 and column 5). 
The three-way interactions of the treatment dummies (UPRA and SA), induced value (value) and 
the result dummy (result) are negative and significant for the SA for the low budget scenario 
(column 2) while the interaction is not significant for the UPRA. This observation implies that 
when a participant receives a favorable outcome in the previous period, she reduces her offer if 
she receives a higher induced value in the next period for SA, while a participant’s result from the 
previous period does not influence her offer decision for the UPRA in the current period. However, 
for the high budget scenario, this three-way interaction is not significant for either of the treatments 
(UPRA and SA) (column 5).  
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3.6.2. Number of units acquired 
 Next, we analyze the number of units that could be acquired under the three auction rules 
discussed above using a random effects regression model (Table 3-6). We again use the DA 
treatment as the baseline. We analyze the number of units acquired separately for the first 15 
periods, last 15 periods and all 30 periods for both the budget scenarios. We again focus our 
analysis on the last 15 periods under each auction format. Results indicate that under both the 
budget scenarios the UPRA generates significantly higher units compared to the baseline DA 
treatment (column 2 and column 5), while there is no significant difference in units acquired 
between the DA and the SA treatment. We do observe variations in the number of units acquired 
between the initial and the later periods of the experiment. During the first 15 periods, the DA 
treatment generates more units. However, over time and with experience, as the participants find 
their optimal bidding strategy, they start bidding higher under the DA treatment (table 3-5) and 
consequently, the number of acquired units under DA reduces under both the budget scenarios. On 
the other hand, even if the UPRA treatment acquires fewer units in the first 15 periods, it acquires 
significantly more units in later periods compared to the DA treatment under both the budget 
scenarios. For the SA treatment, in the last 15 periods we do not notice a significant difference in 
the number of units acquired compared to the DA treatment. Overall (all 30 periods), the SA 
treatment lowered the number of units by 0.8557 (column 3) under the low budget scenario. In the 
high budget scenario, a perfect screening improved the number of units acquired by 0.5098 for the 
SA treatment. This observation is crucial as this indicates the importance of the design of the 
screening criteria.  
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Table 3-6: Random-effects regression results of the total number of units acquired (student subjects) 
 
 Low budget High budget 
 
first 15 periods 
(1) 
last 15 periods 
(2) 
all 30 periods 
(3) 
first 15 periods 
(4) 
last 15 periods 
(5) 
all 30 periods 
(6) 
       
Value -0.0009*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
SA -1.5383*** -0.1410 -0.8557*** -1.0445*** 0.5179 -0.2207    
 (0.3935) (0.3689) (0.2783) (0.4055) (0.3775) (0.2842)    
UPRA -0.5801* 1.0280*** 0.1706 -1.1131*** 0.6499* -0.2128    
 (0.3526) (0.3549) (0.2582) (0.4101) (0.3912) (0.2894)    
value x SA 0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004*** -0.0002**  
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
value x UPRA -0.0002* -0.0004*** -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002**  
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
SA x Pscreening 0.2486 0.0941 0.1588 0.3442** 0.5474*** 0.5098*** 
 (0.1612) (0.1239) (0.1115) (0.1435) (0.1440) (0.1167)    
constant 6.4932*** 5.5074*** 6.0418*** 9.8956*** 8.4776*** 9.1487*** 
 (0.2644) (0.2460) (0.1862) (0.3014) (0.2755) (0.2079)    
Order effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Order-treatment interaction effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
log likelihood -390.0313 -370.7783 -794.2528 -443.2166 -482.52354 -953.13546 
N  540  540 1,080  540  540 1,080 
*p <0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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As the participants are provided with a new induced value each round, we are able to 
identify the supply curves with various slopes in each period and analyze the role of the slope of 
the supply curves in acquiring the number of units for each auction rule. We separated the cases 
where the supply curves were flatter and the cases where the supply curves were steeper than 
average. In table 3-7, column 1 reports the estimation results for the cases with flatter supply curves 
and column 2 reports the cases with steeper curves for the low budget scenario.  Column 3 reports 
the estimation results for the cases with flatter supply curves and column 4 presents the cases with 
steeper curves for the high budget scenario. Results indicate that units acquired under the DA and 
the UPRA treatments are not statistically different irrespective of the slope under either budget 
scenarios. The SA treatment still adds fewer units compared to the DA treatment, however, the 
reduction is smaller for steeper supply curves in the low budget scenario. In the high budget 
scenario, the units acquired under the three treatments are not statistically different for the steeper 
supply curves.   
Overall, we notice that the UPRA treatment generates an equal or higher number of units 
compared to the DA treatment as the participants gain more experience over the periods, although 
the DA treatment generates more units compared to the UPRA treatment for the initial periods. 
The SA treatment generates equal or fewer units compared to the DA treatment.  
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Table 3-7: Random-effects regression results of the total number of units acquired based 
on the slope of the supply curve (student subjects) 
 Low budget Low budget High budget High budget 
 
Flatter slope 
(1) 
Steeper slope 
(2) 
Flatter slope 
(3) 
Steeper slope 
(3) 
     
Value -0.0009*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0009*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)    
SA -1.3058*** -0.8628* -0.5776* -1.2207    
 (0.3474) (0.4622) (0.3389) (0.9833)    
UPRA -0.1266 -0.0737 -0.0525 -1.1348    
 (0.3178) (0.4428) (0.3626) (0.9779)    
value x SA 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002    
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)    
value x UPRA -0.0002* -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0002    
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)    
SA x Pscreening 0.1732 0.1154 0.1086 0.7308*** 
 (0.1399) (0.1305) (0.1593) (0.1494)    
constant 6.0467*** 6.3404*** 9.0960*** 9.9097*** 
 (0.1856) (0.3752) (0.2221) (0.9248)    
Order effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Order-treatment interaction effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
log likelihood -260.6323 -459.5278 -527.4844 -381.4490 
N 433 647 641 439 
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3.6.3. Rent  
 Finally, we analyze the distribution of the rent sought, the deviation of participants’ offers 
from their assigned induced values, using a random effects regression model. The results are 
reported in table 3-8. Again, we use DA as the baseline treatment. Also, we analyze the rent sought 
separately for the first 15 periods, last 15 periods and all 30 periods for both the budget scenarios. 
Our results from the last 15 periods indicate that the deviation of offer prices from the induced 
value is significantly lower for the UPRA and SA treatments compared to the DA treatment. On 
average, the SA treatment generated the lowest rent among the three auction formats (column 2 
and column 5) in the last 15 periods. As before, we do observe variations in the rent-sought 
behavior between the initial and the later periods. For the DA treatment, the rent sought increased 
in the later periods, while for the UPRA and the SA treatment, the rent sought is lower in the later 
periods (except UPRA in the low budget scenario). For both the budget scenarios, a higher induced 
value increased rent sought for both SA and UPRA (columns 2 and 5), which is consistent with 
our findings from section 3.6.1, where we saw a higher induced value led to higher offer prices 
from participants. The interaction term SA x PScreening is negative and significant in column 5, 
which indicates that being able to perfectly screen participants leads to additional lowering of rent 
sought compared to the baseline treatment DA.  
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Table 3-8: Random-effects regression results of rent sought by participants (student subjects) 
 
 Low budget High budget 
 
first 15 periods 
(1) 
last 15 periods 
(2) 
all 30 periods 
(3) 
first 15 periods 
(4) 
last 15 periods 
(5) 
all 30 periods 
(6) 
                      
Value -0.0934*** -0.1296*** -0.1116*** -0.3764*** -0.4806*** -0.4279*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0081) (0.0062) (0.0093) (0.0087) (0.0064)    
SA -696.5870*** -802.3186*** -756.9404*** -1591.4536*** -2076.3355*** -1838.7281*** 
 (81.1505) (66.6372) (53.9252) (84.6303) (80.3630) (59.7453)    
UPRA -791.7406*** -726.1398*** -769.1069*** -1465.6554*** -1768.9008*** -1615.1714*** 
 (74.0884) (61.4306) (49.3011) (76.6110) (73.8109) (54.1996)    
value x SA 0.1294*** 0.1608*** 0.1460*** 0.2769*** 0.4224*** 0.3488*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0114) (0.0087) (0.0133) (0.0125) (0.0092)    
value x UPRA 0.1246*** 0.1388*** 0.1319*** 0.2958*** 0.3778*** 0.3365*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0112) (0.0086) (0.0131) (0.0125) (0.0091)    
SA x Pscreening 18.3647 29.7671 35.6650 -8.6975 -236.2919*** -136.3810**  
 (64.1715) (49.4269) (42.4986) (69.4923) (67.1843) (50.6964)    
constant 750.1069*** 817.8284*** 786.8776*** 2067.9987*** 2474.4113*** 2273.6927*** 
 (56.1510) (44.1855) (37.1996) (62.2997) (61.8130) (50.9344)    
Order effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Order-treatment interaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -42367.102 -41585.076 -84057.053 -42483.844 -42193.468 -84748.349 
N 5,400 5,400 10,800 5,400 5,400 10,800 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 . Standard errors in parentheses.
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3.7. Efficiency  
This section examines the efficiency of each auction rule under both the budget scenarios. 
The efficiency level is calculated as the ratio of the number of units that were provided each period 
to the number of units that could have been provided each period had the participants offered their 
induced values (true opportunity cost). Results indicate that UPRA is the most efficient auction, 
with an average around 98.5% while DA is the least efficient, with an average around 83.5% 
followed by SA with an average around 96%. Table 3-9 provides the regression results with 
average efficiency as the dependent variable. Results show both UPRA and SA produce a 
significantly higher efficiency level compared to the DA treatment under both the budget 
scenarios. Two interesting patterns emerge from the regression results: i. the low budget scenario 
is producing a higher efficiency level and ii. the efficiency level varies over time, but in a different 
direction for different auction types. For the DA, the efficiency level decreases in the later periods. 
But for the SA and the UPRA, efficiency increases over time. Being able to perfectly screen the 
participants improves the efficiency of the SA. 
Table 3-9: Random effects regression results of efficiency (student subjects) 
 Low budget High budget 
 
First 15 
periods 
Last 15 
periods 
All 30 
periods 
First 15 
periods 
Last 15 
periods 
All 30 
periods 
SA 0.060*** 0.109*** 0.083*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.132*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) 
UPRA 0.104*** 0.156*** 0.130*** 0.155*** 0.194*** 0.175*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) 
SA x PScreening 0.043** 0.034* 0.043*** 0.008 0.035**  0.026*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) 
constant 0.892*** 0.842*** 0.867*** 0.833*** 0.797*** 0.815*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01) 
log likelihood 328.80 312.99 634.73 582.58 540.33 1109.23 
N 540 540 1080 540 540 1080 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.10 
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3.8. Result: Induced value experiment with actual landowners who participate 
 We tested the performance of the three auction formats using an induced value experiment 
with landowner participants as well. We used a within-subject experimental design where each 
landowner participant made an offer to enroll a 10-acre field under three different auction rules 
and two different budget scenarios. Previous studies have shown that context framing is helpful 
for experienced subjects participating in field experiments as the subjects can draw on their past 
experience (Cooper et al. 1999; Alatas et al. 2009). Therefore, for the landowner experiment, we 
reduced the number of periods to 15 (from 30 for student experiment) for each treatment. We ran 
only two sessions with a total of fifteen landowner participants due to difficulty in recruiting 
participants. Each participant received a show-up fee of $150. The average payment was $225 for 
a 2-hour session including the show-up fee. A summary of the performance indicators from the 
landowner participants is presented in table 3-10. 
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Table 3-10: Summary of performance indicators by treatment in landowner experiment 
Budget 
Scenario 
Performance 
Indicator  
Auction 
rule  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
No. of 
observation 
Low 
budget 
Offer price 
DA 3515.01 1537.07 625 7800 240 
UPRA 3403.29 1550.19 234 6200 240 
SA 3353.63 1517.52 10 6700 240 
Units acquired  
DA 3.77 0.66 2.56 5 15 
UPRA 2.87 0.36 2.44 3.88 15 
SA 2.24 0.48 1.44 3 15 
Rent 
DA 274.95 396.65 0 2639 240 
UPRA 242.22 514.25 0 3695 240 
SA 209.22 500.84 0 4424 240 
High 
Budget  
Offer price 
DA 3711.44 1229.94 542 6000 240 
UPRA 3442.50 1528.90 4 6000 240 
SA 3496.60 1469.88 500 6000 240 
Units acquired 
DA 7.01 0.37 6.44 7.56 15 
UPRA 5.97 0.57 5 7 15 
SA 5.73 0.88 4 7.13 15 
Rent 
DA 616.85 745.78 0 3359 240 
UPRA 354.59 691.75 0 4269 240 
SA 349.24 587.79 0 3060 240 
 
Results show that on average, the DA treatment received the highest offers and generated 
the highest rent from the participants, however, the DA treatment still generated the highest 
number of enrolled acres. The SA treatment generated the lowest rent among the three auction 
formats. Unlike the student experiment, these observations are consistent across the two budget 
scenarios. Like the student experiment, the offers generated under the DA treatment are higher 
compared to the UPRA (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = 1.613, p =  0.106) and the SA treatment 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = 1.724, p = 0.084), while the offers generated under the UPRA and 
the SA treatments are statistically similar in magnitude (Wilcoxon rank sum test, z = -0.081, p = 
0.935).  
Next, we analyze the offer prices (table 3-11), number of acres enrolled (table 3-12) and 
rent earned by participants (table 3-13) using a random effects regression model. Results reflect 
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that, for the landowner experiment, the offer prices are significantly lower for the SA and the 
UPRA treatment compared to the baseline DA treatment under a high budget scenario (table 3-11; 
columns 3 and 6) considering all 15 experimental periods. A higher induced value (opportunity 
cost) increased the participant offers, as expected.  
Table 3-11: Random-effects regression results of participant offers in landowner 
experiment  
 Low budget High budget 
 
First 5 
periods 
Last 10 
periods 
All 15 
periods 
First 5 
periods 
Last 10 
periods 
All 15 
periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Value 0.967*** 0.907*** 0.926*** 0.813*** 0.650*** 0.706*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)    (0.03) 
SA -182.349 -343.607*** -288.679*** -507.570** -907.617*** -771.321*** 
 (183.42) (125.32) (104.67) (228.71) (156.36)    (130.83) 
UPRA -161.688 -187.608 -186.117* -371.067* -1114.896*** -850.693*** 
 (179.03) (124.15) (103.07) (224.56) (159.17)    (131.30) 
value x SA -0.061 0.024 -0.004 0.084 0.176*** 0.142*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)    (0.04) 
value x UPRA -0.032 -0.003 -0.010 0.027 0.202*** 0.137*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)    (0.04) 
constant 492.165*** 526.344*** 515.196*** 1148.170*** 1725.524*** 1535.823*** 
 (127.74) (90.16) (71.51) (165.45) (135.04)    (105.55) 
       
log likelihood -1836.4053 -3638.4854 -5482.5431 -1889.9674 -3765.8677  -5665.3799 
N 240 480 720 240 480 720 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 Results also show that, for the landowner experiment, the DA treatment generated the 
maximum number of acres (table 3-12) under the low budget scenario. However, in the high budget 
scenario, overall, the SA and the UPRA treatment performed as well as the DA treatment.  
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Table 3-12: Random-effects regression results of acres enrolled in landowner experiment  
 Low budget High budget 
 
First 5 
periods 
Last 10 
periods 
All 15 
periods 
First 5 
periods 
Last 10 
periods 
All 15 
periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Value -0.0011** -0.0006* -0.0009*** -0.0012*** -0.0004 -0.0009*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002)    
SA -3.4544* -0.8985 -2.6577*** -0.9307 2.2580 0.1012    
 (2.0027) (1.5424) (1.0202) (1.4706) (1.6365) (0.9414)    
UPRA -4.2688** -2.0698 -3.1411*** -3.9093** 1.0168 -1.3987    
 (2.0241) (1.5926) (1.0332) (1.5233) (1.8365) (0.9634)    
Value x SA 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0010* -0.0004    
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003)    
Value x UPRA 0.0010 0.0004 0.0007** 0.0010** -0.0006 0.0002    
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003)    
Constant 7.6063*** 5.5361*** 6.6751*** 9.5988*** 8.1403*** 8.8669*** 
 (1.7132) (1.1590) (0.6954) (1.2830) (1.2981) (0.7339)    
Log likelihood -30.0403 -21.2162 -83.4533 -22.1659 -22.0203 -77.3381 
N 30 60 90 30 60 90 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
 Finally, with respect to the rent earned by the participants, regression results show that the 
DA treatment generated the highest rent.  
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Table 3-13: Random-effects regression results rent sought by participants in landowner 
experiment  
 Low budget High budget 
 
First 5 
periods 
Last 10 
periods 
All 15 
periods 
First 5 
periods 
Last 10 
periods 
All 15 
periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Value -0.033 -0.094*** -0.074*** -0.187*** -0.350*** -0.295*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)    (0.03) 
SA -375.811** -260.315** -304.038*** -436.467** -787.682*** -681.083*** 
 (176.25) (119.42) (99.69) (220.17) (146.50)    (122.97) 
UPRA -226.998 -210.006* -219.061** -306.797 -871.534*** -689.324*** 
 (172.03) (118.28) (98.17) (216.18) (149.13)    (123.42) 
Value x SA 0.062 0.077** 0.074*** 0.073 0.173*** 0.141*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)    (0.03) 
Value x UPRA 0.027 0.072** 0.058** 0.042 0.201*** 0.147*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)    (0.03) 
Constant 492.165*** 525.087*** 514.982*** 1148.170*** 1712.246*** 1530.267*** 
 (122.74) (80.39) (67.93) (159.28) (101.94)    (86.67) 
Log likelihood -1826.8282 -3614.2607 -5447.4158 -1880.842 -3732.3838  -5619.5549 
N 240 480 720 240 480 720 
 
3.9. Comparing the results from the two different subject pools 
 While testing hypotheses using laboratory experiments to make claims, researchers face 
issues of generalizability of the results to environments, subject populations, and context. In this 
chapter, we test several hypotheses regarding the performance of three different auction formats 
and two different subject pools. While undergraduate subjects are easy to find and less costly to 
recruit, they are also not experts. They respond to the incentives generated in a context-free 
laboratory setting. On the other hand, expert subjects (landowners in our case) are relatively scarce, 
relatively familiar with the conservation context, and might bring their own perceived notions into 
the laboratory. Therefore, it is important to ask the question of whether we would reach the same 
conclusions using experts as opposed to the standard (undergraduate) subject pool, i.e., testing for 
external validity.  
 Overall, we notice that the participant offers were the highest under the DA treatment. The 
DA treatment mostly performed better (or no worse than) the UPRA treatment and always better 
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than the SA treatment in terms of acquiring the number of units (acres) irrespective of the budget 
scenarios and subject pools. We also notice that the offer prices are statistically similar under the 
SA and the UPRA treatments irrespective of the budget scenarios and subject pools, consistent 
with hypothesis 1. However, there exist variations in terms of the number of units acquired under 
the SA and UPRA treatments based on the budget and subject pool. For the landowner subjects, 
the SA treatment performed significantly better under the low budget scenario, while for student 
subjects, the UPRA treatment performed better under both the low and the high budget scenario 
compared to the SA treatment.  
 
3.10. Alternative unit calculation 
One of our objectives of the experiment was to compare the performances of the UPRA 
and the SA treatment. We used a simple implementation obtained directly from the theoretical 
analysis based on continuously differentiable units for the UPRA and as described in equation 3.7 
for the SA treatment. As a result, the search algorithm used for the SA treatment did not always 
maximize the number of units that the auction rule could have enrolled. Moreover, determining 
the winning prices based solely on the “first rejected offer” pricing rule for the UPRA and the SA 
treatment led to a budget surplus in several periods for each treatment. Therefore, it is imperative 
that we check the robustness of the results presented in section 3.6 (obtained from the original 
experiment) had we implemented the budget-exhaustion rule and the discrete-unit search 
algorithm. In this section, we employ an alternative method of maximizing enrollment when the 
units are discrete in nature in the student-based laboratory experiment. For this method, after using 
the algorithm developed in section 3.3.3 we look for cases where it would be possible to rearrange 
the units across groups to increase the total enrollment. The results (obtained from the modified 
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dataset) are presented below in table 3-14. For the last 15 periods, under both the budget scenarios, 
the UPRA would have enrolled more units compared to the baseline treatment, the DA (similar 
result found from the original data presented in table 3-6, columns 2 and 5). For the low budget 
scenario, the SA performs no less than the baseline treatment DA, however, the SA would have 
enrolled the maximum number of units under the high budget scenario compared to both the DA 
and the UPRA (an improvement over the original data presented in table 3-6, column 5).   
Table 3-14: Random-effects regression results of the total number of units acquired 
(student subjects) under modified maximization rule for discrete units 
 
 Low budget High budget 
 
first 15 
periods 
last 15 
periods 
all 30 
periods 
first 15 
periods 
last 15 
periods 
all 30 
periods 
       
value -0.0009*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
SA -1.5383*** -0.1410 -0.8557*** -0.6984* 1.1439*** 0.2711    
 (0.3935) (0.3689) (0.2783) (0.3860) (0.3590) (0.2715)    
UPRA -0.5801* 1.0280*** 0.1706 -1.1121*** 0.7129* -0.1892    
 (0.3526) (0.3549) (0.2582) (0.3915) (0.3723) (0.2766)    
value x SA 0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0005*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
value x UPRA -0.0002* -0.0004*** -0.0003*** 0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0002**  
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
SA x Pscreening 0.2486 0.0941 0.1588 0.2041 0.5551*** 0.4165*** 
 (0.1612) (0.1239) (0.1115) (0.1329) (0.1386) (0.1095)    
constant 6.4932*** 5.5074*** 6.0418*** 9.9073*** 8.4512*** 9.1443*** 
 (0.2644) (0.2460) (0.1862) (0.2876) (0.2621) (0.1984)    
Order effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Order-treatment 
interaction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
log-likelihood -375.03135 -364.74135  -770.274 -407.72759 -364.73949 -801.93162 
N  540  540 1,080  540  540 1,080 
 
The coefficient of the interaction of the SA and the dummy for perfect screening is positive and 
significant, again implying the importance of the design of the screening criteria to improve the 
performance of the SA.  
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3.11. Conclusion  
Our results indicate that the screening auction and the uniform price auction are generating 
the expected offers compared to a discriminatory auction as the offers are significantly lower under 
both the SA and the UPRA treatments. The UPRA treatment is more cost-effective (in terms of 
the number of units acquired) compared to the DA treatment, while the SA is no worse than the 
DA treatment. Our conjecture is that the group size played an important role in retaining the gains 
from the lower offers generated under a screening auction. In the lab setting, we restricted the 
group size to 10, and in the SA treatment, a group of 10 was divided into two groups, thus reducing 
the competition within the group even further. Future research is required to analyze the impact of 
the group sizes on the number of units acquired. Lower group size in the experiment also led to a 
discreteness of the supply curve (which essentially became a step function instead of a smooth 
supply curve). To examine the consequences of the discreteness of the supply curve, we employed 
an alternative method of calculating the number of units in section 3.10 by rearranging the units 
across the two groups to enroll more units under the SA treatment. In this modified data set, the 
SA treatment is the most cost-effective compared to the DA and the UPRA under the high budget 
scenario. All three indicators (subject offers, units acquired, and rent sought) for the SA treatment 
performed better compared to the low budget scenario which could be indicative of the fact that 
the subject payoff gains were too low under the low budget scenario to generate similar outcomes.  
While the SA treatment has better opportunity cost revelation property compared to the 
DA such that a conservation agent may choose to use the SA treatment to acquire ecosystem 
services for conservation purposes, the SA has several practical challenges for field 
implementation. First and foremost, the screening criteria need to be designed carefully so that it 
is (mostly) out-of-control of landowner bidders in determining their groups. For example, the 
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conservation agent can make field visits to check for animal counts to differentiate a lifestyle 
farmer from a fulltime farmer. The agent can also collect information on soil quality (crop 
productivity) and price of crops for the county (to substitute for the foregone crop production from 
enrolling in conservation) to get an idea of the true opportunity cost of the landowner. However, 
collecting this additional information could be costly enough to reduce the overall cost-
effectiveness of the SA treatment. Secondly, in the SA treatment, in repeated contracting, as the 
participants learn about their groups and maximum accepted offer of the group, the lower cost 
participants can behave strategically and pretend to be a high-cost participant. However, this is an 
empirical question and needs to be explored further. The use of an auction like the SA which may 
treat two groups of participants differently and potentially pay one group a higher cut-off price 
compared to the other group, can lead to concerns about fairness. Finally, the auction process needs 
to be easy enough and the screening criteria transparent enough for the participating landowners 
so as not to lose participation.    
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Appendix 1: Graphs 
Figure A1: Average offer prices by participants under DA, SA and UPRA treatments (student 
subjects) 
High budget scenario                                             Low budget scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Average number of units acquired under DA, SA and UPRA treatments (student 
subjects) 
High budget scenario                                              Low budget scenario 
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Figure A3: Average rent (deviation from induced values) earned by participants under DA, SA 
and UPRA treatments (student subjects) 
High budget scenario                                                Low budget scenario 
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Appendix 2: Experiment instruction 
Our procedure requires that I read the directions out loud while you read along. 
Today you are going to participate in an experiment involving decision-making in an economic 
framework. You have already received a show-up and participation fee of $5, which will be your 
initial balance. During the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of decisions. If you 
follow the instructions closely and make decisions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount 
of money. The show-up fee and any extra amount of money that you earn during the experiment 
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session.  
 
Overview 
Imagine that you own some asset. In the decision-making experiment, you make offers to sell 
your asset to the experimenter/moderator to earn a profit. Today’s experiment is composed of six 
treatments with three different auction rules by which the moderator evaluates your offer. Each 
treatment consists of multiple decision-making rounds. Each decision that you make is 
considered one period of the experiment. The value of your asset is predetermined and will be 
given to you at the beginning of each period. You receive a profit from selling your asset, only if 
your offer is accepted by the moderator. You need to sell your asset to earn profit. If you did not 
sell your asset in a period, your profit for that period is zero.  As we proceed today, the rules that 
the moderator uses to assess your offers will be clear to you. If, at any point in time, you have a 
question please raise your hand and the moderator will come to you. Please do not talk to your 
neighbors! 
 
Process for Earning:   
You will be working with experimental dollars.  Five thousand experimental dollars are equal to 
$1.  Your initial fund will be 25,000 experimental dollars, which represents your fee for showing 
up today.  Your earnings for each period will be added to this amount.  
The moderator uses three different auction rules to assess your offer: a Discriminatory Auction 
(DA) rule, a Uniform Price Auction (UPA) rule, and a Screening Auction (SA) rule. The 
following examples show you how each of these rules work and how you earn money under each 
rule.  
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Description of Treatment 1 (Discriminatory Auction) 
The Rule: 
• You and other participants submit sealed bids to the moderator.  
• The moderator accepts bids, starting with the lowest bid first and keeps accepting bids until 
the budget is exhausted.  
• The winning bidders receive the payment stated in their bids. 
• Losing bidders receive no payment.  
 
What you know: 
• There are 10 participants in your group, including you.  
• There are 30 decision making periods.  
• The budget in each period is $7,800.  
• Your value, as well the value of others, for the asset is randomly drawn from the interval 
[$500, $6000]. That is, your value may range from $500 to $6000 and you are equally likely 
to get a value within this interval.  
• It is safe to assume not all offers can be accepted.  
 
Here is how a Discriminatory Auction works: 
Suppose the moderator receives bids from nine different participants as listed in the table. Also, 
suppose that the moderator’s budget is $30. Following this rule, with a $30 budget, 
• The moderator can accept the bids from 
the first 5 participants (Person A, B, C, D 
and E) since the total payment for the 
lowest 5 participants adds up to $28.5 
(3+5+5+7.5+8=28.5<30).  
• The moderator can pay them each for 
their asset at their offer price ($3 to 
Person A, $5 each to Person B and C, 
$7.50 to Person D and $8 to Person E 
which uses up $28.5 of the budget).  
• Since the budget cannot cover the next 
person’s offer, Person F, G, H and I 
cannot sell their asset. The budget cannot include the 6th lowest offer, $8 from person F 
(3+5+5+7.5+8+8.5=37>30). 
 
 
 
Value 
of asset  
Offer 
Price 
Profit 
Person A 2.00 3.00 1.00 
Person B  4.00 5.00 1.00 
Person C 4.50 5.00 0.50 
Person D 7.00 7.50 0.50 
Person E 7.50 8.00 0.50 
Person F 8.00 8.50 0.00 
Person G 9.00 10.00 0.00 
Person H 9.50 10.00 0.00 
Person I 11.00 12.50 0.00 
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How you earn money: 
If your offer is accepted:   
Your profit = Your offer price – value of your asset. 
If your offer if rejected:     
Your profit = 0. 
Note that if you offer less than the value of your asset, and if such an offer is accepted, you may 
have a negative profit (you could lose money) for that period. 
 
Now please start to make decisions. 
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Description of Treatment 2 (Uniform Price Auction) 
The rule: 
• You and other participants submit sealed bids to the auction moderator.  
• The moderator accepts bids, starting with the lowest bid first and keeps accepting bids until 
the budget is exhausted.  
• The winning bidders all receive the same payment, which equals the lowest offer price that 
the moderator could not accept within the available budget (i.e., the lowest reject offer price). 
 
What you know: 
• There are 10 participants in your group, including you.  
• There are 30 decision making periods. 
• The budget in each period is $7,800.  
• Your value, as well the value of others, for the asset is randomly drawn from the interval 
[$500, $6000]. That is, your value may range from $500 to $6000 and you are equally likely 
to get a value within this interval.  
• It is safe to assume not all offers can be accepted.  
 
Here is how a Uniform Auction works:  
Suppose the moderator receives bids from nine 
different participants as listed in the table. Also, 
suppose that the moderator’s budget is $30. 
Following this rule, with a $30 budget,  
• The moderator can accept bids from the 
first four participants (Person A, B, C, D 
and E) since the total payment for the 
lowest 4 participants add up to $28 
($7*4=$28<$30, where $7 is the lowest 
rejected offer price).  
• So, under the approach of “Lowest 
Rejected bid”, the cut-off price for the accepted participants is determined by Person E’s 
offer of $7.00 (which is the lowest bid the moderator rejects).  
• The moderator is able to accept offers from the first four participants and she pays all the 
accepted participants $7.00. 
• Note that all participants included are paid the same and more than the bids they offered 
in this case.  
• Person E, F, G, H, and I cannot sell their assets based on their offer prices.  
 
 
Value of 
asset 
Offer 
Price 
Profit 
Person A 2.00 3.00 5.00 
Person B  4.00 5.00 3.00 
Person C 5.00 5.00 2.00 
Person D 6.00 6.50 1.00 
Person E 7.00 7.00 0.00 
Person F 8.00 8.00 0.00 
Person G 9.00 10.00 0.00 
Person H 11.50 11.50 0.00 
Person I 12.50 12.50 0.00 
 
 
96 
 
How you earn money: 
If your offer is accepted:  
Your profit = Lowest rejected bid –  value of your asset 
If your offer if rejected:  
Your profit = 0 
Note that, if you offer less than the value of your asset, and if such an offer if accepted and you 
are paid at a price below the value of your asset, you may have a negative profit (you could lose 
money) for that period.  
 
 
 
Now please start to make decisions. 
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Description of Treatment 3 (Screening Auction) 
For this auction rule, the participants are divided into two groups. 
Your group: You will be assigned to a group based on the predetermined value of your asset.  
High value (Group 1) participants: Group 1 participants are those who have a relatively higher 
value for their asset. Low value (Group 2) participants: Group 2 participants are those who 
have a relatively lower value for their asset. If you have a higher predetermined value for your 
asset, you have a higher probability of being assigned to Group 1. However, it is possible that 
you will still be assigned to Group 2, even if you have a relative high value.  
 
The rule: 
• You and other participants in your group, as well as participants in the other group submit 
sealed bids to the auction moderator.  
• The moderator accepts bids, starting with the lowest bid first and keeps accepting bids from 
both the groups to buy as many assets as possible within the budget. 
o The moderator does so by minimizing the cost of buying one more unit of asset from 
each of the two groups 
• The winning bidders within each group are paid the same price of their group. 
• The price will equal the lowest rejected bid for each group (i.e., the bid of the first 
participant rejected in that group). 
What you know: 
• You will be divided into two groups, with the probability of being in each group depending 
on the value of your asset. 
• There are 30 decision making periods. 
• The total budget in each period for both group is $7,800.  
• Your value, as well the value of others, for the asset is randomly drawn from the interval 
[$500, $6000]. That is, your value may range from $500 to $6000 and you are equal likely to 
get a value within this interval.  
• It is safe to assume not all offers can be accepted.  
• You will be paid the same price as other winners in your group. However, the price, or the 
lowest rejected bid, can be different in the two groups.  
Here is how a Screening Auction works: 
Suppose the moderator receives bids from nine different participants as listed in the table. Also, 
suppose that the moderator’s budget is $30.  
Here, person C, F, H and I are identified as the High Value (Group 1) participants, while person 
A, B, D, E and G are identified as the Low Value (Group 2) participants based on the value of 
their assets and some (unstated) characteristics of these assets. 
Following this rule, with a $30 budget, 
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• The moderator compares the cost of buying an asset from a participant from both groups, 
and Person A is the first one to be accepted.  
• The moderator now 
compares the cost of 
buying an asset from 
participants of Group 1 
and Group 2: buying from 
the cheapest Group 1 
participant (person C) 
costs the moderator $5 and 
buying from the next 
cheapest (person B) Group 
2 participant costs the 
moderator an additional 
$7. (Note that $7 includes 
the $5 payment needed for 
Person B plus $2 added to 
the payment that could now be committed to Person A). Therefore, Person C is the next 
one to sell his asset.  
• The moderator then compares the costs of buying from the next cheapest participants 
from the two groups: the next Group 2 participant (Person B) costs an additional $7 and 
buying from the next Group 1 participant (Person F) costs an additional $11. So, Person 
B is the next participant to be accepted in the program.  
• The moderator follows the same process and keeps buying from participants until the 
budget runs out.  
• In the present example, the two lowest Group 2 participants can sell their assets, and they 
are paid $7.50 each, the price offered by the first rejected Group 2 participant. From 
Group 1, only the first participant can sell his asset and is paid $8.00, the price offered by 
the first rejected Group 1 participant.  
• Notice, the accepted participants get paid more than their bids.  
For group i, if your offer is accepted:  
Your profit = Lowest rejected bid in group i – value of your asset. 
If your offer if rejected:  
Your profit = 0. 
Note that, if your offer leads you to receive a price that is less than the value of your asset, then 
your profit could be negative (you could lose money) for that period. 
 
Now please start to make decisions. 
High Value Group (Group 1)  
Value of asset Offer price Profit 
Person C $5.00 $5.00 $3.00 
Person F $8.00 $8.00 $0.00 
Person H $11.00 $11.50  $0.00 
Person I $12.50 $12.50  $0.00 
Low Value Group (Group 2)  
Value of asset Offer price Profit 
Person A $2.00 $3.00  $5.50 
Person B $4.00 $5.00  $3.50 
Person D $6.00 $7.50  $0.00 
Person E $7.00 $8.00  $0.00 
Person G $9.00 $9.00 $0.00 
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Treatment 4 (Discriminatory Auction, High budget) 
• Everything is same as in the Treatment 1 (Discriminatory Auction), except that now the 
budget in each period is $25,000, which means more assets will be bought in each 
period.  
 
Now please start to make decisions. 
 
 
Treatment 5 (Uniform Price Auction, High budget) 
• Everything is same as in the Treatment 2 (Uniform Price Auction), except that now the 
budget in each period is $25,000, which means more assets will be bought in each 
period.  
 
Now please start to make decisions. 
 
 
Treatment 6 (Screening Auction, High budget) 
• Everything is same as in the Treatment 1 (Screening Auction), except that now the 
budget in each period is $25,000, which means more assets will be bought in each 
period.  
 
Now please start to make decisions. 
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Chapter 4 
Essay 3: Impact of oil and gas drilling on land use 
changes in North Dakota: A dynamic matching 
approach 
 
Abstract 
The state of North Dakota is undergoing rapid development due to oil and gas exploration activities 
which have positive economic benefits and implications for energy security, however, this 
development also has major negative consequences for the lost ecosystem services as a result of 
the drilling activities. Using data from Cropland Data Layer (CDL) of USDA between 1997 – 
2016, this chapter quantifies the impact of oil and gas drilling activities on six different land use 
and land cover types in North Dakota. The chapter uses a dynamic matching approach to match 
parcels with and without drilled wells in them and applies a fixed effects panel data (FEPD) 
estimator on the matched sample to find the average treatment effect on the treated parcels. Results 
show that there has been a 1.31% - 2.08% increase in cropland area while there has been a decline 
in grassland area in the range of 2.58% to 2.99% due to energy development in North Dakota. 
Even though the long run trend is increasing for cropland, in the short run the trends are negative. 
The results also indicate that the decline in grassland is more severe, in the range of 5.8% to 6.59%, 
in the cropland dominated parcels.  
 
Keywords: Bakken region, unconventional energy, matching, fixed effect panel data estimator 
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4.1. Introduction 
Increased demand for energy coupled with technological advances in oil and gas extraction 
methods led to an increased effort to extract oil and gas from various sources in the United States. 
One of these sources, the Bakken shale, is undergoing extensive drilling and production. The 
Bakken is one of the largest continuous oil accumulations in the world. Bakken producing zones 
mainly include Western North Dakota, Eastern Montana and Southern Saskatchewan. In April 
2008, USGS reported an estimated 3 to 4.3 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil within the 
Bakken Formation with a mean of 3.65 billion barrels (USGA, 2008). Hydraulic fracturing, 
combined with horizontal drilling, has led to North Dakota's explosion in oil and natural gas 
development in the Bakken Shale. In 2005, the Bakken Formation produced less than 3,000 barrels 
of oil per day which rapidly increased to an average of 547,000 barrels per day by early 2012. In 
March 2012, North Dakota produced nearly 18 million barrels of oil, surpassing Alaska and 
California to become the second leading oil-producing state in the U.S, with Texas being the lead 
producer. 
A recent study notes that since 2000, an average of 50,000 new wells have been drilled in 
central North America per year (Allred et al. 2015). Recent advances in drilling technology have 
increased global oil and gas production, which has led to a decrease in oil and gas prices. However, 
the overall impact of oil and gas development, a combined effort of horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing, can be uncertain. On one hand, the shale boom can have positive implications 
for local air pollution and greenhouse gas emission by displacing coal in electricity generation and 
other industrial uses. On the other hand, the process of hydraulic fracturing is very water intensive 
which could adversely affect agricultural productivity. Drilling can also affect agriculture 
adversely through increased competition for inputs like water, land, and labor (Hitaj et al., 2014; 
 
 
102 
 
CCA, 2014) and through potential contamination of aquifers, rivers and streams from sediment 
run-offs from nearby well-pads (Olmstead et al., 2013; Burton et al. 2014). Drilling visually 
impairs landscape by the construction of well pads, new roads, and pipelines, while the overall 
landscape changes from a rural to a more industrialized setting. Energy development also threatens 
several ecosystems; grasslands being one of the most vulnerable systems (Moran et al., 2017; 
Allred et al., 2015).  This paper quantifies the change in land use and land cover (LULC) within 
the state of North Dakota that is attributable to energy development. 
 
4.2. Literature review 
With ever-growing demand, energy use is expected to increase annually in the United 
States where approximately 78% of the demand is expected to be met from fossil fuel sources 
(Energy Information Administration, 2013). To meet the demand approximately 200,000 km2 of 
the country will be directly affected by energy development by 2040, making energy sprawl the 
largest driver of land use change in the United States (Trainor et al., 2016). Horizontal drilling, 
combined with hydraulic fracturing, have made extraction of shale resources economically viable, 
which in turn led to a rapid increase in unconventional energy production in the United States over 
the last decade (Kerr 2010).  The Bakken region is also undergoing rapid development due to oil 
and gas exploration activities (North Dakota Industrial Commission, 2012). Along with the 
increased production, the unconventional technology also triggered various environmental and 
social concerns among the researchers ranging from potential groundwater, surface water, and 
local air quality pollution to induced seismicity and ecosystem fragmentation (Jackson et al. 2014).  
The Bakken region contains the grassland of the Great Plains which are among the most 
endangered ecosystems in North America (Cully et al., 2003). The major threat that these 
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ecosystems face is the loss of grassland due to agricultural expansion and urbanization (Samson et 
al., 2004). Historically researchers analyzing changes in landcover and its impact on habitat loss 
focused on the effects of agricultural expansion (Ramankutty and Foley, 1999) and urbanization 
(Kalnay and Cai, 2003), however, evaluating the impact of energy development on habitat are 
becoming increasingly relevant (Hernandez et al., 2014; Mjachina, 2014; Wang and Wang, 2015). 
For example, in an effort to quantify the amount of habitat that was indirectly degraded by energy 
development in North Dakota, researchers found that grassland birds avoid areas within 149 meters 
of roads, 267 meters of single-bore well pads and 150 meters of multi-bore well pads (Thompson 
et al., 2015). Several other studies have documented the loss and disruption of the natural habitat 
of mule deer, white-tailed deer, elk, pronghorn, waterfowl, and golden eagle due to energy 
development in North Dakota (Dyke et al. 2011).   
Over 90 percent of North Dakota’s total land area is farmland and of this farm land, 69% 
is devoted to cropland production (Gascoigne et al. 2013). Also, only 3.9% of land in North Dakota 
is federally owned (Vincent et al. 2014). So, the majority of the land for energy development is 
privately owned and is presently used in crop production. Small farms that operate on low-profit 
margins can gain from diversifying their assets to improve financial security by leasing their land 
for oil and gas extraction. Being able to lease lands to energy companies for exploring 
unconventional energy sources provides a new avenue of wealth creation for the farmers (Weber, 
Brown and Pender, 2013). The landowners receive two forms of compensation by leasing their 
mineral rights: the first one is a sign-up bonus which is paid on a per acre basis at the time of 
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signing the lease. The second is the oil and gas royalty which is calculated as a percentage of 
money generated from the oil and gas extracted from the lessor’s property11. Initially, the royalty 
rate was 12.5% in North Dakota, but more recently the rate has been around 15 to 20% (Figure 4-
1, panel a). While the average number of acres leased by the landowners in North Dakota increased 
between 2002 to 2008, there has been a sharp decline in acres between 2008 and 2013 (Figure 4-
1, panel b). There has been an increase in the duration of the lease since 2010 (Figure 4-1, panel 
c).  
Every time a well pad is placed on an active farmland and access roads are built around it, 
it fragments the land. The drilling activities can take the farmland out of production for a short 
period (Adams and Kelsey, 2012; Glenna et al., 2014) and production can decline for up to five 
years following installation of drilling infrastructures (Searchrist, 2011). Several studies that 
analyzed the impact of oil and gas development on agriculture in the Marcellus shale formation 
found that there was a greater increase in the number of farms in counties without shale gas (Hitaj, 
Boslett and Weber, 2014) and that higher level of drilling was associated with a larger decline in 
the number of farms (Xiarchos et al., 2017). Furthermore, researchers found that drilling could be 
associated with farm consolidation in the shale counties (Xiarchos et al., 2017; Hoy et al., 2018). 
Finally, Hoy et al. (2018) found that the farmers in the drilling counties were not removing land 
out of production due to the drilling. 
                                                          
11 The signing up bonus is typically $200 - $500 per acre. This could be the only payment a landowner receives. The 
royalties kick in once the wells start producing (https://blackbearddata.com/oil-and-gas-royalties-what-they-are).  
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Unconventional drilling also requires massive water usage mixed with chemicals which 
poses a risk of contamination when the fluid returns to the surface (Olmstead et al., 2013) raising 
concerns for both water quality and quantity (Hitaj et al., 2014; Sutter et al. 2015). The volume of 
water in the fracturing process can vary between 8000 – 80,000 m3 per well each time it is fractured 
(Jackson et al., 2014). However, the amount of water varies across states and depends on the depth 
of the resource below the surface (Sutter et al., 2015). In the Bakken region, the average water 
usage per well increased from 1,893 m3 to 14,850 m3 from 2008 to 2014 (Lin et al.2018). During 
the same time period, water use for shale oil development in the Bakken accounted for 0.5 to 10% 
of total water consumption in North Dakota (Lin et al. 2018). Despite the increased water usage 
shale oil development did not cause serious reductions in the region’s surface water streams and 
fresh water aquifers (Lin et al. 2018).   
Regarding the impact of changing landscape structure on ecosystem services due to energy 
development, two U.S studies (Allred et al. 2015, Moran et al. 2017) address multistate landcover 
change consequences. Allred et al. (2015) used a satellite-derived dataset on Net Primary 
Production (NPP), a measure of a region’s ability to produce ecosystem services and estimated 
that advances in oil and gas development between 2000 and 2014 reduced NPP by ~4.5 Tg of 
carbon across central North America. They also estimate that the amount of biomass lost in 
croplands is the equivalent of 120.2 million bushels of wheat, which accounts for about 6% of the 
wheat produced in 2013 within the region. Moran et al. (2017) used a direct measure of land-use 
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change derived from satellite-based imagery and estimated the cost of lost ecosystem services for 
eight US tight oil and gas regions for the period 2004 to 2015. Their estimates show that through 
2015 over 140,000 ha of land have been developed or modified due to oil and gas operations, with 
most of the land coming from temperate grassland, deciduous forest, woodland, and desert. Based 
on well count projections, they estimate the ecosystem service cost for eight major US tight oil 
and gas regions where the Bakken shale continues to be the second highest (in terms of the value 
of lost ecosystem services) under three different well projection scenarios. They also show that 
grassland/pasture would be the most affected habitat type under various well projection scenarios.  
The goal of this study is to provide a foundation for the overall change in land use types in 
North Dakota. The estimates from the study can be used to predict the impact of unconventional 
energy development on several ecosystem services that originate from the land use types examined 
in this research using published values for each land use type.  
4.3. Unconventional drilling in North Dakota 
Oil and gas reserves are found in geologic formations known as fields that lie beneath the 
earth’s surface. Energy companies drill wells into those fields to extract these reserves for 
processing and sale. Conventional drilling involves drilling a vertical hole that allows oil and 
natural gas to flow to the surface. Recent advances in drilling technologies, such as hydraulic 
fracturing (or fracking) and horizontal drilling, which is categorized as an unconventional drilling 
technique, have enabled energy companies to access reserves that were previously inaccessible. 
Horizontal drilling involves drilling through, into and parallel, to the reservoir. Hydraulic 
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fracturing uses pressure and fluids after the well has been drilled to create fractures in the rock. 
Fluid and gas then flow from the peripheries of the reservoir through the fracture and into the well 
bore (Raymond and Leffler, 2006). 
Oil and gas extraction in North Dakota are mainly concentrated in the Bakken and Three 
Forks formation, which are in the Williston Basin (Figure 4-2).  Hydraulic fracturing is not new in 
the Bakken region. The first horizontal well was drilled in 1987 in the upper Bakken shale. Since 
the discovery of the Elm Coulee field in 2000 in Eastern Montana, more than 600 horizontal wells 
have been drilled and more than 200 million barrels of oil have been recovered from Elm Coulee 
(Nordeng, 2010). In 2003, the Bakken play moved east to the Nesson Anticline area in North 
Dakota, which remains a very active developmental area to date (Nordeng, 2010). By 2006 the 
play was extended into the Parshall area of North Dakota (Figure 2). The use of unconventional 
technologies has led the Bakken formation to yield an estimated 7.4 billion bbls of oil and over 6 
trillion cubic feet of gas over its lifetime (USGS, 2013). Figure 4-3 shows the monthly oil and gas 
production in North Dakota.  
Conventional (Vertical) oil and gas wells were predominant in Williston basin between 
2000 and 2003 which required placing separate well pads (single-bore well pads). The use of 
single-bore well pads continued until 2009 when the production transitioned to unconventional (or 
horizontal) drilling (Preston and Kim, 2016). The well pads are approximately 4 – 6 acres for 
single-bore and 5 – 7 acres for multi-bore in the Bakken region (North Dakota Petroleum Council, 
2014)12.  
                                                          
12 Some of these well pads can be reclaimed after production starts (North Dakota petroleum Council, 2014) by 
contouring the land to blend with surrounding topography, covering with topsoil and then revegetated.    
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According to the North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources, in 2000 there were 
approximately 500 wells, on average, that were hydraulically fractured and produced 20% of total 
oil and gas in North Dakota. In 2010 the number of fractured wells increased up to 2579 on average 
and produced 89% of oil and gas within the state. By the end of 2016, the number of fractured 
wells increased to 11,279 and the production from those wells accounted for 97% of oil and gas 
production in the entire state.  
4.4. Data  
In this chapter, I use a detailed land use data set from North Dakota to estimate the effects 
of oil and gas drilling activity on land-use and land-cover (LULC) changes. I use the data on 
drilling activity from North Dakota Department of Mineral Resources and Drillinginfo, a private 
sector oil and gas industry data provider. The drilling data includes information on the geographic 
locations of wells over the years, dates of first drilling (spud date), the status of the wells (currently 
producing or abandoned, etc.), types of drilling (horizontal or vertical), and the total amount of 
extracted oil and gas per well.   
I obtained the land use data from USDA NASS. I use the information from Cropland Data 
Layer (CDL) which reports pixel level agriculture type and location annually, where each pixel 
represents a crop or a land cover type. For example, in 2016 CDL reported 48 crop and land cover 
types for North Dakota. I use the CDL data for North Dakota from 1997 to 2016. I use the Public 
Land Survey System (PLSS) parcels as the unit of analysis for land use change. The PLSS is a 
way of subdividing and describing the land in the United States, which is regulated by the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM). The state of North Dakota is divided into 71,470 quarter section 
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parcels13. I overlap the state level CDL data with the PLSS parcels and use the quarter- section-
level CDL data for the final analysis. For crop and land cover, I aggregated the CDL data into six 
major land cover types: cropland, fallow or idle land, grass or pasture land, forest land, developed 
land and other land types (which include water, wetland, and shrubland). Figure 4-4 provides an 
example of nine randomly selected parcels with various land use types between 1997 and 2016. 
The figure also shows the PLSS boundaries and drilling wells between 1997 and 2016.  
4.5. Empirical analysis  
 This section describes how drilling wells over the years have differentiated effects on land 
use change in North Dakota, both within and outside the Bakken boundary.  
Estimation strategy 
If wells were drilled randomly then one could estimate the Average Treatment effect on 
the Treated (ATT) by comparing LULC change for parcels with and without wells in them. 
However, the decision to drill wells on parcels depends on various geographic and economic 
factors, and therefore, is non-random. Therefore, assessing the LULC change impacts of drilling a 
well on a parcel is difficult because of incomplete information. While it is possible to identify if a 
parcel has a well or not and the percentage change in LULC type in the parcel conditional on 
having a well, one cannot observe the counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened had no wells 
been drilled on the parcel. Thus, the fundamental problem in identifying treatment effect is 
constructing the unobservable counterfactuals for treated observations. In this study, I define a 
parcel as treated if the parcel has a well in a given year, and the outcome of interest is the 
                                                          
13 All the subsequent parcels mentioned in this paper are quarter sections. A quarter section equals a quarter of a 
square mile, or 160 acres.  
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percentage change in LULC type on that parcel conditional on having a well between the period 
1997 and 2016. I want to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated parcels, which is 
defined as: 
               𝐸[𝐿1𝑖 − 𝐿0𝑖| 𝑇𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝐿1𝑖|𝑋, 𝑇𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐿0𝑖|𝑋, 𝑇𝑖 = 1]                                         (4.1) 
where 𝐿𝑖 is land use in parcel 𝑖 and 𝑇𝑖 is the treatment status. Then 𝐿1𝑖 is land use in parcel 𝑖 in 
presence of treatment (𝑇𝑖 =1) and 𝐿0𝑖 is potential land use in parcel 𝑖 in the absence of treatment 
(𝑇𝑖 = 0). The first term on the right-hand side of equation 4.1 shows the average LULC type on 
treated parcels. The second term is the average LULC type that would have occurred on the same 
parcel had no wells been drilled in them. Since we do not observe the second term, we need to 
create a counterfactual control group of parcels that were not treated but still having characteristics 
similar to those of the treated parcels. Therefore, I use matching techniques to identify treated and 
counterfactual control parcels based on observed characteristics. Matching is an ex post 
identification technique that uses observable characteristics to identify a counterfactual control 
group from parcels that are not treated and that are similar to the treated group (Imbens, 2004; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
For this study, I define four time intervals corresponding to various levels of drilling 
activities and match treated and control parcels within each time interval. I use 1997 to 2000 as 
the base period, followed by 2001 to 2005 as the time period with low drilling activity, 2006 to 
2010 as the time period with medium drilling activity, and finally 2011 to 2016 as the period with 
the high drilling activity (figure 4-5). Treated parcels within a time period are matched with an 
untreated parcel from that period based on similar observable characteristics 𝑋 of the parcels. The 
observable characteristics, 𝑋, for the parcels include area under cropland, area under grassland, 
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area under developed land, area under other landcover type, distance to major roads, distance to 
major cities, distance to pipeline, elevation and slope. To match a treated parcel with a control 
parcel, I first compute the probability of having a well in a parcel, or the propensity score, 
following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) using a random effects logit model. Then the treated and 
control parcels are matched based on the estimated propensity scores within each time period 
described above. The matching algorithm is applied with caliper; if a treated parcel does not have 
a match within the caliper (less than or equal to one standard deviation of each covariate), it is 
dropped from the sample.  
Once I obtain the matched sample, I use a common linear additive fixed effects panel data 
estimator (FEPD) to estimate the ATT following Ferraro and Miranda (2017) and Wichman and 
Ferraro (2017). Ferraro and Miranda (2017) show that preprocessing the data by matching 
followed by the application of the common FEPD estimator is able to provide estimates and 
inferences from an observational design similar to those from experimental designs. The 
identification strategy relies on the repeated observation on parcel level data to control for 
unobserved and unchanging factors that might be related to change in LULC types and exposure 
to treatment. I apply the following FEPD model on the matched sample 
                               𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐴𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                        (4.2) 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑡 =
𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑎 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎
 for parcel 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝐴𝑖 is the vector of time-invariant 
parcel characteristics (which includes the distance to major cities, distance to major roads and 
railroads, distance to pipeline, slope and elevation) for parcel 𝑖; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying 
parcel characteristics (which includes status of wells) for parcel 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a treatment 
indicator on parcel 𝑖 at time 𝑡; and 𝜆𝑡 are time fixed effects. Equation 4.2 provides an unbiased 
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estimator of the Average Treatment Effect 𝛿 under the assumption of conditional bias stability 
(Ferraro and Miranda, 2017; Wichman and Ferraro, 2017). I run the model in equation 4.2 for six 
different LULC types: cropland, grassland, developed land, forest land, fallow land and other land 
(which includes water, wetland, and shrubland). Equation 4.2 provides an estimate of percentage 
change in each LULC types. As an alternative, I also use the total area under a specific LULC type 
as a dependent variable to get an estimate of change in total area using equation 4.2.   
I estimate the ATT at two levels. First, I consider all the parcels without wells located 
anywhere within North Dakota as candidates for the counterfactual group while applying the 
matching algorithm. Then I focus on the Bakken Shale region in North Dakota and conduct the 
same analyses within the Bakken boundary. The analysis within and outside the Bakken boundary 
enables me to identify the heterogeneity in the pattern of LULC change. 
4.6. Result 
Quality of match  
 Prior to presenting the results of the impact estimates of drilling on land use change, I check 
the quality of the match generated from the matching algorithm used, i.e., checking whether the 
matched parcels are similar on their observed characteristics. If the covariates are not balanced, 
then the estimated ATT may not be solely due to the treatment but may be arising from a 
combination of the treatment variable and the unbalanced covariates. I present a visual test of 
equality of the covariates from both the full sample and the matched sample using QQ-plot and 
provide t-tests for the quality of means for each covariate for matched treated and control parcels.  
Figures 4-6 (before the match) and 4-7 (after the match) present the QQ-plot of the full 
sample and matched sample for the total area of the control and treatment parcels for all six LULC 
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types used in the study. If the treated and control parcels follow the same distribution, then QQ 
plot follows the 45-degree line. Visually, the treated and control parcels look similar for all the 
LULC types except for developed area.  Figures 4-8 (before the match) and 4-9 (after the match) 
present the QQ-plot of the full sample and matched sample for the other covariates used in the 
study: distance to major roads, distance to major cities, distance to pipeline, elevation, and slope. 
Again, visually the treated and control parcels look similar for these covariates, implying that the 
matching algorithm generated control parcels similar to the treated parcels based on observable 
characteristics.  
Tables 4-1 and 4-2 report the descriptive statistics of the covariates. Table 4-1 presents the 
mean values of the covariates for the full sample, treated parcels and control parcels before 
matching.  Table 4-2 presents the mean values of the covariates after matching and the t-test for 
equality of means for the parcels with and without wells. Most of the covariates are balanced 
except for the crop area, other area and distance to a major city. 
Estimation results for North Dakota 
Results from the fixed effects estimation are presented in tables 4-3, 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6. 
Tables 4-3 and 4-4 use the ratio of area under a LULC type to the parcel area as the dependent 
variable while tables 4-5 and 4-6 use total area under LULC type as the dependent variable.  
My results show that there have been significant increases in cropland and forest land while 
there have been significant declines in grassland, fallow land, and other land use types between 
1997 and 2016 in North Dakota overall due to oil and gas drilling activities. I find no overall 
significant change in developed land in North Dakota between 1997 to 2016. While we observe 
an increasing trend in change in the percentage of cropland and forest land in the long run, the 
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short run impacts are varying. For cropland, I observe a 1.31 % increase (table 4-3, col. 1) or 
33,371 m2 increase (table 4-5, col. 1) between 1997 and 2016 for the treated parcels. For forest 
land, I observe a 0.11% increase (table 4-3, col. 4) or 2902 m2 increase (table 4-5, col. 4) between 
1997 and 2016 for the treated parcels. However, in the short run, I observe a declining trend for 
the cropland. Compared to the baseline period of 1997 – 2000, the treated parcels experienced a 
decline in cropland in the amount of 24% (620,527 m2) between 2001 – 2005, 7.5% (197,447 m2) 
between 2006 – 2010 and 20% (521,793 m2) between 2011 – 2016. For forested land, the increase 
is consistent even in the short run for the treated parcels: increasing by 7% (200,932 m2) between 
2001 – 2005, 1.7% (46,141 m2) between 2006 – 2010 and 1.5% (40,933 m2) between 2011 – 2016.  
For grassland, fallow land and other land use, I observe a declining trend in the long run 
because of oil and gas drilling. For grassland, fallow land and other land use, I find a decline by 
2.9% (76,860 m2), 1.9% (49,369 m2) and 0.04% (4,497 m2), respectively, on the treated parcels 
between 1997 to 2016. For grassland and fallow land, the decline has been consistent in the short 
run. Compared to the baseline period 1997 – 2000, for grassland, the treated parcels experienced 
a decline by 19% (505,721 m2) between 2001 – 2005, 12% (309,960 m2) between 2006 – 2010 
and 35% (921,041 m2) between 2011 – 2016. For fallow land, the treated parcels experienced a 
decline by 7 % (188,053 m2) between 2001 – 2005, 21% (561,751 m2) between 2006 – 2010 and 
17% (449,293 m2) between 2011 – 2016. The decline in other land use types, which include water, 
shrubland, and wetland, has been very small, about 0.04% (4497 m2) overall. In the short run, other 
land use types declined between 2001 – 2005 by 3% (20,6824 m2), but increased by 3% (13,517 
m2) between 2006 – 2010, and 7% (82,436 m2) between 2011 – 2016, respectively.  
For the developed land use type, even if I find no significant change in the long run, I do 
find significant changes in the short run. Between 2001 – 2005, developed land declined by 5% 
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(132,351 m2) on the treated parcels due to oil and gas drilling. However, developed land increased 
by 5% (128,387 m2) between 2006 – 2010 and by 3% (80,312 m2) between 2011 – 2016. These 
numbers are in sharp contract with the numbers presented in Allred et al. (2015) where they 
estimate the land area occupied by the well pads, roads and storage facilities is close to a 
cumulative 3 million ha. (310 m2) for eleven central North American States between 2002 – 2012.   
Results from the Bakken region only 
 Applying the same analysis to the Bakken region only, I find an increase in cropland and 
decline in grassland and fallow land on the treated parcels between 1997 to 2016 due to oil and 
gas drilling. I find no significant changes in developed land, forest land, and other land use types. 
In the Bakken region, cropland has increased by 2% (table 4-4, col. 1) or by 51,822 m2 (table 4-6, 
col. 1) between 1997 – 2016. However, in the short run, cropland in the Bakken region dropped 
by 12% (336,228 m2) between 2001 – 2005, increased by 4% (98,207 m2) between 2006 – 2010 
and declined again by 19% (510,998 m2) between 2011 – 2016. There has been a steady and 
significant decline in grassland within the Bakken region due to drilling activities, and the rate of 
decline is more severe in the Bakken region compared to the state of North Dakota as a whole. 
Overall, the Bakken region experienced a 2.5% decline in grassland (table 4-4, col. 2) or 64,800 
m2 (table 4-6, col. 2) between 1997 and 2016. In the short run, the rate of decline is 44% (1,137,842 
m2) between 2001 – 2005, 31% (805,105 m2) between 2006 – 2010 and 44% (1,160,463 m2) 
between 2011 – 2016. These rates are higher at each time period compared to the decline rates in 
North Dakota overall, implying the grasslands are declining at a faster rate within the Bakken 
region because of oil and gas drilling activities. Fallow land also experienced a declining trend 
within the Bakken region between 1997 – 2016. Overall, the rate has been 1.9% (table 4-4, col. 5) 
or 43,106 m2 (table 4-6, col. 5) decline. In the short run, the region lost 14% (358,329 m2) fallow 
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land between 2001 – 2005, but gained 7% (185,893 m2) between 2006 – 2010 and 10% (266,514 
m2) between 2011 – 2016.  
4.7. Robustness check 
To test for robustness of the LULC change estimates from the previous section, I run the 
same analysis on parcels that are dominated by cropland (at least 70% of the parcel is crop land).  
Results are presented in tables 4-7 through 4-10. My results indicate that parcels that are dominated 
by cropland experienced a higher decline in grassland (3.4%) and fallow land (4%) due to the 
drilling activities. Also, the cropland dominated parcels are experiencing a higher rate of increase 
in cropland.  
4.8. Discussion  
My results indicate that oil and gas drilling activities led to a shift among several land use 
and land cover types in North Dakota, within and outside of the Bakken boundary. Drilling led to 
an increase in cropland and forested land while grassland, fallow land and other land use types 
(water, wetland, and shrubland) declined. The parcels within the Bakken boundary experienced a 
higher increase in cropland, but a lower decline in grassland. Other researchers found similar 
evidence of the switch from grassland to crop land in the Dakotas (Wimberly et al., 2017), in 
Northern Plains (Carriazo, 2010), in the Prairie Potholes region (Rashford et al., 2011) and in the 
Western Corn Belt region (Wright et al., 2013) due to changing farm and farm-operator characters, 
changing crop-insurance and disaster payment programs, changing landscape characteristics, 
economic returns to alternative uses and changing commodity prices. However, with the increase 
in unconventional energy development, it is important to include the effect of oil and gas drilling 
on LULC change dynamics.  
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Understanding the differentiated impact of energy development on various LULC types 
will be important for future policy making to minimize the ecological footprint of energy 
development. North Dakota has taken measures to minimize the ecological footprint by focusing 
on development along energy corridors with well pads constructed on either side of the main or 
access road (Preston and Kim, 2016), as this type of placement reduces edge effect. This type of 
development also potentially increases the amount of core habitat for songbirds compared to other 
haphazard development (Thompson et al. 2015). Also, using areas that has already been impacted 
by human activity to place energy infrastructure has been recommended in other areas 
experiencing similar energy development (Moran et al., 2015). This type of approach could work 
in Bakken area as the region contains an extensive acreage in cultivated land which could reduce 
the amount of grassland conversion resulting from energy development (Preston and Kim, 2016).  
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Figure 4-1: Royalty, Land Area and duration of lease in North Dakota 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 a                                                b                                                c    
(data source: Drillinginfo) 
Panel a. Royalty percentage paid to landowners leasing their land to energy companies 
Panel b. Average number of acres leased by the landowners to the energy companies 
Panel c. Average number of months the land was leased  
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Figure 4-2: Study area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Graph source: U.S. Energy Information Administration) 
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Figure 4-3: Oil and gas production in North Dakota 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Data source: Drillinginfo) 
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Figure 4-4: Example of land use pattern between 1997 and 2015 in North Dakota. The grids in each panel represent quarter sections  
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Figure 4-5: Total number of wells (conventional and horizontal) producing oil and gas in North 
Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 
Monthly oil and gas production in North Dakota from 1997 to 2018 
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Figure 4-6: Q-Q plots for area (km2) under various land use types of the unmatched sample. 
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Figure 4-7: Q-Q plots for area (km2) under various land use types of the matched sample. 
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 Figure 4-8: Q-Q plots for various covariates of the unmatched sample.  
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Figure 4-9: Q-Q plots for various covariates of the matched sample.  
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Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics of the full sample, parcels with wells and parcels without wells from 1997 to 2016 before matching  
 
 Full sample  Parcels with wells Parcels without wells   
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N 
t-stat p-value 
            
Crop area (km2) 1.13 0.80 1214346 0.98 0.79 138194 1.15 0.80 1076152 75.10 0.000 
Fallow area (km2) 0.20 0.29 781248 0.17 0.28 97526 0.21 0.29 683722 35.66 0.000 
Grass area (km2) 0.71 0.71 1201671 0.83 0.78 139013 0.69 0.70 1062658 -65.24 0.000 
Developed area (km2) 0.09 0.13 1011581 0.09 0.09 115494 0.09 0.13 896087 17.29 0.000 
Other area (km2) 0.21 0.36 1048212 0.14 0.26 123837 0.22 0.38 924375 91.83 0.000 
Dist. to pipeline (km) 0.02 0.02 1243627 0.02 0.02 143463 0.02 0.02 1100164 159.76 0.000 
Dist. to major roads (km) 0.01 0.00 1243627 0.01 0.01 143463 0.01 0.00 1100164 -66.37 0.000 
Dist. to major city (km) 0.07 0.03 1243627 0.07 0.03 143463 0.07 0.03 1100164 80.85 0.000 
Elevation (m) 565.05 151.29 1243012 662.64 121.48 143463 552.32 150.15 1099549 -3.1e+02 0.000 
Slope (degree) 3.54 5.08 1243012 5.15 7.00 143463 3.33 4.73 1099549 -95.91 0.000 
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Table 4-2: Descriptive statistics of the full sample, parcels with wells and parcels without wells from 1997 to 2016 after matching  
 
 Full sample Parcels with wells Parcels without wells   
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. N 
t-stat P 
value 
            
Crop area (km2) 1.08 0.79 195468 1.07 0.79 97734 1.09 0.78 97734 5.11 0.08 
Fallow area (km2) 0.15 0.26 113351 0.15 0.26 64475 0.15 0.27 48876 3.03 0.11 
Grass area (km2) 0.90 0.77 195468 0.90 0.77 97734 0.90 0.77 97734 1.18 0.117 
Developed area (km2) 0.09 0.10 195468 0.09 0.09 97734 0.09 0.12 97734 -0.35 0.64 
Other area (km2) 0.13 0.23 195468 0.13 0.23 97734 0.13 0.22 97734 -3.73 0.07 
Dist. To pipeline (km) 0.02 0.02 195468 0.02 0.02 97734 0.02 0.01 97734 1.18 0.881 
Dist. To major roads (km) 0.01 0.01 195468 0.01 0.01 97734 0.01 0.01 97734 1.09 0.137 
Dist. To major city (km) 0.07 0.03 195468 0.07 0.03 97734 0.06 0.03 97734 -7.36 0.000 
Elevation (m) 646.86 132.16 195468 645.84 120.12 97734 647.89 143.18 97734 3.39 0.99 
Slope (degree) 4.37 5.83 195468 4.41 6.16 97734 4.33 5.47 97734 -3.10 0.99 
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Table 4-3: Change in land use types (percentage) in North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 
Crop ratio 
(1) 
Grass ratio 
(2) 
Developed ratio 
(3) 
Forest ratio 
(4) 
Fallow ratio 
(5) 
Other ratio 
(6) 
       
_treated 0.0131*** -0.0299*** -0.000189 0.00113* -0.0191*** -0.0004*** 
 (0.00295) (0.00493) (0.000544) (0.000545) (0.00249) (0. 00083) 
Year dummy  
(baseline 1997 - 2000)     
2001-2005 -0.241*** -0.193*** -0.0510*** 0.0768*** -0.0726*** -0.03025*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0136) (0.00379) (0.00459) (0.00727) (0. 0035) 
2006-2010 -0.0763*** -0.123*** 0.0503*** 0.0173*** -0.216*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0142) (0.00340) (0.00433) (0.00641) (0.0038) 
2011-2016 -0.203*** -0.359*** 0.0318*** 0.0151*** -0.172*** 0.0772*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0143) (0.00335) (0.00430) (0.00630) (0. 0038) 
Constant  0.329*** 0.168*** 0.0140*** 0.0298*** 0.137*** 0.0410*** 
 (0.00206) (0.00308) (0.000462) (0.00100) (0.00156) (0.000645) 
Covariates included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 195468 195468 195468 97698 128478 195468 
Number of parcels 48,082 48,074 48,081 29,925 38,341 48,081 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4-4: Change in land use types in the Bakken region of North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 
Crop ratio 
(1) 
Grass ratio 
(2) 
Developed ratio 
(3) 
Forest ratio 
(4) 
Fallow ratio 
(5) 
Other ratio 
(6) 
       
_treated 0.0208*** -0.0258*** -0.000524 -0.000208 -0.0190*** -0.0000717 
 (0.00290) (0.00466) (0.000546) (0.000792) (0.00281) (0.00144) 
Year dummy  
(baseline 1997 - 2000)      
2001-2005 -0.126*** -0.442*** -0.0945*** 0.0915*** -0.146*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0256) (0.00838) (0.0165) (0.0126) (0.0143) 
2006-2010 0.0412* -0.312*** 0.0316*** -0.00277 -0.141*** 0.0728*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0229) (0.00812) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0181) 
2011-2016 -0.195*** -0.448*** 0.00838 -0.0134 -0.111*** 0.104*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0249) (0.00818) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0188) 
Constant  0.326*** 0.178*** 0.0162*** 0.0242*** 0.169*** 0.0400*** 
 (0.00221) (0.00313) (0.000578) (0.00300) (0.00178) (0.00154) 
Covariates included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 122554 122554 122554 64758 81400 122554 
Number of parcels 17,972 17,972 17,972 14,215 16,814 17,972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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Table 4-5: Change in land use types (total area) in North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 
 Crop area Grass area Developed area Forest area Fallow area Other area 
       
_treated  33371.35*** -76860.53*** -437.74    2902.52**  -49369.15*** -4497.47*   
 (7630.98)    (12698.10)    (1407.50)    (1395.97)    (6450.09)    (2634.04)    
Year dummy  
(baseline 1997 - 2000) 
2001-2005 -620527.95*** -505721.80*** -132351.85*** 200932.43*** -188053.66*** -206824.14*** 
 (26717.11)    (35012.70)    (9471.91)    (11765.51)    (18828.90)    (8472.02)    
2006-2010 -197447.25*** -309960.58*** 128387.87*** 46141.07*** -561751.45*** -13517.61*   
 (26778.76)    (36433.82)    (8468.51)    (11087.83)    (16624.62)    (7378.90)    
2011-2016 -521793.54*** -921041.64*** 80312.52*** 40932.52*** -449293.13*** 82436.17*** 
 (27513.42)    (36733.56)    (8245.89)    (11016.14)    (16315.78)    (7099.11)    
Constant  845917.44*** 432532.55*** 35681.07*** 76917.78*** 354418.39*** 105001.80*** 
 (5308.76)    (7939.25)    (1183.53)    (2565.39)    (4027.68)    (1661.98)    
Covariates included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 195468 195468 195468 97698 128478 195468 
Number of parcels 48087 48080 48084 29926 38341 48080 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4-6: Change in land use types (total area) in the Bakken region of North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 
 Crop area Grass area Developed area Forest area Fallow area Other area        
_treated  51811.2*** -64800.0*** -1254.4 -554.9 -43106.0*** -123.1    
 (6.92) (-5.41) (-0.89) (-0.27) (-6.32) (-0.03)    
Year dummy 
(baseline 1997 - 2000)   
2001-2005 -336228.4*** -1137842.4*** -245961.1*** 240889.6*** -427648.8*** -358329.7*** 
 (-7.21) (-17.22) (-11.31) (5.69) (-13.18) (-9.68)    
2006-2010 98207.4* -805105.5*** 78225.8*** -2555.7 -373001.3*** 185893.7*** 
 (2.07) (-13.58) (3.71) (-0.08) (-11.11) (3.97)    
2011-2016 -510998.1*** -1160463.9*** 18963.6 -30071.6 -296903.6*** 266514.9*** 
 (-10.24) (-17.95) (0.89) (-0.93) (-9.03) (5.49)    
Constant  840086.5*** 456487.8*** 41793.3*** 63146.1*** 438930.7*** 102952.6*** 
 (148.14) (56.90) (29.12) (8.23) (96.60) (25.92)    
Covariates 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 122554 122554 122554 64758 81978 122554    
Number of parcels 17,972 17,971 17,972 14,217 16,769 17,972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4-7: Change in land use types (percentage) in on Cropland dominated parcels North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 Crop ratio Grass ratio 
Developed   
ratio Forest ratio 
Fallow 
ratio Other ratio 
       
_treated 0.0659*** -0.0347** -0.0029 0.0038 -0.0405** -0.0059    
 (0.0229) (0.0164) (0.0018) (0.0042) (0.0175) (0.0037)    
Year dummy (baseline 1997 - 2000)      
2001-2005 -0.2202*** 0.0728** -0.0161* -0.0955*** 0.2497*** -0.0724*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0336) (0.0087) (0.0352) (0.0363) (0.0196)    
2006-2010 -0.2797*** -0.0125 0.0456*** 0.0036 0.0740* 0.0883*** 
 (0.0461) (0.0383) (0.0112) (0.0314) (0.0413) (0.0184)    
2011-2016 -0.1077** -0.1523*** 0.0309*** 0.0073 0.0925** 0.0911*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0382) (0.0102) (0.0323) (0.0368) (0.0205)    
Constant 0.6205*** 0.1566*** 0.0144*** -0.0087* 0.1690*** 0.0293*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0088) (0.0017) (0.0049) (0.0100) (0.0031)    
Covariates included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations 9200 9200 9200 3664 6040 9200 
Number of parcels 2,679 2,678 2,678 1,577 1,984 2,679 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4-8: Change in land use types (percentage) in on Cropland dominated parcels within the Bakken region in North Dakota from 
1997 to 2016 
 Crop ratio Grass ratio 
Developed 
ratio Forest ratio Fallow   ratio Other ratio 
       
_treated 0.0580** -0.0471** -0.0015 0.0152 -0.0361** 0.0021    
 (0.0259) (0.0191) (0.0020) (0.0101) (0.0180) (0.0041)    
Year dummy (baseline 1997 - 2000)      
2001-2005 -0.0679 0.0914 -0.0091 0.0154 0.0385 -0.0328    
 (0.1075) (0.0831) (0.0137) (0.0533) (0.0799) (0.0381)    
2006-2010 -0.2475** 0.1915* 0.0684*** -0.0098 -0.0444 0.0183    
 (0.1120) (0.0992) (0.0146) (0.0473) (0.0876) (0.0324)    
2011-2016 -0.4597*** 0.2137** 0.0590*** -0.0166 0.0588 0.1299*** 
 (0.1219) (0.0985) (0.0141) (0.0479) (0.0968) (0.0389)    
Constant 0.5616*** 0.1762*** 0.0081*** -0.0152* 0.2054*** 0.0278*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0105) (0.0015) (0.0088) (0.0103) (0.0032)    
Covariates included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations 5188 5188 5188 1672 3588 5188 
Number of parcels 979 979 979 622 882 979 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4-9: Change in land use types (total area) on Cropland dominated parcels in North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
       
 Crop area Grass area Developed area Forest area Fallow area Other area 
       
_treated 170558.20*** -89062.79** -7013.00 12520.80 -106368.37** -15612.26*   
 (59242.54) (42532.79) (4546.85) (10845.90) (45245.82) (9370.43)    
Year dummy (baseline 1997 - 2000)     
2001-2005 -559345.80*** 192391.52** -42731.08* -224513.40*** 633176.14*** -185892.28*** 
 (125846.65) (85408.05) (22102.72) (79945.08) (92843.70) (50016.55)    
2006-2010 -715954.17*** -23617.19 117768.25*** 21830.65 162708.10 229054.91*** 
 (119249.85) (98094.97) (28571.99) (70244.74) (106064.47) (46866.25) 
2011-2016 -269849.55** -385181.96*** 78935.31*** 31276.40 219016.22** 235965.44*** 
 (124248.23) (97509.65) (26043.99) (72856.56) (95051.74) (52200.38)    
Constant 1601610.84*** 400623.00*** 35888.31*** -18281.83* 430990.67*** 75317.85*** 
 (33279.06) (22778.91) (4006.48) (10619.34) (25729.21) (7308.25)    
Covariates included  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Observations 9200 9200 9200 3664 6040 9200 
Number of parcels 2,678 2,678 2,678 1,577 1,984  2,679 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 4-10: Change in land use types (total area) on Cropland dominated parcels within the Bakken region in North Dakota from 1997 
to 2016 
       
 Crop area Grass area 
Developed 
area Forest area Fallow area Other area 
       
_treated 152675.21** -120993.46** -3974.28 38259.60 -98177.35** 5798.27    
 (66747.93) (49128.51) (5160.64) (25410.05) (46724.66) (10438.64)    
Year dummy (baseline 1997 - 2000)       
2001-2005 -170801.17 238440.23 -22704.46 57807.67 94234.35 -93821.62    
 (278620.39) (213977.28) (34850.05) (117174.42) (207139.51) (96075.33)    
2006-2010 -634015.35** 496487.14* 176106.52*** -5440.53 -116540.63 42396.96    
 (287835.79) (255143.42) (37454.16) (103461.81) (225102.53) (83235.93)    
2011-2016 -1176614.88*** 553275.73** 151368.01*** -22431.99 136456.21 330549.73*** 
 (309710.69) (251941.41) (35869.12) (105356.45) (244594.39) (100202.51)    
Constant 1441939.84*** 447188.21*** 19701.99*** -28120.41 522621.60*** 70274.52*** 
 (38926.46) (26838.49) (3593.03) (21265.61) (26840.04) (7908.22)    
Covariates included  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Observations 5188 5188 5188 1672 3588 5188 
Number of parcels 979 979 979 622 882 979 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Appendix: 
Table A1. Full result: Change in land use types (percentage) in North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
  Crop area Grass area Developed area Forest area Fallow area Other area 
       
treated 0.0131*** -0.0299*** -0.000189 0.00113* -0.0191*** -0.00174 
 (0.00295) (0.00493) (0.000544) (0.000545) (0.00249) (0.00102) 
year_dummy (baseline 
1997 - 2000)       
2001-2005 -0.241*** -0.193*** -0.0510*** 0.0768*** -0.0726*** -0.0796*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0136) (0.00379) (0.00459) (0.00727) (0.00329) 
2006-2010 -0.0763*** -0.123*** 0.0503*** 0.0173*** -0.216*** -0.00554 
 (0.0104) (0.0142) (0.00340) (0.00433) (0.00641) (0.00287) 
2011-2016 -0.203*** -0.359*** 0.0318*** 0.0151*** -0.172*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0143) (0.00335) (0.00430) (0.00630) (0.00276) 
dist_major_city x year05 -0.000000265*** 0.000000154 0.000000173*** -0.000000686*** 0.000000135** 5.61e-08** 
 (6.65e-08) (9.33e-08) (2.38e-08) (2.73e-08) (5.18e-08) (2.18e-08) 
dist_major_city x year10 -0.000000684*** 3.28e-08 0.000000123*** -0.000000298*** 2.68e-08 0.000000116*** 
 (6.75e-08) (9.49e-08) (2.48e-08) (2.56e-08) (5.01e-08) (1.92e-08) 
dist_major_city x year16 -0.000000924*** 0.000000658*** 9.62e-08*** -0.000000313*** -0.000000223*** 0.000000234*** 
 (6.88e-08) (9.83e-08) (2.41e-08) (2.55e-08) (5.32e-08) (1.86e-08) 
dist_major_road x year05 -0.00000257*** 0.00000180*** 0.000000211* -2.38e-09 0.000000504* 3.14e-08 
 (0.000000294) (0.000000486) (9.09e-08) (0.000000152) (0.000000221) (0.000000104) 
dist_major_road x year10 -0.00000242*** 0.000000130 -0.00000155*** 0.000000299* 0.00000143*** 0.000000946*** 
 (0.000000299) (0.000000462) (8.11e-08) (0.000000138) (0.000000230) (9.17e-08) 
dist_major_road x year16 -0.00000414*** 0.00000641*** -0.00000157*** 0.000000402** 0.000000943*** 0.00000162*** 
 (0.000000298) (0.000000485) (7.75e-08) (0.000000138) (0.000000235) (8.73e-08) 
dist_to_pipeline x year05 0.000000255* -5.50e-08 -0.000000122*** 0.00000109*** -0.000000949*** 0.000000103* 
 (0.000000126) (0.000000169) (3.23e-08) (4.99e-08) (0.000000111) (4.13e-08) 
dist_to_pipeline x year10 
0.00000110*** 
-
0.000000966*** -0.000000160*** 0.00000103*** -0.00000137*** -8.73e-08* 
 (0.000000137) (0.000000184) (3.38e-08) (4.75e-08) (0.000000116) (3.68e-08) 
dist_to_pipeline x year16 0.000000925*** -0.00000109*** -0.000000178*** 0.00000105*** -0.000000934*** -0.000000209*** 
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 (0.000000135) (0.000000195) (3.24e-08) (4.71e-08) (0.000000111) (3.56e-08) 
elevation x year05 0.000584*** 0.000335*** 0.0000657*** -0.0000774*** 0.000124*** 0.000112*** 
 (0.0000156) (0.0000192) (0.00000435) (0.00000799) (0.0000103) (0.00000467) 
elevation x year10 0.000357*** 0.000488*** -0.0000115** -0.0000331*** 0.000170*** -0.00000321 
 (0.0000157) (0.0000200) (0.00000395) (0.00000759) (0.00000909) (0.00000404) 
elevation x year16 0.000603*** 0.000779*** 0.00000611 -0.0000305*** 0.000156*** -0.0000564*** 
 (0.0000161) (0.0000206) (0.00000384) (0.00000756) (0.00000920) (0.00000389) 
slope x year05 -0.00288*** 0.000369 0.0000964 -0.00371*** 0.0000103 -0.00144*** 
 (0.000184) (0.000401) (0.0000881) (0.000153) (0.000137) (0.0000815) 
slope x year10 -0.00664*** 0.00597*** -0.00160*** 0.00187*** 0.00119*** 0.0000325 
 (0.000245) (0.000435) (0.0000752) (0.000141) (0.000138) (0.0000739) 
slope x year16 -0.00606*** 0.0110*** -0.00125*** 0.00227*** 0.000132 0.00111*** 
 (0.000225) (0.000480) (0.0000718) (0.000140) (0.000154) (0.0000687) 
       
activewell x year05 0.00788 -0.0332** 0.00601** 0.0156*** -0.0140*** -0.0146*** 
 (0.00529) (0.0116) (0.00200) (0.00208) (0.00402) (0.00193) 
activewell x year10 0.0183*** -0.0209*** -0.00146** 0.00158** -0.00557** -0.000620 
 (0.00242) (0.00494) (0.000447) (0.000531) (0.00188) (0.00104) 
activewell x year16 -0.00233 -0.00361 -0.0000153 0.000252 -0.00573*** 0.000846 
 (0.00213) (0.00311) (0.000313) (0.000374) (0.00163) (0.000749) 
       
horizontalwell x year05 0.000916 -0.0179 0.00774*** -0.00591* -0.0256*** -0.0216*** 
 (0.00575) (0.0148) (0.00211) (0.00274) (0.00474) (0.00220) 
horizontalwell x year10 0.00354 -0.0148** -0.00204*** 0.000893 -0.00318 0.000672 
 (0.00240) (0.00518) (0.000375) (0.000514) (0.00185) (0.00104) 
horizontalwell x year16 0.00582** -0.00700* 0.000108 0.000782* -0.00625*** 0.0000611 
  (0.00195) (0.00289) (0.000232) (0.000356) (0.00164) (0.000734) 
Constant 0.329*** 0.168*** 0.0140*** 0.0298*** 0.137*** 0.0410*** 
 (0.00206) (0.00308) (0.000462) (0.00100) (0.00156) (0.000645) 
Observations 195468 195468 195468 97698 128478 195468 
Number of parcels 48,082 48,074 48,081 29,925 38,341 48,081 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A2: Full result: Change in land use types in the Bakken region of North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 Crop area Grass area Developed area Forest area Fallow area Other area 
       
treated 0.0208*** -0.0258*** -0.000524 -0.000208 -0.0190*** -0.0000717 
 (0.00290) (0.00466) (0.000546) (0.000792) (0.00281) (0.00144) 
year_dummy (baseline 
1997 - 2000)       
2001-2005 -0.126*** -0.442*** -0.0945*** 0.0915*** -0.146*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0180) (0.0256) (0.00838) (0.0165) (0.0126) (0.0143) 
2006-2010 0.0412* -0.312*** 0.0316*** -0.00277 -0.141*** 0.0728*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0229) (0.00812) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0181) 
2011-2016 -0.195*** -0.448*** 0.00838 -0.0134 -0.111*** 0.104*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0249) (0.00818) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0188) 
dist_major_city x year05 0.000000182* 6.40e-08 0.000000277*** -8.51e-08 5.57e-08 0.000000445*** 
 (8.83e-08) (0.000000128) (4.21e-08) (8.40e-08) (7.54e-08) (5.13e-08) 
dist_major_city x year10 -0.000000275** 0.000000304* 0.000000260*** 0.000000365*** -0.000000325*** 0.000000224*** 
 (9.08e-08) (0.000000128) (4.36e-08) (7.76e-08) (7.27e-08) (6.07e-08) 
dist_major_city x year16 -0.000000684*** 0.00000103*** 0.000000228*** 0.000000360*** -0.000000498*** 0.000000279*** 
 (9.02e-08) (0.000000130) (4.34e-08) (7.75e-08) (7.21e-08) (6.31e-08) 
dist_major_road x year05 -0.00000284*** 0.00000476*** 0.000000373** 0.00000129* 4.12e-08 -0.000000533* 
 (0.000000331) (0.000000590) (0.000000115) (0.000000634) (0.000000292) (0.000000231) 
dist_major_road x year10 -0.000000832* -0.00000391*** -0.00000148*** 0.00000163** 0.00000180*** 0.000000794*** 
 (0.000000343) (0.000000513) (0.000000115) (0.000000551) (0.000000303) (0.000000211) 
dist_major_road x year16 -0.00000245*** 0.000000209 -0.00000155*** 0.00000183*** 0.000000657* 0.00000152*** 
 (0.000000344) (0.000000580) (0.000000113) (0.000000552) (0.000000311) (0.000000229) 
dist_to_pipeline x year05 6.98e-08 -0.000000408* 0.000000114** 0.00000154*** -0.00000166*** -0.000000200* 
 (0.000000153) (0.000000191) (4.24e-08) (0.000000248) (0.000000134) (9.93e-08) 
dist_to_pipeline x year10 0.00000181*** -0.00000181*** -9.98e-08* 0.000000462* -0.00000207*** -0.000000604*** 
 (0.000000162) (0.000000203) (4.49e-08) (0.000000212) (0.000000133) (9.22e-08) 
dist_to_pipeline x year16 0.000000992*** -0.00000124*** -0.000000137** 0.000000465* -0.00000165*** -0.000000538*** 
 (0.000000156) (0.000000207) (4.39e-08) (0.000000211) (0.000000131) (9.44e-08) 
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elevation x year05 0.000349*** 0.000710*** 0.000110*** -0.000154*** 0.000205*** 0.000186*** 
 (0.0000273) (0.0000370) (0.00000993) (0.0000327) (0.0000184) (0.0000200) 
elevation x year10 0.0000963*** 0.000786*** 0.00000296 -0.0000508 0.0000548** -0.000114*** 
 (0.0000274) (0.0000340) (0.0000102) (0.0000270) (0.0000195) (0.0000235) 
elevation x year16 0.000500*** 0.000910*** 0.0000294** -0.0000356 0.0000601** -0.000158*** 
 (0.0000288) (0.0000382) (0.0000104) (0.0000269) (0.0000196) (0.0000246) 
slope x year05 -0.00193*** -0.000581 -0.000477*** -0.00430*** 0.00106*** -0.00213*** 
 (0.000181) (0.000449) (0.0000962) (0.000815) (0.000162) (0.000198) 
slope x year10 -0.00604*** 0.00599*** -0.00189*** 0.00228** 0.00220*** -0.000401* 
 (0.000243) (0.000463) (0.000104) (0.000694) (0.000176) (0.000184) 
slope x year16 -0.00474*** 0.0106*** -0.00157*** 0.00268*** 0.00103*** 0.000871*** 
 (0.000216) (0.000533) (0.000103) (0.000694) (0.000191) (0.000196) 
       
activewell x year05 -0.00108 -0.000608 0.00820*** 0.0162* -0.00365 -0.0164 
 (0.00658) (0.0139) (0.00215) (0.00688) (0.00486) (0.00839) 
activewell x year10 0.00652* -0.0148** -0.00224*** 0.00229*** -0.00410 -0.00137 
 (0.00271) (0.00526) (0.000500) (0.000516) (0.00246) (0.00138) 
activewell x year16 0.00490 -0.00781* -0.000189 -0.000137 -0.00212 0.000890 
 (0.00254) (0.00355) (0.000387) (0.000448) (0.00222) (0.00126) 
       
horizontalwell x year05 -0.000727 0.0312 0.00818*** -0.00817 -0.0159** -0.0154* 
 (0.00739) (0.0176) (0.00235) (0.0117) (0.00590) (0.00668) 
horizontalwell x year10 -0.00321 -0.0108* -0.00156*** 0.000740 -0.000670 0.00239* 
 (0.00265) (0.00522) (0.000416) (0.000462) (0.00239) (0.00109) 
horizontalwell x year16 0.0115*** -0.00566 -0.0000721 0.000755* -0.00557* 0.000673 
 (0.00239) (0.00327) (0.000287) (0.000369) (0.00220) (0.000968) 
Constant 0.326*** 0.178*** 0.0162*** 0.0242*** 0.169*** 0.0400*** 
 (0.00221) (0.00313) (0.000578) (0.00300) (0.00178) (0.00154) 
Observations 122554 122554 122554 64758 81400 122554 
Number of parcels 17,972 17,972 17,972 14,215 16,814 17,972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table A3: Full result: Change in land use types (total area) in North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 Crop area Grass area Developed area Forest area Fallow area Other area 
       
treated 33371.35*** -76860.53*** -437.74 2902.52** -49369.15*** -4497.47* 
 (7630.98) (12698.10) (1407.50) (1395.97) (6450.09) (2634.04) 
year_dummy (baseline 1997 - 
2000)       
2001-2005 -620527.95*** -505721.80*** -132351.85*** 200932.43*** -188053.66*** -206824.14*** 
 (26717.11) (35012.70) (9471.91) (11765.51) (18828.90) (8472.02) 
2006-2010 -197447.25*** -309960.58*** 128387.87*** 46141.07*** -561751.45*** -13517.61* 
 (26778.76) (36433.82) (8468.51) (11087.83) (16624.62) (7378.90) 
2011-2016 -521793.54*** -921041.64*** 80312.52*** 40932.52*** -449293.13*** 82436.17*** 
 (27513.42) (36733.56) (8245.89) (11016.14) (16315.78) (7099.11) 
dist_major_city x year05 -0.72*** 0.38 0.45*** -1.74*** 0.33** 0.16*** 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) 
dist_major_city x year10 -1.79*** -0.01 0.32*** -0.74*** 0.06 0.31*** 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) 
dist_major_city x year16 -2.38*** 1.56*** 0.25*** -0.78*** -0.59*** 0.60*** 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.05) 
dist_major_road x year05 -6.55*** 4.68*** 0.55** 0.03 1.41** 0.07 
 (0.76) (1.26) (0.23) (0.39) (0.57) (0.27) 
dist_major_road x year10 -6.27*** 0.55 -4.01*** 0.78** 3.82*** 2.50*** 
 (0.77) (1.19) (0.21) (0.35) (0.59) (0.24) 
dist_major_road x year16 -10.69*** 16.88*** -4.06*** 1.05*** 2.62*** 4.27*** 
 (0.77) (1.25) (0.20) (0.35) (0.60) (0.22) 
dist_to_pipeline x year05 0.65** -0.08 -0.29*** 2.67*** -2.39*** 0.23** 
 (0.32) (0.43) (0.08) (0.13) (0.29) (0.11) 
dist_to_pipeline x year10 2.81*** -2.40*** -0.40*** 2.60*** -3.46*** -0.23** 
 (0.35) (0.47) (0.08) (0.12) (0.30) (0.09) 
dist_to_pipeline x year16 2.31*** -2.68*** -0.45*** 2.62*** -2.33*** -0.53*** 
 (0.35) (0.50) (0.08) (0.12) (0.29) (0.09) 
elevation x year05 1504.71*** 877.78*** 169.84*** -204.89*** 320.73*** 289.37*** 
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 (40.25) (49.50) (10.82) (20.46) (26.65) (12.03) 
elevation x year10 922.25*** 1255.28*** -28.04*** -89.48*** 444.85*** -10.16 
 (40.66) (51.57) (9.77) (19.44) (23.51) (10.40) 
elevation x year16 1552.35*** 2008.15*** 17.34* -82.90*** 407.74*** -147.32*** 
 (41.50) (53.32) (9.36) (19.37) (23.80) (10.00) 
slope x year05 -7429.75*** 888.98 238.22 -9468.87*** -35.96 -3686.41*** 
 (473.78) (1034.43) (226.89) (392.24) (353.64) (209.78) 
slope x year10 -17056.99*** 15269.39*** -4125.53*** 4868.14*** 3053.15*** 61.82 
 (630.43) (1119.17) (194.13) (360.53) (356.14) (190.28) 
slope x year16 -15554.39*** 28235.46*** -3239.75*** 5891.59*** 321.32 2843.24*** 
 (580.55) (1234.68) (185.03) (359.49) (399.55) (176.94) 
       
activewell x year05 21416.85 -83303.43*** 15676.96*** 40239.21*** -36438.08*** -37119.11*** 
 (13550.32) (30024.67) (5153.83) (5325.15) (10390.95) (4973.60) 
activewell x year10 47871.21*** -54514.65*** -3874.27*** 4189.51*** -14768.22*** -1507.19 
 (6241.12) (12679.36) (1152.96) (1360.43) (4862.27) (2671.56) 
activewell x year16 -5989.53 -8947.71 -43.72 647.70 -14943.97*** 2231.94 
 (5490.45) (8037.90) (811.31) (956.59) (4207.18) (1929.53) 
       
horizontalwell x year05 1622.91 -45132.05 19465.23*** -15146.73** -66785.79*** -55936.69*** 
 (14743.63) (38018.08) (5415.66) (7028.32) (12242.22) (5659.18) 
horizontalwell x year10 8949.99 -36540.73*** -5163.61*** 2263.80* -8139.12* 1606.79 
 (6120.99) (13279.96) (965.23) (1316.31) (4792.40) (2686.27) 
horizontalwell x year16 15665.84*** -18918.03** 331.41 1993.26** -16517.10*** 184.51 
 (5017.84) (7450.04) (597.69) (910.41) (4234.45) (1891.01) 
Constant 845917.44*** 432532.55*** 35681.07*** 76917.78*** 354418.39*** 105001.80*** 
 (5308.76) (7939.25) (1183.53) (2565.39) (4027.68) (1661.98) 
Observations 195468 195468 195468 97698 128478 195468 
Number of parcels 48087 48080 48084 29926 38341 48080 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
148 
 
Table A4: Full result: Change in land use types (total area) in the Bakken region of North Dakota from 1997 to 2016 
 Crop area Grass area 
Developed 
area Forest area Fallow area Other area 
       
wellyes 51811.2*** -64800.0*** -1254.4 -554.9 -43106.0*** -123.1    
 (6.92) (-5.41) (-0.89) (-0.27) (-6.32) (-0.03)    
year_dummy (baseline 1997 - 
2000)       
2001-2005 -336228.4*** -1137842.4*** -245961.1*** 240889.6*** -427648.8*** -358329.7*** 
 (-7.21) (-17.22) (-11.31) (5.69) (-13.18) (-9.68)    
2006-2010 98207.4* -805105.5*** 78225.8*** -2555.7 -373001.3*** 185893.7*** 
 (2.07) (-13.58) (3.71) (-0.08) (-11.11) (3.97)    
2011-2016 -510998.1*** -1160463.9*** 18963.6 -30071.6 -296903.6*** 266514.9*** 
 (-10.24) (-17.95) (0.89) (-0.93) (-9.03) (5.49)    
dist_major_city x year05 0.445 0.105 0.702*** -0.181 0.201 1.153*** 
 (1.94) (0.32) (6.63) (-0.84) (1.04) (8.71)    
dist_major_city x year10 -0.755** 0.722* 0.637*** 0.969*** -0.924*** 0.585*** 
 (-3.21) (2.18) (5.83) (4.85) (-4.98) (3.74)    
dist_major_city x year16 -1.724*** 2.512*** 0.566*** 0.956*** -1.356*** 0.709*** 
 (-7.38) (7.48) (5.22) (4.79) (-7.40) (4.36)    
dist_major_road x year05 -7.666*** 12.33*** 0.932** 3.360* 0.451 -1.341*   
 (-9.05) (8.08) (3.19) (2.07) (0.63) (-2.25)    
dist_major_road x year10 -2.707** -10.01*** -3.839*** 4.216** 4.493*** 2.159*** 
 (-3.10) (-7.57) (-13.09) (2.97) (5.98) (3.99)    
dist_major_road x year16 -6.874*** 0.720 -4.017*** 4.738*** 2.608*** 4.038*** 
 (-7.91) (0.48) (-14.01) (3.34) (3.40) (6.87)    
dist_to_pipeline x year05 0.167 -0.974* 0.333*** 3.732*** -4.366*** -0.572*   
 (0.43) (-2.01) (3.45) (5.97) (-12.24) (-2.34)    
dist_to_pipeline x year10 4.542*** -4.672*** -0.206* 1.026 -5.272*** -1.574*** 
 (10.98) (-9.03) (-2.02) (1.92) (-14.98) (-7.05)    
dist_to_pipeline x year16 2.353*** -3.128*** -0.308** 1.029 -4.168*** -1.389*** 
 (5.92) (-5.94) (-3.11) (1.93) (-11.76) (-6.06)    
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elevation x year05 921.2*** 1831.9*** 286.0*** -403.9*** 590.1*** 481.5*** 
 (13.01) (19.08) (11.12) (-4.80) (12.39) (9.33)    
elevation x year10 270.2*** 2030.6*** 13.94 -137.8* 143.4** -293.0*** 
 (3.79) (23.13) (0.53) (-1.98) (2.84) (-4.82)    
elevation x year16 1307.9*** 2363.4*** 80.32** -98.25 153.6** -404.8*** 
 (17.48) (23.83) (2.98) (-1.42) (3.05) (-6.38)    
slope x year05 -4951.0*** -1594.2 -1224.4*** -11064.9*** 3085.7*** -5496.2*** 
 (-10.60) (-1.38) (-4.89) (-5.28) (7.36) (-10.77)    
slope x year10 -15447.6*** 15317.8*** -4865.7*** 5887.6*** 6465.9*** -1041.1*   
 (-24.77) (12.82) (-18.02) (3.30) (14.41) (-2.19)    
slope x year16 -12134.7*** 27153.5*** -4054.0*** 6924.0*** 3508.6*** 2234.7*** 
 (-21.86) (19.76) (-15.12) (3.88) (7.35) (4.43)    
       
activewell x year05 -998.4 -2883.8 21509.0*** 41860.1* -10883.7 -42526.5*   
 (-0.06) (-0.08) (3.82) (2.35) (-0.86) (-1.97)    
activewell x year10 18645.5** -39138.8** -5826.5*** 5963.7*** -4813.0 -3653.1    
 (2.68) (-2.89) (-4.50) (4.49) (-0.79) (-1.03)    
activewell x year16 13164.2* -20739.0* -516.9 -352.7 -9507.6 2348.9    
 (2.02) (-2.27) (-0.52) (-0.31) (-1.75) (0.72)    
       
horizontalwell x year05 -2490.2 78619.3 20635.1*** -20968.7 -44589.1** -39630.4*   
 (-0.13) (1.73) (3.39) (-0.69) (-2.89) (-2.29)    
horizontalwell x year10 -8698.5 -26993.8* -3878.5*** 1860.6 -2190.2 6082.9*   
 (-1.29) (-2.01) (-3.60) (1.56) (-0.36) (2.16)    
horizontalwell x year16 30256.3*** -15529.4 -179.5 1902.3* -15935.8** 1827.2    
 (4.96) (-1.85) (-0.24) (2.00) (-2.90) (0.73)    
Constant 840086.5*** 456487.8*** 41793.3*** 63146.1*** 438930.7*** 102952.6*** 
 (148.14) (56.90) (29.12) (8.23) (96.60) (25.92)    
Observations 122554 122554 122554 64758 81978 122554    
Number of parcels 17,972 17,971 17,972 14,217 16,769 17,972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The research presented in this dissertation uncovered several important aspects of valuing, 
acquiring and managing ecosystem services. However, there remains several other aspects that 
need to be explored to make this research more applicable for conservation field practitioners. 
  The first essay implemented the use of a novel solicitation approach, an Individualized 
Price Auction (IPA), which was initially developed using the restoration of seagrass in coastal 
Virginia (Smith, 2012; Smith & Swallow, 2013). Our implementation of the IPA process using 
Bobolink habitat as the ES of interest shows that a similar approach could be used for other ES 
contexts where donor contributions can be directly linked to a specific outcome. Donors in the 
Bobolink market supported the overall idea of IPA, but results showed that some were initially 
reluctant to incur the mental or time cost of understanding the IPA mechanism, which was 
unfamiliar to them as opposed to a standard solicitation approach used by fundraising 
organizations. Therefore, even if the IPA mechanism enabled conservation agents to capture 
consumer benefits based on their own valuation of a specific good, it reduced participation because 
(potentially) of the perceived complexity of the mechanism. Further research needs to provide 
estimated donations from the IPA approach and the standard approach, after controlling from 
reduced participation, to help conservation agents select the approach with the highest donations. 
An important challenge that emerges from this research is to design mechanisms to capture the full 
willingness to pay of the contributors but at the same time make it simple enough so as not to lose 
revenue from diminished participation.  
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 The second essay explored the cost-effectiveness of a uniform price auction with screening 
criteria using an induced value lab experiment. Our simple implementation of the screening 
auction with limited resources did not fully uncover the true potential of the auction outcome. Our 
results showed that the screening auction has the potential to acquire more units compared to a 
uniform price auction and a discriminatory auction for a given budget. In hindsight, limiting the 
experiment to a group of 10 subjects each session may have magnified the problem of the 
discreteness of the supply curve. Setting the winning price based solely on the “first rejected offer” 
rule did not always lead to budget exhaustion and using a maximization algorithm derived 
originally for continuous units on the discrete units did not always lead to the maximum number 
of units for the screening auction. Future research needs to incorporate these two important aspects 
to compare the cost-effectiveness of the screening auction with the more familiar uniform price 
auction and discriminatory auction. Also, more research is needed to explore the influence of the 
group size on the performance of the screening auction.  
 The third essay was motivated by Allred et al. (2015) who estimated a huge loss of biomass 
from cropland and rangeland between 2000 – 2012 due to oil and gas development activities in the 
central North America, while we find very minimal reduction in grassland in North Dakota 
between 1997 – 2016. One possibility of this departure could be that the CDL (Cropland Data 
Layer) data used in our research may not be able to detect the land use and landcover change as 
well as the NPP (Net Primary Production) data used by Allred et al. (2015). Future research needs 
to explore the NPP data using the same econometric methodology used in our research to get a 
better comparison of the estimates from the two studies. Another point that is overlooked in both 
Allred et al. (2015) and our research is the fact that landowners are required by law to reclaim the 
drilling sites. Therefore, even if drilling leads to changes in the landuse and landcover types in the 
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short run, the long run estimates might differ significantly after controlling for reclaimed land. 
Future research should incorporate reclamation information to get the true impact of drilling on 
landuse and landcover change in the long run.  
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